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Introduction
One year ago Abiy Ahmed Ali, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister, 
was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to achieve 
peace with Eritrea. At the time this Report is going to press, 
his national army had just launched a war on the rebellious 
administration of the key Tigray regional state. Both events drew 
the attention of the wider public to the Horn of Africa, a far 
too often neglected region that has recently shown remarkable 
political and economic dynamism.
In-between the two abovementioned events in Ethiopia, 
the coronavirus emergency struck the world, and the Horn 
as well. This happened somewhat belatedly to the rest of the 
world, and with far lower numbers. Still, it eventually affected 
the Horn too, with devastating effects. Slowly yet inexorably, 
the spread of the pandemic highlighted the fragility of local 
health systems, ill prepared to cope with a novel disease. The 
pandemic fuelled a rise in extreme poverty, pushing millions to 
the brink of starvation in an insecure social environment where 
informal labour is the rule, and lockdowns are unsustainable 
measures. It worsened the economic vulnerability of states like 
Eritrea, Somalia, and Djibouti while challenging the soundness 
of the development model in Ethiopia, which just a few years 
back stood firmly among the world’s top countries for GDP 
growth. The political impact of the pandemic has proved just 
as serious. A long-awaited election, deemed a milestone for 
the consolidation of political openings in Ethiopia, has been 
postponed until next year. Faced with the risk of an uncontrolled 
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spread of the virus, authorities have put the electoral process on 
hold, thus fanning the flames of regional and ethnic tensions, 
including those in Tigray.
In short, Covid-19 has disrupted the lives of Ethiopians, 
Somalis, Djiboutian and Eritreans just as it has ours. 
Nevertheless, ongoing political processes in one of the most 
dynamic regions of the continent have not halted. The area 
continues to garner geostrategic interest from external actors, 
global powers (suffice it to mention China, with Xi Jinping’s 
Maritime Silk Road plans stretching toward the Horn) and 
medium-size powers with strong ambitions like the Gulf states. 
Against the backdrop of the global pandemic, then, this 
ISPI Report examines the scale of political, social, economic 
and security dynamics across the Horn of Africa, and strives 
to understand how far the changes currently under way may 
impact Europe’s political strategy and Italy’s national interests 
in a region that has always been identified as the main priority 
of our Africa policy. The Report does so by taking an original 
approach: it reverses the established order of priorities with 
which one normally looks at the Horn’s balance of power. 
Djibouti and Eritrea, always considered two minor players, 
have been given centre stage in the volume’s structure in order 
to stress their often overlooked importance in the regional 
system; Somalia and Ethiopia, to which much of the analysts’ 
attention is usually addressed, this time close the circle.  
In the first chapter, Giovanni Carbone provides a regional 
overview. He outlines the main developments shaping the 
region’s power structure, which historically revolves around 
Ethiopia, and discusses the recent events that have contributed 
most to making the Horn of Africa a dynamic, strategically 
relevant and potentially crucial area in the global landscape. 
The reason for the region’s importance is crystal clear. On the 
one hand, it is afflicted by the most serious causes of instability 
on the continent, from direct exposure to the effects of climate 
change that are exacerbating ecological disasters, droughts and 
famines, to food insecurity that deprives local communities of 
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their livelihoods; from regional and international migration 
flows that affect local communities, to acts of Jihadi terrorism 
(in Somalia and beyond). On the other hand, the region is 
full of opportunities in terms of potential markets, a nascent 
industrial sector, and strategic maritime hotspots in an area 
through which 9% of the world’s seaborne-traded oil flows. 
Such opportunities are limited in a time of pandemic, of course, 
but they are still there, waiting to be seized.
The impact of the Covid-19 crisis on the Horn of Africa 
has been examined by D’Alessandro, Zemelak and Putoto, 
who cast an experienced and well-informed gaze on what the 
ongoing emergency represents in terms of public health, from 
the spread of the virus to vulnerabilities in local response, and 
their social consequences. Their findings apply particularly to 
Ethiopia. The Ethiopian government acted in a timely manner 
to curb the spread of the pandemic, through the adoption of 
containment measures well in advance of many other African 
states. During the most acute phases of the emergency, Prime 
Minister Abiy played a pivotal role on the continent: he 
coordinated the institutional response to the crisis while urging 
– through an appeal published in the columns of the Financial 
Times – for a coherent and effective economic intervention by 
the international community to support Africa. As stressed by 
the authors, the effects of the pandemic threaten to wipe out 
nearly two decades of progress in the fight against poverty in 
Ethiopia and the rest of the region, where the most vulnerable 
social groups, first and foremost some two million internally 
displaced persons, are set to pay the highest price.
David Styan shifts the spotlight on Djibouti, the tiniest state 
in the region and one of the poorest in Africa. Overlooking the 
Bab el-Mandeb Strait that separates the Red Sea from the Gulf 
of Aden, its position makes it a critical strategic hub. Djibouti 
has leveraged this to acquire crucial geopolitical relevance in the 
international system. It notoriously hosts a number of foreign 
military facilities – among them China’s first overseas military 
base – and represents the main outlet to the sea for its regional 
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neighbour and hegemon, Ethiopia. Control over the country’s 
harbours has been feeding fierce competition among external 
powers, while Beijing’s growing influence has exacerbated 
Djibouti’s outstanding debt exposure to China.
Eritrea has long been considered Africa’s “North Korea”, 
an “island” in the sea of international relations, and both 
politically and economically isolated. In chapter four, Michael 
Woldemariam explains how Isaias Afewerki’s Eritrea seems to 
have embarked on a path of gradual opening to the outside 
world. As with Djibouti, it is a strategically relevant outpost for 
external actors eager to control commercial routes along the Red 
Sea. The peace deal with Ethiopia – boosted by Abiy Ahmed’s 
rise to power in Addis Ababa – was indeed the most obvious 
manifestation of this process, providing the international 
community with a concrete sign of change. However, despite 
progress made in this respect, domestically, Eritrea still has a 
long way to go. Pushing young Eritreans to flee the country due 
to harsh repression and indefinite military conscription, Isaias’ 
authoritarianism remains to date the most contentious obstacle 
to a complete normalization of Eritrea’s international relations.
Afyare Elmi and Abdi Hersi investigate Somalia in 
chapter five. A prime example of a failed state since the early 
1990s, Somalia is now struggling to rebuild its political and 
institutional systems, while the activities of al-Shabaab’s jihadi 
militants in the south and centrifugal forces in Somaliland and 
Puntland hinder the development of state-building. Here, as 
elsewhere in the Horn, the presence of external actors is far from 
negligible. Italy too is involved in the country, participating 
in training missions for national armed forces and counter-
piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. A major role is played 
by Turkey, who have exerted a pervasive influence in Somalia 
for some twenty years, while the UAE’s interests here project 
the geopolitical rivalry between the two middle-eastern powers. 
Last, but surely not least, Ethiopia. A regional giant and 
would-be continental leader, Ethiopia is examined here by 
Aleksi Ylönen and Alexander Meckelburg. Since coming to 
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power in April 2018, Abiy has dramatically changed the face 
of the country, through economic liberalisation programmes 
and political openness, even if some of his pledges are still 
at an embryonic stage. As pointed out by the authors, the 
most spectacular shift has been Ethiopia’s rising political and 
diplomatic protagonism well beyond regional borders. Of 
course, gaping wounds and deep rifts remain, in a state marked 
by ethnic and regional factionalisms, as well as local élites’ 
ambitions for power. The current conflict against TPLF forces in 
Tigray, and the direct military involvement of Eritrea, threatens 
to greatly increase violence and instability in the region. On the 
international stage, the dispute over the filling and operation of 
the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) – which could 
have a severe impact on Egypt’s and Sudan’s capacity to exploit 
the Nile waters – risks attaining explosive proportions. In this 
respect, Donald Trump’s stance and statements are not going 
to help the situation: he has addressed the issue in his own 
way, warning about a likely military intervention by Egypt to 
destroy the dam and preserve its vital interests in the Nile river. 
To conclude, despite all the disruptions that the pandemic 
has brought to the region, ongoing political processes are 
transforming the Horn of Africa and making it increasingly 
central in this ever more interconnected world. In a nutshell, 
the pandemic has slowed down change, but has not stopped 
it. Today the Horn of Africa is still a thorny area to deal with, 
one that combines new and unresolved risks of conflict and 
human suffering with reasons for hope for more stability and 
prosperity.
Paolo Magri
ISPI Executive Vice President
1.  A New Horn. Still Thorny
Giovanni Carbone
The Horn of Africa at the Beginning of the 2020s
The Horn of Africa (HoA) is going through a delicate time of 
change, both actual and potential. Processes that originated in 
Ethiopia have been shaking the country while also generating 
repercussions across the region at large, a reflection of both Addis 
Ababa’s heavyweight role as well as of the deep interconnections 
that historically characterise states and societies in the area. 
After a long period during which regional developments 
were essentially shaped by the legacy of the 1991 events – if 
definitely not without a rich texture of new and unpredictable 
occurrences ever since – the Ethiopian leadership transition 
of 2018 opened up an entirely new phase, dense with both 
promise and uncertainty. Where this new phase will lead to is 
bound to affect – and to be affected by – not only domestic 
and regional dynamics, but also the international relations of a 
region whose strategic relevance is like no other’s in Africa.
A number of quite extraordinary features have long made the 
Horn an outstanding region in the continent and beyond. A 
land straddling Africa, the Middle East and Asia, it shapes a key 
shipping route between Asia and Europe – the shortest, cheapest 
and busiest – via the Indian Ocean, the Gulf of Aden, the Bab 
el-Mandeb Strait and through the Red Sea, all the way to the 
Suez Canal, whose opening, one hundred and fifty years ago, 
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had crucially increased the importance of this sea lane. A naval 
itinerary China’s Maritime Silk Road initiative is currently adding 
extra relevance to. But the region’s geographic location also makes 
the Horn a major access gate to African markets in the Eastern 
part of the continent and further inland, for Asian and Arab 
states in particular, prompting developments in a wide range of 
sectors, from agriculture to industrial de-localisation, from ports 
and railway facilities to ICT and submarine cable connectivity.1 
In addition, proximity to multiple crisis scenarios – notably 
jihadism in Somalia, the Yemeni civil war, and piracy in the 
Indian Ocean (the latter drastically declined due to international 
patrolling) – raises external interests and stakes in what goes on in 
the area and along its coasts. Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies, for 
example, see Eritrea and other Horn countries as key partners in 
ensuring control and security on the Western side of the Arabian 
peninsula, particularly with regard to the Saudi-led intervention 
in Yemen. Similarly, Ethiopians are the United States’ established 
regional ally in countering Somali armed fundamentalism. Thus, 
complex local developments and growing international attention 
make this a region of great dynamism that demands constant 
effort to monitor, analyse and understand it. 
The Horn of Africa is a roughly triangle-shaped peninsula 
that primarily consists of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, and 
Djibouti. Sudan is at times added to the four, as are on 
occasions Kenya, Uganda and South Sudan within a “Greater 
Horn of Africa” notion. The eight are the members of IGAD 
– the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development –, the 
sub-regional organisation officially-recognised by the African 
Union and tasked with addressing common issues in three 
key priority areas, namely food security and environmental 
protection; economic cooperation, regional integration and 
social development; peace and security – a short inventory of 
the many deep, structural challenges the region faces.
1 See, for example, Oxford Business Group, “Djibouti to utilise geostrategic location 
to develop ICT connectivity hub”, 2016.
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In substantial tracts of the HoA, development progress 
has long been limited, with today’s living conditions in some 
countries arguably worse than they were in the past, particularly 
for war-torn Somalia and reclusive Eritrea. Food security remains 
an issue across the area, partly because the latter is especially 
vulnerable to substantial climatic and environmental threats. 
Worldwide, the last two officially-declared famines occurred in 
this area (Somalia in 2011 and South Sudan in 2017), which is 
also often subject to flooding and, in 2020, saw the vegetation, 
agriculture and pasture land of vast zones ravaged by the worst 
locust infestation in 70 years. Meanwhile, the population has 
been rising fast, along with urbanisation processes, increasing 
the pressure on land and water resources and feeding into social 
tensions, particularly in Ethiopia, a country of over 110 million 
people and by far the region’s demographic giant. Primarily 
driven by limited economic prospects, political repression 
and instability, contemporary migration from the Horn has 
also been very substantial – north-eastbound towards Arab 
countries, northbound towards north Africa and Europe, and 
southbound towards South Africa. Finally, domestic tensions 
between different groups and communities, and transnational 
ones between states and nationalities, have historically 
crisscrossed the entire Horn, frequently escalating into inter- 
and intra-state conflicts.
As much as its countries are the prized target of external 
attention, the overarching feature distinguishing the Horn 
from much of the rest of Africa is the prevalence of regional 
dynamics – largely drawing from past events and historical 
patterns – over pressures originating from outside the region, 
with competition for state territories and boundaries more 
intense than anywhere else on the continent. The Horn hosts 
the one non-colonised African country – Ethiopia, which was 
able to defeat the Italians in 1896 and was only briefly occupied 
by them some forty years later – as well as sub-Saharan Africa’s 
only large, ‘classic’ interstate wars for territorial annexation 
(between Ethiopia and Somalia in the late 1970s and between 
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Ethiopia and Eritrea in the late 1990s). It is also home to the 
only case of a fully collapsed state (Somalia) and the first case 
of successful secession on the continent (Eritrea, with the only 
other one not far away, namely South Sudan).
Numerous motives thus make the Horn’s evolving scenario 
relevant beyond the region as such, both as a key area for Africa’s 
development and stability as well as for international trade and 
geopolitics.
Post-1991 Political “Order”
The beginning of the 1990s was a revolutionary, defining 
moment for the politics and development of the contemporary 
Horn of Africa.2 The end of the Cold War coincided with a 
time of major political destabilisation and fragmentation, 
including state reconfigurations and regime changes, as well as 
the emergence of entirely new regional and external relations in 
a context that, following Soviet disengagement and America’s 
loss of interest, initially saw the relevance of the HoA decline.
In Ethiopia, Mengistu Haile Mariam’s Derg regime, in 
power since 1974, had been weakened during the 1980s by the 
military defeats suffered at the hands of the Eritrean People’s 
Liberation Front (EPLF), by the end of Soviet support, and by 
two successive famines. It was eventually brought down on 28 
May 1991 as a result of parallel insurgencies by the EPLF and 
the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The regime that 
was then established under the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) – an umbrella organisation for a 
Tigrayan-led coalition – turned out to be one of Africa’s most 
successful development stories of the past thirty years – with 
annual growth rates to the tune of 9% for the entire 2000-2019 
period – if long criticised for only allowing a strictly-controlled 
2 Cf. M. Guglielmo, Il Corno d’Africa. Eritrea, Etiopia, Somalia, Bologna, Il Mulino, 
2013; and C. Clapham, Horn of Africa. State formation and decay, New York-
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017.
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opening up of the political sphere. Economic progress was 
not primarily driven by any mineral or energy resource 
wealth, but from the firm implementation of a pragmatic, 
hybrid development model for which comparisons have often 
been drawn with Asia’s “developmental states”. Relying on 
an established tradition of functioning state institutions and 
bureaucracy as well as on an ethnic federal set up as the chosen 
strategy to address its complex domestic diversity,3 the new 
government in Addis Ababa retained not only monopolistic 
control of key economic sectors – notably energy, telecoms, 
logistics and airlines – but formal ownership of the country’s 
land too. The latter also aimed to limit speculation on land and 
the related risk that, if dispossessed of land, Ethiopia’s massive 
and fast-growing rural population would be driven towards 
urban centres at an unsustainable pace. Reviving agriculture 
and agricultural exports by supporting both small farmers, 
particularly in the highlands, and large commercial enterprises in 
the lowlands was central to the regime’s strategy of Agricultural 
Development-Led Industrialisation (ADLI). Large investments 
were meanwhile undertaken to develop Ethiopia’s physical 
infrastructure, particularly the transportation network (roads 
and railways), as well as industrial parks and energy plants.4 The 
strategies adopted essentially paid off. Besides the impressive 
national growth rates, absolute poverty was also dramatically 
reduced, from about half of the population in 1995-1996 to 
a quarter of it twenty years later, in 2015-2016.5 The fight 
against destitution has been a constant concern and a priority 
in the national budget, as manifest in efforts to promote food 
security as well as health and education. Overall, the EPRDF 
was able to move beyond its Marxist roots and, while retaining 
3 C. Clapham (2017), pp. 65 ff.
4 J. Mosley, Ethiopia’s transition: implications for the Horn of Africa and Red Sea 
region, SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security, 2020/5, March 2020, pp. 9ff.
5 T. Woldehanna and M. Araya, “Poverty and inequality in Ethiopia, 1995-1996 and 
2015-2016”, in F. Cheru, C. Cramer and A. Oqubay (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of 
the Ethiopian economy, New York-Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2019.
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the hegemonic role of a vanguard party firmly led by Meles 
Zenawi, who managed to assert his leadership in the 1990s 
and to consolidate it in the subsequent decade, to adopt a 
pragmatic and adaptable approach towards both domestic as 
well as external issues.
The emergence of a new Ethiopia went hand in hand with 
the birth of Eritrea. The coastal region had been annexed to 
Ethiopia in 1962, putting an end to ten years of “federation”, 
which spurred the creation of armed liberation movements. 
Isaias Afwerki’s Eritrean People’s Liberation Front ultimately 
came to control the region’s territory and, with the collapse of 
the Derg regime in Addis Ababa, set up a new, separate state in 
1991 that formally became independent via a 1993 referendum. 
Despite a relatively more promising beginning, Isaias’s regime 
saw a gradual deterioration in relations with Ethiopia. This 
escalated into fully-fledged war – independent Africa’s worst 
international conflict based on death toll – between 1998 and 
2000. The end of the war did not imply a normalisation of Ethio-
Eritrean relations, rather the opposite. The strains between 
the Horn’s largest state and its comparatively tiny neighbour 
remained and dragged on for twenty years. Eritreans were the 
main casualties. While Ethiopia aptly manoeuvred to have 
Asmara internationally isolated – including by twice managing 
to have the UN impose sanctions on it – Isaias’ regime used the 
rhetoric of an external existential threat to build an increasingly 
secluded and cruel state. A period of economic fragility and 
declining prospects ensued, resulting in massive flows of people 
fleeing the country’s dire political and socioeconomic living 
conditions, year after year. 
Several developments in contemporary Somalia  have been 
a quintessential denial of Africa’s post-colonial expectations. 
Long seen as one of the most viable states on the continent 
as the vast majority of the population shares a language, 
religion and lifestyle, the country’s institutions and society 
have actually fragmented since the 1980s, following armed 
reactions to Siad Barre’s repressive and discriminatory regime. 
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Somali’s traditional clan-based structure and relations did not 
prove a sound constitutive element on which to build, as they 
ultimately nurtured the ever evolving nature of the country’s 
identities and identity politics.6 Siad himself fled the capital 
Mogadishu at the beginning of 1990, notoriously leaving the 
country with no central government at all. One of sub-Saharan 
Africa’s most ambitious independent nations – the only one 
that renounced a continental agreement to accept and stick 
to inherited colonial borders, and openly claimed parts of 
Ethiopian, Kenyan and Djiboutian land – was turned into the 
most classic case of a failed state. Despite significant progress, 
it has essentially remained so ever since. The long process of 
reconstructing a national government and infrastructure was 
not simply challenged by breakaway Somaliland in the north-
west, but, over the past fifteen years or so, primarily by the 
al-Shabaab militias operating at the opposite extreme of the 
country’s territory. In the central and southern regions, jihadism 
has proven a successful mobilisation tool, cutting across clan 
affiliations and appealing to Somali nationalist sentiment and 
common Islamic identity as a response to external interference. 
In a clan-structured society dominated by the elderly, a promise 
of social change have proven particularly attractive to the youth. 
The Federal Government of Somalia, set up in accordance 
with the 2012 Constitution and led by a president indirectly-
elected via a byzantine, clan-based procedure – currently 
Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed “Farmajo” –, still struggles to 
transform its control of the capital and other major towns into 
a stable and functioning presence across substantial tracts of the 
national territory. Backing by the African Union’s 20,000-strong 
AMISOM mission, Ethiopian and Kenyan troops, alongside a 
growing string of drone strikes by the US, has not been enough 
to terminate the conflict with the jihadists and restore nation-
wide stability in Somalia.
6 D. Laitin and D. Posner, The implications of constructivism for constructing ethnic 
fractionalization indices, APSA-CP, Winter, 2001, p. 13-17.
Africa’s Thorny Horn20
A little-known country outside the region, Djibouti has seen 
its international geopolitical relevance escalate over the past 
two decades. The smallest among the Horn of Africa’s states 
is also the most strategically located. A potential gatekeeper 
and launchpad, it lies both where the waters of the Red Sea 
and the Gulf of Aden meet – on the narrow Bab-al-Mandeb 
Strait – as well as where the sub-Saharan landmass gets closest 
to the Arabian Peninsula and thus the Middle East. It is this 
position that led to a dramatic surge in international attention 
in Djibouti, transforming it into a veritable military hub (see 
below) while also emphasising the key role of its port facilities 
for serving global and continental trade routes. Besides its 
outward orientation, however, the country ruled by Ismaïl 
Omar Guelleh for over two decades retains innate and dense 
relations with all its neighbours – Djibouti shares borders and 
ethnic ties with Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somaliland/Somalia – in 
what remains an unstable region.
International Geopolitical Competition in the Horn
The geostrategic relevance of the HoA is primarily structural, 
rather than a new or recent phenomenon. Yet, since the turn of 
the millennium both international and African developments 
greatly raised external interest in the region. Nothing illustrates 
this better than the crowded foreign military presence in 
Djibouti, continental Africa’s tiniest state after the Gambia and 
Lesotho and now a veritable hub where several non-African 
armed forces are stationed. Besides hosting a French military base 
since independence in 1977, the country today accommodates 
German and Spanish troops – also in the French base – but, 
most notably, the largest and only permanent US army barracks 
on the continent, set up in 2003 and also home to a smaller 
British unit, as well as, since 2017, China’s only foreign military 
base. Italy has troops too, contributing to the EU anti-piracy 
initiative in the Indian Ocean, as has Japan (aimed at countering 
pirates as well as responding to Beijing’s growing influence in 
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the area), whereas Saudi Arabia is in the process of establishing 
its own foothold. Geopolitical, commercial and military 
competition has driven the deployment of foreign soldiers to 
the region beyond Djibouti too, with Turkish troops stationed 
in Mogadishu, Israel in Eritrea, and the United Arab Emirates 
present both in Eritrea and Northern Somalia (in Boosaaso, in 
the Puntland semi-autonomous region).7
In the past, the HoA was a ground for confrontation, turns 
and twists of events between major international powers during 
the Cold war. The US was originally close to Hailé Selassié’s 
Ethiopia, only to gradually turn its back on the communist 
regime established after the emperor was ousted in the early 
1970s. At that point, Washington became closer to Somalia. 
The Soviet Union had meanwhile abandoned Mogadishu – 
which it had hitherto supported to gain influence and control 
over the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea maritime routes – to become 
a key ally of Addis Ababa in its response to Somalia’s invasion 
of Ethiopia’s Ogaden region. In the Horn, as across the rest of 
Africa, however, the end of the Cold War led to a decline in the 
region’s relevance.
Today, an expanding number of global, emerging and 
regional powers have become increasingly engaged in the region. 
The overarching concern is the protection of key, strategic sea 
trade routes in a historically turbulent area straddling distinct 
world regions. That Saudi Arabia was recently forced to 
temporarily suspend oil shipments through the Red Sea lane, 
following Houthi rebel attacks on two Saudi tankers, illustrates 
the point. Even before the Yemeni crisis began, however, 
international schemes had been launched to counter piracy in 
the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden, including the EU Naval 
Force (Operation Atalanta). Yet, as Alex de Wall noted, while 
“all players have a shared interest in maritime security … the 
mechanisms for coordination and implementation are lacking”.8
7 N. Melvin, The foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa, SIPRI Background 
papers, April 2019.
8 A. de Waal, Horn of Africa and Red Sea Synthesis Paper, Conflict Research Program, 
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China’s Maritime Silk Road initiative further increased 
the strategic relevance of the Horn of Africa region. Beijing, 
for whom Eastern Africa represents a natural entry point to 
the continent, aims at ensuring privileged access to port 
facilities along the coast for merchant vessels flying its flag. 
But landlocked Ethiopia is also very much part of the picture, 
with China having developed close economic and diplomatic 
ties with the HoA’s colossus and providing it with substantial 
financing for strategic infrastructure, particularly the new 
Addis-Djibouti railway and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance 
Dam currently under construction on the Blue Nile. Energy 
resources are an additional inducement. The HoA region is not 
currently a major area of origin for oil and natural gas supplies. 
But important reserves have been discovered in the Ogaden 
region, with the gradual stabilisation of the area meaning the 
prospect of extraction and commercial exploitation is nearer, 
again with China already on board. Financial involvement in 
strengthening regional infrastructure and resource potential has 
come under scrutiny of late for fear that large borrowing on the 
part of African governments, should the latter at some point 
no longer be able to meet their repayments obligations, may 
leave them and their newly built transport, energy or mineral 
infrastructure prey to Chinese control and pressure.
The region’s closeness to the Middle East has exposed its 
countries to the goals of wealthy Gulf states, driven, on the 
one hand, by a desire to diversify their national economies 
away from oil and to improve food security, and, on the other 
hand, by an effort to expand their political influence in a 
nearby and increasingly relevant area. They have thus grown 
prominent among investors in the Horn over the last ten years 
or so. Industrial and agribusiness ventures, alongside large land 
acquisitions, have been pursued by many Arab states. Sudan, 
historically closely linked to them, has been singled out as a 
major target. The reverberation of Middle Eastern rivalries into 
London School of Economics, 2017, p. 13.
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the Horn of Africa has been a growing feature of the external 
presence in the region, pitting the likes of Saudi Arabia and its 
Arab partners against Iran (the latter, on the defensive, lost its 
previous allies of Eritrea and Sudan) but also the so-called Arab 
Quartet (the Saudis, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt) against Qatar, 
accused of standing too close to Iran and the jihadists. Similarly, 
Turkey – which gained a solid foothold in Somalia9 – and Israel 
have also joined the ranks of those drawn to the area with the 
aim of earning influence in the region. Egypt, on the other 
hand, stands as a case apart. Bordering the region, it has a vital 
interest in the Horn as the source of the Blue Nile, one of the 
two main tributaries to the river on whose waters the country’s 
population and economy so entirely depend. A dispute about 
the filling of the new Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which 
grants Ethiopians control over the downstream flow of water, 
has heightened tensions and caused increasing wars of words 
between Addis Ababa and Cairo, with international mediation 
efforts failing to help the two strike a compromise thus far.
Besides geographic, economic and political drivers, a human 
mobility factor is at play too. Migration flows originating 
from the region have become a major concern for European 
nations (as well as for some more nearby states, including South 
Africa). While, in recent years, migrant routes from West Africa 
via the Western Sahel have attracted the lion’s share of media 
attention, large numbers of Africans hailing from the Horn 
have crossed the Sahara to reach the southern shores of the 
Mediterranean Sea via Sudan and then Egypt or Libya. Middle 
Eastern countries themselves are also major destinations for 
HoA migration, although, on the whole, they respond to it with 
relatively more open approaches. Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia and 
Eritrea all traditionally have large diasporas. The European 
Union set up an EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative 
(the Khartoum Process) to bring together origin, transit and 
9 B.J. Cannon and F. Donelli, Involvement in the Release of Silvia Romano in 
Somalia, ISPI, 26 May 2020.
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destination countries to cooperatively address migration-related 
issues. The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, established 
at the Valletta Summit on Migration in 2015, devolved some 
€1.9 billion to humanitarian and development projects in the 
Horn of Africa region to improve local conditions so as to limit 
migration. 
Despite relations with non-African nations often including 
asymmetric elements, Horn of Africa countries have, to different 
degrees, repeatedly shown they want their own agendas to be 
part of the process. At least for a time, for example, Eritrea and 
Sudan exploited external rivalries to hire port facilities or even 
their own troops – notably with regard to the war in Yemen 
– with a view to gaining external support from Saudi Arabia 
and circumventing international isolation. The very fact the 
2018 peace deal between Ethiopia and Eritrea was officially 
signed in Riyadh testifies to the close relations between Asmara 
and the Saudi regime. In Somalia, Northern regions aiming at 
distancing themselves from Mogadishu have worked towards 
obtaining external sponsorships. Ethiopia, on the other hand, 
has often travelled a path of neutrality, one of its major mid-
term goals being the opening of alternative trade routes to the 
sea – via Berbera in Somaliland and Assab in Eritrea – that 
would reduce its heavy reliance on the port of Djibouti. 
Another Turning Point for the Region? 
The Changes Ignited in 2018
Abiy Ahmed’s rise to power in Ethiopia was a surprising turn 
in a complex rebalancing of the political scenario that had 
dominated the country for the better part of three decades. 
What over time had asserted itself as the pivotal element of 
that scenario – i.e. Meles’ leadership – vanished with the Prime 
Minister’s sudden death in 2012. Political continuity itself 
had begun to be questioned with the choice of Hailemariam 
Desalegn as a new, non-Tigrayan head of government, stripping 
the ethnic minority that was closely identified with Ethiopia’s 
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post-1991 regime of formal control over the reins of power. The 
move was forced upon the Tigrayan ruling elite by the need to 
respond to growing unrest among key sections of the Ethiopian 
populace who had grown increasingly frustrated as they felt 
essentially excluded under the existing political settlement. 
Popular discontent, however, did not abate but rather spread 
further, particularly among the Oromos – the country’s largest 
community – with major protests taking place in both 2014-15 
and 2016-17. The confrontation did not seem to lead to any 
softening of the regime, as a state of emergency was declared 
that would last ten months (October 2016 to August 2017) 
and result in a crackdown and some 11,000 arrests. A second 
state of emergency followed in the first half of 2018. Yet, the 
fact that demonstrations had led the government to abandon 
the controversial Addis Ababa Master Plan – a scheme meant to 
expand the capital territory and seen by the Oromos as a Tigrayan 
and Amhara plot that would leave local farmers dispossessed 
of their land – was not simply unusual. As observers pointed 
out, the “rejection of official plans by government members is 
unprecedented in Ethiopia. It is … historic, as it could be seen 
as acknowledging the legitimacy of the protests”.10
The deteriorating situation convinced Hailemariam to resign 
to open the way for a different political solution. Few, however, 
envisaged this would lead to a figure like Abiy Ahmed taking 
over. The country’s first-ever Oromo Prime Minister emerged as 
the result of the Oromo and Amhara components of the ruling 
EPRDF coalescing in a move aimed at dismantling Tigrayan 
control of the dominant alliance. 
Abiy went further as he quickly moved not only to usher in 
a series of wide-ranging political and economic reforms, but 
also to dissolve the EPRDF itself and replace it with a new 
Prosperity Party – with the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front 
opting for staying out of it – as a platform to run in the election 
10 “Ethiopia cancels Addis Ababa master plan after Oromo protests”, BBC News, 
www.bbc.com, 18 January 2016
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scheduled for 2020, which he promised would be the country’s 
first free and fair election. While political space for dissent 
was dramatically expanded, it did not prevent a new wave of 
protests from emerging in 2018 and 2019, with a mixture of 
community clashes and centrifugal demands for the creation 
of new ethnic regions. A failed coup in the Amhara regional 
state, in 2019, was a further warning of the risks of a weakening 
power at the centre. Domestic unrest thus led Abiy to make 
more assertive moves, apparently in line with the idea that 
Ethiopia, in the words used by an observer half a century ago, 
is “a ‘tough-man system’. At every level, and most of all in the 
national central government, it depends on powerful authority 
figures … In times of imperial weakness, the different elements 
in the state immediately start to drift apart ... There are indeed 
roots of national unity … but a powerful man at the top is 
needed to draw on them”.11 Persisting structural challenges add 
to the complex evolution of Ethiopia’s internal politics, notably 
huge demographic pressures and key environmental challenges. 
In its external relations too, the impact of China’s slowdown 
is still to be fully assessed, and growing national debt has also 
raised concerns. 
Ethiopia’s leadership transition acquired crucial regional 
importance the very moment Abiy reached out to Eritrea to 
strike a peace deal, an initiative that set the entire Horn of 
Africa on a new course, albeit undoubtedly neither a trouble-
free nor a predetermined one. The détente in Ethiopia-Eritrea 
relations after two decades of latent war – tensions have eased 
enormously, although the border issue has not been fully 
normalised – was bound to generate spill-over effects across the 
region, notably in terms of a possibly broader stabilisation of the 
Horn and of new potential for regional economic integration, 
both formal and informal. 
11 C. Clapham, “Imperial leadership in Ethiopia”, African Affairs, vol. 68, no. 271, 
1969, p. 111.
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Addis Ababa itself was quick to induce the Ogaden National 
Liberation Front (ONLF), up to that point backed by Eritrea 
itself, into ending a long rebellion in the country’s Somali-
inhabited South-eastern region. Abiy also assumed a high-
profile mediatory role across the region, with involvement in 
mediation between Eritrea and Djibouti, Kenya and Somalia, 
as well as in peace talks between South Sudan’s warring factions 
and in domestic negotiations in post-Bashir Sudan. 
Eritrea is the country most directly affected by domestic 
changes in Ethiopia. United Nations sanctions were lifted in 
late 2018 after almost a decade. To the extent that it seizes 
the opportunity to adapt its course and end its international 
isolation, the small coastal state stands to gain both politically 
and economically. Eritrea and its ports are a natural export 
and import transit zone for the vast and expanding Ethiopian 
market. Asmara also agreed with Djibouti to normalise 
diplomatic relations that had soured since 2008 due to a border 
dispute. Sudan, on its part, reopened the frontier with Eritrea, 
which had been sealed in 2018 to stop arms trafficking. But 
any economic advances will require Asmara to directly address 
a number of domestic issues, including freeing up the extensive 
economic and human resources still devoted to the country’s 
defence and removing the constraints that make it the second-
worst business environment in the world (only followed by 
Somalia).12
Authorities in Mogadishu also stand to benefit from regional 
developments in terms of their efforts to stabilise Somalia 
and expand government control over the national territory. 
The ample al-Shabaab presence continues to feed the region’s 
most prominent crisis. Since the turn of the millennium, 
the country has become the ground for a proxy war between 
Addis Ababa and Asmara, with the former backing the fragile 
central government, including through participation in the 
African Union’s AMISOM mission, and the latter clandestinely 
12 See World Bank, Doing Business 2020, 2020.
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supporting al-Shabaab (which led the UN Security Council to 
impose sanctions on Eritrea). Following Ethiopia’s openings, 
it did not take long for Eritrea and Somalia to re-establish 
diplomatic relations for the first time in about twenty years. 
Isaias Afwerki’s first-ever visit to Mogadishu, in late 2018, 
testified to the new course between the two countries. Any 
progress in Somalia – home to jihadism and a key source of 
refugee flows, kidnappings and piracy in the region – would in 
turn have a broader stabilising effect across the HoA. A degree 
of stability in Somalia is also a near necessary condition for 
Ethiopia to exploit the recently-discovered oil and natural gas 
fields of the Calub and Hilala reserves, in the Ogaden region. 
That a new era has been opened is also reflected by the regular 
meetings held by the leaders of Ethiopia, Somalia and Eritrea 
since 2018, as they established an alliance aimed at fostering 
comprehensive trilateral cooperation on political, economic 
and security issues. The alliance itself may favour Eritrea’s return 
to IGAD after more than a decade, but it also raises questions 
about the relationship between the new grouping and the wider 
regional body.13
Horn of Africa in the Time of the Pandemic: 
2020 and Beyond
The Horn of Africa region, an area in which stability and 
democracy fared poorly for the better part of the post-
independence period, is going through a time of political 
transformation that was ignited by the domestic leadership 
transition in Addis Ababa. While the latter ushered in a phase 
of social and political uncertainty in Ethiopia – including the 
opening up of the political space and rising ethnic tensions 
– the Horn region as such appeared to embark on promising 
processes towards the normalisation and stabilisation of relations 
13 S.T. Demissie, Is another regional alliance what the Horn needs?, ISS Today, 
Institute for Security Studies, 24 March 2020.
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among the countries belonging to it. Then Coronavirus disease 
2019 (Covid-19) hit. In an area with a number of structural 
weaknesses – including endemic poverty, comparative state 
fragility, and challenging environmental conditions – the 
potential for the pandemic to become a most dangerous stress 
test for both domestic as well as regional dynamics is high. 
In spite of the initial doomsday expectations, in terms of 
official numbers, Covid-19 in the Horn has not reached the 
kind of diffusion and lethality shown elsewhere – at least for 
now. Numbers of cases and deaths are still relatively low when 
compared to hard-hit countries in other world regions. The 
extent to which this is the result of weak testing and reporting 
or of an actually more limited presence and impact on health 
of the virus partly remains an open question. In the Horn as 
in much of Eastern Africa, food security in 2020 has already 
suffered a hit due the locust invasion.
Besides the health and economic impact, however, the 
pandemic could have major implications for governance, 
security and politics. Governments have become more inward 
looking – their primary concerns being the social and economic 
impact of the Covid-19 emergency and the responses required 
to limit the spread of the virus and protect the most vulnerable 
sections of the population, including the need to implement 
lockdowns and other measures – with bilateral and regional 
meetings, diplomatic initiatives, and discussions within the 
Horn being delayed or placed on hold. Similarly, relations with 
international donors and multilateral organisations are also 
suffering a slowdown if not a standstill. 
Domestically too, the political price of Covid-19 could 
potentially be high. In Ethiopia, one major effect of Covid-19 
was the postponement of a key election. This immediately 
spurred further domestic political developments, with 
opposition parties ratcheting up the pressure to go to the polls 
and Abiy somehow caught between the need to legitimise his 
initiatives and rule (the mandate for MPs has formally exceeded 
the five years envisaged by the constitution, and the PM’s stay 
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in office was allowed to be extended by parliament) and the 
responsibility not to force through a vote in unsafe health 
conditions. Frustration and tension have grown, with violence 
ensuing. The stand-off with Tigrayan regional authorities, 
in particular, led the federal government to start a military 
intervention that risks igniting full-scale civil war. Anti-Abiy 
forces may try and seize this opportunity. Somalia followed suit: 
it abandoned plans for a definitive return to direct elections 
with universal suffrage – still difficult to arrange in a highly 
troubled and unstable country much of whose territory is 
hardly under government control – and postponed the entire 
multi-stage voting process for one year to 2021.
This Report digs into the recent developments in the Horn 
of Africa region, a traditionally highly dynamic area – and one 
of greatly increased international interest – where the turn of 
events was initially accelerated by Ethiopia’s 2018 domestic 
leadership transition, before it had to face new challenges due 
to the advent of the pandemic. The book starts out from this 
last topic, with a chapter framing and examining the impact 
of Covid-19 in the region. It then moves on to individually 
deal with each of the four core Horn of Africa countries. But it 
does so by inverting what would be a more conventional order. 
Djibouti and Eritrea are examined first, in an effort to place 
more attention on them too and to stress how minor players 
are highly relevant to the political evolution of a historically 
intertwined region. Attention finally shifts to Somalia and 
Ethiopia, that is, the two countries that remain, respectively, 
the most unsettled state in the area and the political, economic 
and social giant in the region.
2.  Covid-19 in the Horn: 
     Health and Social Impact 
Michele D’Alessandro, Zemelak A. Ayele, 
Giovanni Putoto
This chapter analyses the health and social impact of Covid-19 
in Africa and the Horn. The first part outlines the spread of the 
pandemic by giving some figures and trends at both continental 
and regional level, paying particular attention to some specific 
regional dynamics in terms of health, migration patterns and 
peace and security threats. The second part examines the health 
and social impact of Covid-19 by focusing on three core aspects: 
the direct impact of the virus on mortality rates, the indirect 
impact of Covid-19 on other health conditions and the socio-
economic consequences of the outbreak of coronavirus on the 
continent. The third part concentrates on the Ethiopian case by 
examining how the virus has impacted on the internal political, 
social and economic dynamics of the country. The fourth part 
analyses some key responses to Covid-19, first at health system 
level, and then in terms of regional and international initiatives 
to tackle the pandemic, before setting out the final conclusions.
The Spread of Covid-19 in Africa and the Horn 
On 14 February 2020, Africa confirmed its first coronavirus 
disease (Covid-19) case in Egypt. Since then, more than 1.1 
million cases have been reported and every country on the 
continent has officially recorded infections. As of 3 October 
Africa’s Thorny Horn32
2020, a cumulative total of 1,187,689 Covid-19 cases have been 
reported in the African region, with 36,222 deaths.1 Confirmed 
cases of Covid-19 in Africa have increased rapidly, following 
improved testing, in ten countries that account for about 88% 
of all reported Covid-19 cases in the African Region: South 
Africa, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Algeria, Ghana, Kenya, Cameroon, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Madagascar and Senegal. South Africa alone 
accounts for about 60% of all reported cases.2 However, the 
evolution of the pandemic on the African continent has been 
different compared to many other regions of the world. The 
exponential surge in cases that was expected to peak a few 
weeks after the outbreak, did not occur in Africa. Instead, 
many African countries are experiencing a gradual and quite 
diversified rise in Covid-19 cases, with different transmission 
patterns between and within countries.
According to the World Health Organization (WHO) and 
the Africa Centres for Disease Control (Africa CDC), new 
cases being reported in the last few weeks on the continent 
are apparently slowing down, with a total of 34,564 new 
confirmed Covid-19 cases and 1,173 new deaths reported 
from forty-five countries between 2 and 8 September 2020. 
This represents a 17% decrease in incidence cases as compared 
with the previous reporting period (from 26 August to 1 
September 2020).3 However, the Africa CDC warns that it 
is too early to say that the Covid-19 outbreak in Africa may 
have passed its peak, as many countries are still experiencing 
a sustained increase in cases, notably Morocco and Tunisia in 
North Africa, Namibia and Mozambique in Southern Africa 
and Ethiopia and Uganda in East Africa.4 Data is fast changing, 
1 World Health Organization (WHO), Covid-19 dashboard in the WHO African 
Region, October 2020.
2 Ibid.
3 World Health Organization (WHO), Covid-19 Situation update for the WHO 
African Region, External Situation Report 28, September 2020.
4   P. Mwai and C. Giles, “Coronavirus: Is the rate of growth in Africa slowing 
down?”, BBC News, 10 September 2020.
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and all these dynamics will definitely require further analysis.
With a population of roughly 170 million people (including 
Sudan), the Horn of Africa is home to some of Africa’s fastest 
growing economies on the continental scene, with Ethiopia 
often heading the table in the last ten years. Moreover, the 
historic peace agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia reached 
in 2018, the stabilisation efforts in Somalia, and the recent 
though intermittent peace negotiations between Sudan and 
South Sudan have raised hopes for a new era of political and 
security cooperation in the region. Despite this progress, 
however, the Horn of Africa remains one of the most fragile 
regions in the world, where weak security and state governance 
still undermine long-term development objectives.
The last decades have shown that the Horn of Africa has 
been one of the world’s most conflictual regions, with conflict 
dynamics caused and maintained by a wide range of underlying 
and interconnected factors.5 The internal conflict in Somalia, 
for instance, was the epicentre of a regional conflict with 
interdependencies and collateral effects in both Kenya and 
Ethiopia. The countries of the Horn of Africa thus share common 
challenges in terms of economic development, health, migration 
patterns, and peace and security threats. Unemployment, 
protracted conflicts, and environmental degradation are some of 
the key determinants that have shaken this region for decades, 
forcing many local communities to migrate either internally 
towards the cities or abroad towards neighbouring countries. 
At the end of 2019, 2.2 million South Sudanese refugees 
were hosted in bordering Uganda, Ethiopia and Kenya, while 
Somalia had 2.6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 
South Sudan 1.7 million.6 A further spread of Covid-19 in the 
region would place an additional burden on the already complex 
humanitarian situation, with devastating consequences.
5 P.D. Williams, Horn of Africa: Webs of conflict & Pathways to Peace, Washington, 
DC, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2011.
6 IOM (International Organization for Migration) Regional Office for the East and 
Horn of Africa, A Region on the Move Report, September 2019.
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Ethiopia and Sudan announced the first cases of Covid-19 
in the region on 13 March 2020. Somalia reported its first 
cases on 16 March and Djibouti on 18 March. Three days later, 
the first case in Eritrea was confirmed in Asmara, while on 5 
April 2020, the virus was confirmed to have reached South 
Sudan. As of 3 October 2020, Ethiopia has 76,988 cumulative 
cases, representing 6.5% of all the cases in the WHO Africa 
Region; Sudan has confirmed 13,653 positive cases, Djibouti 
5,417 cases, Somalia 3,593, South Sudan has recorded 2,715 
positive cases, and Eritrea 381 cumulative cases. These regional 
disparities in the number of Covid-19 cases and different 
incidence rates might be due to several causes, including access 
and reliability of health data, differences in epidemiological 
and population factors, testing capacities and criteria, as well 
as clinical and public health practices. Moreover, discrepancies 
in the modality of implementation of Covid-19 containment 
strategies across the region might have contributed to variations 
in incidence and current prevalence.7
In May, Djibouti and Somalia were the countries reporting 
the sharpest-rising trend of cases in the region, with Djibouti 
recording the highest prevalence on the continent at the end of 
April.8 Given the extensive cross-border movements through these 
countries to the entire region, both Somalia and Djibouti were 
key for the trajectory of the epidemic. In other countries such 
as South Sudan and Eritrea, the low number of detected cases 
might be linked to inadequate testing capacity or to the scarce 
availability of data, although Eritrea currently appears to have 
controlled the epidemic. The outbreak of Covid-19 in the Horn 
of Africa represents a tremendous challenge for the region, as it 
poses an additional and critical threat for already weak national 
7 M. Martini and M. Abdiker, Migration & Human Mobility: New & Old Challenges 
for Global Health Security & Public Health in East Africa and Horn of Africa in the 
Context of Covid-19, Situational Brief: Report on East Africa and Horn of Africa, 
Lancet Migration, 2020.
8 “Coronavirus surges in Djibouti as population ignores measures”, Al Jazeera, 24 
April 2020.
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health systems operating in fragile humanitarian contexts. Even 
if the Horn escapes a major Covid-19 outbreak, the economic 
and social impact of the virus is likely to be profound, and will 
soon reveal its effect on the economic and political progress that 
has been painstakingly achieved in recent years.
The Health and Social Impact of the Pandemic
As Covid-19 continues to spread throughout the globe, available 
data and trends related to the pandemic are changing, so the 
following considerations regarding the impacts of Covid-19 on 
the African continent will require further and more detailed 
analysis. This section outlines the health and social impact of 
Covid-19 by focusing on three key aspects: the direct impact of 
the virus on mortality rates, the indirect impact of Covid-19 on 
other health conditions and the socio-economic consequences 
of the outbreak of coronavirus on the continent. According 
to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 
between 300,000 and 3.3 million people in Africa could die 
as a direct result of Covid-19 infection. The transmission and 
mortality rate will depend on the effectiveness of mitigation 
and containment measures that should take into consideration 
specific susceptibility and vulnerability of African populations, 
including social structure, culture, and mobility patterns.9
In particular, specific susceptibilities and vulnerabilities of the 
African context may lead to considerably differentiated impacts. 
Susceptibility – defined as the sensitivity to spread and impact – 
is critical among African countries, as the majority of the urban 
population is concentrated in overcrowded slums, with poor 
access to household handwashing facilities.10 Vulnerability – 
defined as critical fragilities in Africa’s response – is also a key 
factor, as the health systems of countries in Africa are generally 
9 UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), Covid-19 in Africa Protecting 
Lives and Economies, June 2020.
10 Ibid.
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weaker, with lower ratios of hospital beds, Intensive Care Units 
(ICUs), and health professionals to its population. Africa has 
on average 1.8 hospital beds per 1,000 people, compared to 
5.98 in France.11
As of 3 October 2020, total Coronavirus deaths in the WHO 
African region amount to 36,222, of which about 6% are in the 
Horn, with 1,208 in Ethiopia, 836 in Sudan, 99 in Somalia, 61 in 
Djibouti, 50 in South Sudan, and 0 in Eritrea.12 The availability 
and reliability of data related to mortality rates in developing 
countries, however, is a delicate issue. Especially in Africa, the 
lack of reliable health information is a major obstacle in terms 
of both improving the health of the population and having 
data reliable enough to be able to produce global estimates and 
trends.13 In many sub-Saharan African countries, there is a poor 
stream of reliable health information. Sometimes this is simply 
because in many countries there are not enough trained staff 
and resources to collect and compile the needed information, 
thus preventing the development of tools and standards for the 
creation of proper health information systems. Other times, 
however, the reason is purely political, as governments control 
the access to and the stream of health information for the 
purposes of their political agenda.
The second key aspect concerns the indirect impact of 
Covid-19 on other health conditions. As Covid-19 continues 
to spread throughout the continent, many sub-Saharan African 
countries are still experiencing outbreaks of other infectious 
diseases such as cholera, measles and viral haemorrhagic diseases. 
These outbreaks have often occurred alongside humanitarian 
crises and other public health emergencies, forcing many 
countries to fight on multiple fronts. The Covid-19 pandemic 
is therefore putting additional pressure on already stretched and 
fragile health systems across the continent, and is underlining 
11 Ibid.
12 Africa CDC (Centres for Disease Control and Prevention), Coronavirus Disease 
2019 (Covid-19), October 2020.
13 “Stumbling around in the dark”, Editorial, Lancet, vol. 365, 11 June 2005, p. 1983.
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once again the pressing need for improving the resilience 
of the health sectors in order to ensure effective outbreak 
response. Moreover, Africa has the highest prevalence of certain 
underlying conditions, like tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS. The 
vulnerability of health systems of countries on the continent 
will thus impact not only on the Covid-19 response, but also 
on Africa’s existing health challenges, as has already happened 
during other health emergencies.
Before the current pandemic, the 2014-15 Ebola virus 
disease (EVD) outbreak was the most severe in recent history, 
and it mainly affected three West African countries: Guinea, 
Sierra Leone and Liberia. During the Ebola crisis, the number 
of women giving birth in hospitals and health clinics dropped 
by 30% and the maternal mortality rate increased by 75%.14 In 
Sierra Leone, the trends concerning the utilisation of maternal 
and child health (MCH) services before, during and after 
the Ebola outbreak, clearly showed a decrease in all MCH 
indicators after the EVD outbreak, including institutional 
deliveries, paediatric and maternity admissions and paediatric 
and maternity deaths.15 The study also concluded that a stronger 
health system enabled health facilities to maintain service 
provision and uptake during and after the Ebola epidemic in 
the country.16
Some reports have warned of similar trends for the current 
pandemic. The recently-released report of the UN Inter-
agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation (UN IGME) 
says that decades of progress on child and youth mortality 
are now threatened by the indirect effects of Covid-19.17 
14 S. Davies and B. Bennett, “A gendered human rights analysis of Ebola and Zika: 
locating gender in global health emergencies”, International Affairs, vol. 92, no. 5, 
2016, pp. 1041-60 reported in J. Smith, “Overcoming the ‘tyranny of the urgent’: 
integrating gender into disease outbreak preparedness and response”, Gender & 
Development, vol. 27, no. 2, 2019.
15 G. Quaglio et al. “Impact of Ebola outbreak on reproductive health services in a 
rural district of Sierra Leone: a prospective observational study”, BMJ Open, 2019.
16 Ibid.
17 United Nations Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation (UN 
Africa’s Thorny Horn38
While current evidence indicates that the direct impact of 
Covid-19 on child and youth mortality is limited, indirect 
effects can be crucial: these include limitations on preventative 
measures like vaccination and nutrition supplements, declining 
utilisation and provision of basic health services, as well as the 
reallocation of healthcare resources and personnel.18 Following 
drops in household incomes and medical and food supply 
chain disruptions, the UN IGME report estimates that 6.7 
million additional children could suffer from wasting in 2020, 
compared with projections for 2020 before Covid-19. At the 
same time, these children (mainly located in Southern Asia and 
sub-Saharan Africa) are at greater risk of death from infectious 
diseases worsened by malnutrition.19 Unfortunately, Covid-19 
also threatens to slow progress on a series of other health and 
service indicators, such as immunisation coverage, malaria and 
noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) such as cancer, diabetes, 
heart and lung disease and stroke, as recently demonstrated by 
the 2020 edition of the WHO annual World Health Statistics.20
The third key aspect of the impact of Covid-19 has to do 
with the economic and social consequences of the pandemic, 
and especially with its effects on hunger and poverty. Although 
it is too early to say what the virus will do to global hunger, 
Covid-19 is expected to worsen food security and nutrition, 
as it is disrupting food supply globally, in particular as regards 
farm labour, processing, transport and logistics, as well as critical 
shifts in demand.21 Consequently, the pandemic could increase 
the total number of undernourished people in the world by 
between 83 and 132 million in 2020.22 For sub-Saharan Africa, 
IGME), Levels and Trends. Child Mortality, June 2020.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 World Health Organization (WHO), World Health Statistics 2020, May 2020.
21 OECD Policy Responses to Coronavirus (Covid-19), Food Supply Chains and 
Covid-19: Impacts and Policy Lessons, June 2020.
22 H. Kretchmer, Global hunger fell for decades, but it’s rising again, World Economic 
Forum, 23 July 2020.
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the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is projecting an 
economic contraction of 3.2% for 2020.23 Between 2000 and 
2015, on average, sub-Saharan economies grew faster than the 
rest of the world, but this region remains the world’s poorest, 
and most countries have difficulties in mobilising the resources 
that are necessary to minimise the economic damage. Among 
G20 economies, stimulus funding averages about 22% of GDP, 
but for sub-Saharan African countries that average is just 3% 
– of much smaller GDPs.24 The above-mentioned UNECA 
report estimates that in Africa Covid-19 will push below the 
extreme poverty line of US$1.90 per day between five and 
twenty-nine million people. For low-income households that 
spend an average of 36% of their income on healthcare-related 
expenses, access to health care will become almost impossible.25 
Consequently, the impact of Covid-19 is expected to increase 
informal and vulnerable employment (more than 60% of men 
and nearly 75% of women are informally employed in Africa), 
with the International Labour Organization (ILO) anticipating 
nineteen million job losses overall in Africa.26 
Covid-19 affects every aspect of society, and it threatens the 
most vulnerable groups. Among them, one of the most exposed 
are people moving within and between countries, whether they 
are economic migrants, displaced persons, refugees or asylum 
seekers. The link between Covid-19 and these vulnerable 
groups is crucial, as many migrant and refugee populations 
live in conditions where physical distancing and precautionary 
hygiene measures are very challenging. The Covid-19 pandemic 
has revealed the extent of marginalisation faced by migrant and 
refugee populations and has also brought to light the normative 
23 International Monetary Fund (IMF), Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan 
Africa, June 2020.
24 Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Covid-19. A Global Perspective, 2020 
Goalkeepers Report, September 2020.
25 UNECA (2020).
26 International Labour Organization (ILO), Covid-19 causes devastating losses in 
working hours and employment, 7 April 2020.
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and political vacuum when it comes to health and migration, as 
migrants and refugees have been excluded from the Covid-19 
response.27 The case of irregular migrants and related forced 
expulsion of these groups in times of Covid-19 is of particular 
concern. Many international organisations have advised 
governments against returning irregular migrants during these 
challenging times, as the expulsion of irregular migrants to 
under-prepared countries puts migrants and communities at 
risk. The case of Ethiopia, as briefly outlined in the following 
section, is a clear example of how forced repatriations bring 
harsh consequences for both irregular migrants and their 
countries of origin.
The Impact of Covid-19 on Ethiopia
On 11 March 2020, the World Health Organization declared 
the Novel Coronavirus a global pandemic. Two days later, the 
first confirmed case of Covid-19 was reported in Ethiopia, the 
most populous country in the Horn of Africa region. The first 
person tested positive was a Japanese national who travelled 
from Burkina Faso to Ethiopia. Initially, the country did not 
have the technology for conducting the tests, so samples from 
suspected cases were sent to South Africa for testing, thus 
probably hindering a timely testing and tracing of the spread of 
the virus. Since then, the virus has been spreading incrementally 
in the country, despite the limited testing being conducted. At 
the time of writing, over 60.000 cumulative cases of Covid-19 
infections were reported, out of a million tests conducted in 
the country.28 Addis Ababa is the epicentre of the virus – with 
over 70% of confirmed cases being in the city – followed by the 
Oromia and Tigray regions. Over 900 people have died due to 
27 Lancet Migration, Leaving no one behind in the Covid-19 Pandemic: a call for 
urgent global action to include migrants in the Covid-19 response, 10 April 2020.
28 Africa CDC (2020); Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Ministry of 
Health, http://www.moh.gov.et/ejcc/
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the Covid-19, while a little over half of those who have been 
infected with the virus have recovered.29
Even before the virus was declared a global pandemic, the 
federal government was taking some precautionary measures, 
such as requiring everyone entering the country to pass through 
temperature checks. After the first case was confirmed, the 
federal government required all its non-essential workers to 
work from home. Ethiopian Airlines, the most important airline 
of the continent, suspended all its flights with the exception 
of cargo flights. Seven days after the first confirmed case was 
reported, the federal government decided to close its borders. 
Only Ethiopians were allowed to enter into the country, on 
condition that they spent two weeks of mandatory quarantine 
upon arrival. Some regional states, such as Oromia and Amhara, 
took some preventive measures too. For instance, in some cities 
of Oromia, public transport was suspended for two weeks, and 
Bahr Dar, the capital of the Amhara state, was on lockdown for 
several days. Moreover, the Tigray state declared a three-month 
state of emergency and forbade any movement from urban 
areas to rural areas within the state, in addition to introducing a 
mandatory two-week quarantine for those entering the state.30 
This was followed by a federal state of emergency on 8 April 
2020.31 A regulation was issued by the Council of Ministers 
(CoM) detailing restrictions that would be imposed to contain 
the spread of the virus: it required everyone to wear a mask 
in public spaces; it forbade the gathering of more than four 
people, for any reason; cafeterias were allowed to remain open, 
on condition that they did not serve more than three people 
at the same table and that they kept each table two metres 
29 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Ministry of Health..., cit.
30 “Tigray Region declares a state of emeregency to prevent spread of #Covid-19”, 
Addis Standard, 26 March 2020. Under Article 93 of the Federal Democratic 
Republic Constitution (1995), states have the power to declare a state of emergency, 
among others, to contain pandemics.
31 “Ethiopia declares a state of emergency to fight coronavirus”, Al Jazeera, 8 April 
2020.
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apart; buses, mini-buses and trains were required to use half of 
their capacity; schools and universities were closed, so public 
education had to be conducted exclusively online, despite the 
country’s low internet connectivity; sports and games involving 
more than two people were banned; and the country’s borders 
were closed, except for Ethiopian citizens upon permission of 
the Council.32
Some of the restrictions have now been eased, at least in 
practice, despite the fact that the virus is still spreading at a 
growing rate. Ethiopian Airlines has resumed flights to several 
cities in and outside Africa, and there is an evident relaxation in 
public movements in Addis Ababa even though the city is the 
epicentre of the virus. Moreover, the federal government has 
decided not to extend the state of emergency, which expired on 
5 September 2020.33
The spread of the virus is already having adverse political, 
economic and social impacts. The country had just come out 
of massive public protests that began taking place in 2015 and 
continued until 2018. The protests, which were caused by, 
among other things, a lack of democracy in the country under 
the authoritarian rule of the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF), came to an end when the current 
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to power. The Prime Minister 
was expected to introduce certain institutional reforms so that 
the sixth general elections, which were scheduled to take place 
in May 2020, would be free and fair. Most importantly, these 
32 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Proclamation 3/2020, also known as 
the State of Emergency Proclamation Enacted to Counter and Control the Spread of 
Covid-19 and Mitigate Its Impact, April 2020.
33 A state of emergency expires automatically after six months unless explicitly 
renewed by Parliament. And Parliament has not renewed it which means the SoE 
would automatically expire. Moreover, according to the Reporter, the government 
has decided to attempt to contain the spread of the virus using normal law 
enforcement mechanisms. The government seems of the view that the SoE did not 
make any difference in containing the spread of the virus. Y. Anberbir, “የአስቸኳይ 
ጊዜ አዋጁ እንደማይራዘም ተጠቆመ (It is indicated that the SoE will not be 
extended)”, The Ethiopian Reporter, 30 August 2020.
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elections created many expectations both within and outside 
the country, as they were supposed to be the litmus test as to 
whether Ethiopia was indeed transforming into a democratic 
state. The elections, however, were postponed from May to 
August 2020, because the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia 
(NEBE) declared that it needed more time to make all the 
necessary preparations for administering the elections. Because 
of the outbreak of the virus, however, it was impossible to hold 
the elections in August.
With the term of the current parliament formally due to end 
in October 2020, how the country would be governed until the 
holding of elections became a major constitutional issue. The 
federal government took the matter to the House of Federation, 
the organ with the power to resolve constitutional issues, and 
the latter decided to extend the term of the legislature and all 
state councils until Parliament determines that Covid-19 is 
no longer a public health threat. The decision to postpone the 
elections indefinitely, while allowing the current government 
to remain in office in the meantime, is viewed by critics 
as thwarting Ethiopia’s political transformation. It caused 
major political divisions in the country. The Tigray People’s 
Liberation Front (TPLF) – the nucleus of the country’s ruling 
coalition until it was marginalised under the new leadership 
– rejected the decision of the House of Federation and went 
on to hold the vote in the Tigray regional state, where it is the 
sole party in power. There is fear that the dispute between the 
federal government and the Tigray state may escalate to armed 
confrontation.
Covid-19 is also posing major challenges for the economy of 
the country. The Federal Job Creation Commission report shows 
that  jobs have been lost thus far due to Covid-19.34 A survey 
that the World Bank conducted in two rounds on the impact of 
34 የሥራ ፈጠራ ኮሚሽን በኮሮና ወረርሽኝ ምክንያት በሚሊዮኖች የሚቆጠሩ ሥራዎች 
ሊታጡ እንደሚችሉ ሥጋቱን ገለጸ (“The Federal Job Creation Commission fears 
that millions of jobs could be lost due to Covid-19”), The Ethiopian Reporter, 26 
July 2020.
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Covid-19 on 550 business firms in Addis Ababa shows that 41% 
of them ceased all activities, even though this figure fell to 29% in 
the second round of the survey.35 Up to 40% of the firms reported 
zero earnings. This was mainly due to a drop of up to 80% in 
demand for the goods and services provided by these firms. Those 
in the informal sector, such as street vendors, are gravely affected 
by the pandemic.36  A UN Ethiopia report indicates that the virus 
will cause a drop of up to 4% in the country’s GDP growth.37 A 
survey of the World Bank shows that 45% and 55% of urban and 
rural households, respectively, have suffered income losses due to 
Covid-19.38 The government has reduced its own estimate of the 
country’s economic growth for 2020, from 9 to 5.2%. Moreover, 
the virus emerged close to the main rainy season of the country, 
which is heavily affecting the agriculture sector, the backbone 
of the country’s economy. The situation is worsened by a locust 
invasion in six of the nine states of the country. As a result, food 
inflation is now hovering at around 30%.
On the social side, the emergence of the virus is eating into 
the progress made in the last two decades in terms of making 
social services available and reducing poverty. If Covid-19 
spreads further, thereby causing a GDP contraction, the number 
of those living under income poverty is expected to increase 
from 10 to 12.2 million. The closure of schools is leading to 
hundreds of girls being forced into early marriages in some 
states of the country, despite the government’s effort to thwart 
such practices. Domestic violence is rising at alarming rates. 
This is worsened by the fact that courts were closed (and they 
are still not functioning at full capacity) due to the pandemic, 
so women did not have appropriate recourse to the judicial 
bodies.
35 World Bank, Monitoring Covid-19 impacts on firms in Ethiopia, June 2020.
36 Ibid. 
37 UNICEF Ethiopia, Socio-economic impacts of Covid-19 in Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, 
April 2020.
38 A. Dabalen and P. Paci, How severe will the poverty impacts of Covid-19 be in 
Africa?, World Bank Blog, 5 August 2020.
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As seen in the previous section, an often-marginalised aspect 
of the social impacts of Covid-19 has to do with health and 
migration, and the case of Ethiopia is particularly revealing of 
this problematic nexus. Positioned at the centre of the migration 
crossroads of the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia represents the point 
of origin, transit and destination for migratory flows within and 
beyond the region: to the Middle East via Djibouti and Yemen 
on the Eastern migration route; to South Africa via Kenya and 
other East Africa countries along the southern route; and to 
Europe through Libya and Sudan along the Northern migratory 
route. In this context, and in the midst of the Covid-19 
epidemic, thousands of Ethiopian irregular migrants (together 
with other groups of migrants) have been forcibly repatriated 
from Saudi Arabia, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, Sudan and other 
countries, creating a second health emergency in Ethiopia. 
In both the border regions and the capital, the Ethiopian 
government converted schools, universities and other facilities 
into temporary quarantine centres, in order to contain these 
sudden flows of people for at least fourteen days, test them and 
– if necessary – activate contact tracing, before accompanying 
them to their respective regions. This situation has led the UN 
Resident Humanitarian Coordinator in Ethiopia, Catherine 
Sozi, to call for a suspension of deportations on behalf of the 
UN community.39
Within less than four months, Covid-19 is already having 
devastating political, economic and social consequences in 
Ethiopia. Things seem likely to get worse in the foreseeable 
future. Indeed, the federal and state governments are taking 
some measures to ease the adverse effect of the virus, including 
tax exemption on imported materials and equipment that can 
be used in containing the spread of Covid-19. It also granted 
tax exemption to affected companies as well as cancellation of 
interest and penalties for unpaid taxes which were due between 
39 D. Endeshaw and G. Paravicini, “U.N. says Saudi deportations of Ethiopian 
migrants risks spreading coronavirus”, Reuters, 13 April 2020.
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2015 and 2018. Moreover, it introduced price controls on basic 
commodities. The National Bank also injected ETB15 billion 
as liquidity for private banks so that they could provide grace 
periods or debt relief to their customers. Employers are banned 
from dismissing their employees except in accordance with a 
protocol issued by the Ministry of Social Affairs. States and 
local governments are also introducing tax exemptions to small 
traders and businesses. These measures, though encouraging, 
are far from sufficient if compared to the magnitude of the 
emerging economic and social problems. 
Health Systems and Pandemic Responses 
Like anywhere else in the world, the response of African 
governments has been quite diversified and context-based, but at 
macro level we can distinguish three main layers of intervention 
to respond to the health emergency: the system-regulatory level, 
the hospital-health facility level, and public health measures of 
intervention. At the end of 2019, almost all African countries 
had undertaken a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of the 
International Health Regulations (IHR), which helped countries 
to identify the gaps in their ability to prevent, detect, and respond 
to public health threats.40 In their ongoing Covid-19 response, 
African countries have focused on intensive surveillance and 
case-finding, leveraging the Integrated Disease Surveillance 
and Response framework (IDSR) adopted by all countries of 
the WHO Africa region, which provides a framework for case-
based and syndromic surveillance of forty conditions including 
influenza-like illness and severe acute respiratory illness.41
At hospital-health facility level, the most urgent commitment 
has been to securing the safety of health workers by providing 
personal protective equipment (PPE) to healthcare staff and 
40 C. Ihekweazu and E. Agogo, “Africa’s response to Covid-19”, BMC Med, vol. 18, 
no. 151, 2020.
41 Ibid.
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all the operators involved in the emergency management, 
and by providing the facilities with the minimum equipment 
for diagnosis and clinical management such as infrared 
thermometers to screen patients, oximeters to measure the 
status of blood oxygenation and oxygen concentrators for 
the supply of oxygen. Extraordinary commitment has been 
required in the training of operators and in the involvement 
of the communities, to promote proper behaviours and 
hygienic and protection norms. At the onset, Covid-19 
mainly affected capital cities, but the virus is now moving 
from high-density urban areas to informal settlements and 
rural areas with a lower population density. A coordinated, 
effective risk communication and community engagement is 
therefore essential at this point to curb the virus.
In the past six months, African governments have imposed 
progressive lockdowns and key public health measures that have 
helped slow down the Covid-19 outbreak. Public health and 
social measures have been implemented across the continent. 
Countries have shut borders, established quarantine centres 
and introduced self-isolation for exposed persons. The rationale 
behind all these policies is that if public health measures 
flatten the rate of transmission, then the health systems will 
have fewer cases of severely ill patients, and they will be able to 
manage the overall burden of the pandemic. Over the last few 
months, preventive, diagnostic and treatment measures have 
been strengthened. The progressive  scaling up of molecular 
testing across the continent has been impressive, with countries 
such as South Africa and Nigeria that are now using molecular 
laboratory diagnostic capacity that exists for specific disease 
programs like drug-resistant tuberculosis, Lassa fever and 
HIV to scale up testing for Covid-19.42 All countries can now 
diagnose Covid-19, with 14 fourteen countries performing 
over 100 tests per 10,000 population. Production of oxygen, 
critical for severely ill Covid-19 patients, has also considerably 
42 Ibid.
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increased, with the number of oxygen plants in the region rising 
to 119 from 68 sixty-eight at the onset, while the number of 
oxygen concentrators has more than doubled to over 6,000.43
Moreover, all fifty-four countries on the continent have 
recently expressed interest in COVAX, a global initiative led 
by the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations 
(CEPI), the Vaccine Alliance (Gavi), and the World Health 
Organization. The partners are working with governments and 
manufacturers to procure enough vaccine doses to protect the 
most vulnerable populations on the continent. The initiative 
aims to ensure access for both higher and middle-income 
countries, which will self-finance their own participation, 
and also for lower-middle income and low-income countries, 
which will be supported by the COVAX Advance Market 
Commitment (AMC).44 Eight African countries have agreed to 
self-finance their vaccine doses through the COVAX Facility, 
while the remaining forty-six countries are eligible for support 
from the financing instrument. Despite the fact that the AMC 
instrument is still lagging behind the needed budget, this is 
an important initiative that would allow African countries to 
participate in vaccine and clinical trials that are taking place 
elsewhere, thus reaching beyond the continent to work together 
with other governments and manufacturers on a global scale.45
International cooperation is paramount to respond to the 
pandemic on the African continent. In April, the World Bank 
Group and the International Monetary Fund convened African 
leaders, partners and multilateral institutions to encourage 
faster action on Covid-19 response in African countries. During 
that meeting, the leaders applauded the important accord 
among G20 countries to temporarily suspend debt repayments, 
in order to provide much-needed support to the poorest 
43 World Health Organization (WHO), Regional Office for Africa, Africa marks six 
months of Covid-19, 13 August 2020.
44 World Health Organization (WHO) Africa, “African countries engaging in 
ground-breaking Covid-19 vaccine initiative”, 3 September 2020.
45 Ibid.
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countries.46 Together, official creditors have mobilised up to 
US$57 billion for Africa in 2020 alone – including upwards 
of US$18 billion from the IMF and the World Bank, each to 
provide front-line health services, support the most vulnerable, 
and support economies. Private creditor support this year could 
amount to an estimated US$13 billion, but the African Finance 
Ministers have estimated the needs to be approximately US$200 
billion dollars for the continent to absorb this shock – leaving 
a wide financing gap.47 Large financing gaps between needs 
and capacity remain a crucial problem, and greater support is 
needed to ensure that African countries and institutions are 
able to respond effectively to the health crisis and to address 
the unprecedented economic challenges. The Africa Centres 
for Disease Control and Prevention, the public health arm of 
the African Union, has estimated that it needs US$430 million 
to implement its Continental strategy, in particular to procure 
lifesaving medical supplies and increase testing capacities.
At the end of March, the Heads of State and Government of 
the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) 
– i.e. the regional organisation of the Horn of Africa – 
convened via video-conference for the Extraordinary Summit 
on Covid-19. The meeting produced an important Regional 
Health Response Strategy with the aim of developing an 
implementation plan to respond to the Covid-19 pandemic 
in the IGAD region. Notably, the Response Strategy has 
also incorporated the protection of vulnerable groups such 
refugees, IDPs and migrants, who face major difficulties in 
accessing the national health systems. The IGAD Response 
Strategy also aims to establish an Emergency Unit at the 
IGAD Secretariat, analyse cross-border migration amongst the 
46 “Joint Statement by World Bank Group President David Malpass and IMF 
Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva on Outcome of G20 Finance Ministers’ 
Meeting”, The World Bank, 15 April 2020.
47 “World Bank Group and IMF mobilize partners in the fight against Covid-19 
in Africa, Opening Remarks by IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva”, 
Tralac, 18 April 2020.
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IGAD member states, enhance coordination and information 
sharing with the national task force of IGAD member states 
and enhance active surveillance, case investigation and contact 
tracing through training and capacity-building activities of 
healthcare workers. 
Conclusion
The Covid-19 pandemic has turned our world upside down, 
causing tragic loss of life and disrupting our social and economic 
fabric. The outbreak of Covid-19 is having a significant impact 
across Africa, where the socio-economic dimension of this 
pandemic is as crucial as the public health needs. Despite 
appropriate actions to contain the spread of Covid-19 and 
important advances in epidemic control, the Horn of Africa 
region remains particularly vulnerable. The high burden of HIV, 
tuberculosis and acute malnutrition, prevalent in many of the 
Horn of Africa countries, might exacerbate the severity of the 
disease once the virus gets deeply rooted. In the event of major 
transmission of Covid-19 in these countries, their respective 
health systems will be further weakened, and cholera, measles 
and other infectious diseases will thrive. The indirect impact of 
Covid-19 on these vulnerable groups will then be particularly 
severe, as seen during the 2014-15 Ebola crisis when measles, 
malaria, HIV/AIDS and maternal and child mortality rates 
claimed more lives than Ebola in the affected countries.
In addition, as seen above, the presence of large numbers 
of refugee and IDPs populations as well as migrants living in 
the region can make the virus explosively transmissible in these 
high-risk settings. In such contexts, the population is highly 
vulnerable and lives in often overcrowded settlements where 
distancing is impossible and with limited access to basic health 
services and hygiene. Covid-19 containment measures, testing 
and care for millions of refugees, IDPs and migrants living in the 
region is very complicated, as it implies intervening in scattered 
camps, detention centres, transit locations, urban environments 
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and cross-border areas. The pandemic has revealed a normative 
and political vacuum that initially excluded these groups from 
the Covid-19 response. Recent efforts have nonetheless proved 
that regional cooperation among states is crucial to face these 
complex, trans-border humanitarian situations, as the IGAD 
Response Strategy has demonstrated.
The impact of Covid-19 in such delicate contexts might also 
lead to social destabilisation, affecting the security situation 
in the region. Unless urgently and effectively addressed by 
regional and international partners, parts of the area might turn 
into ungoverned spaces in which terrorism, irregular migration 
and transnational organised crime flourish. As one of the most 
insecure conflict clusters in the world, the Horn of Africa region 
has often demonstrated that weak security and state governance 
becomes fertile ground for protracted conflicts among different 
identity groups, thus undermining those intermittent though 
evident signs of economic and political progress that the region 
has experienced in the last few years.
In view of the above and in response to the threats posed by 
further Covid-19 transmission, more and more funding and 
healthcare resources will be needed. It is fundamentally important 
to enhance public health capacity aimed at strengthening the 
resilience of national health systems, in order for both the 
continent and the region to absorb this extraordinary external 
shock. The pandemic is undermining the progress made so far 
on sustainable development goals,48 as this year the world will 
regress on the vast majority of them.49 So there is an urgent need 
for collaborative responses. All countries must work together 
to end the pandemic and begin rebuilding economies. This 
unprecedented crisis requires courageous political solutions and 
collective global action organised around a common sense of 
“shared vulnerability” and common interests.
48 J. Thornton, “Covid-19 pandemic has derailed progress on sustainable 
development goals, says WHO”, BMJ, May 2020.
49 Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (2020). 
3.  Djibouti: Geostrategic Balancing 
     Between the Horn and Red Sea
 David Styan
This chapter examines the state of Djibouti. It focuses principally 
on selected aspects of the regional and foreign policies of the 
Horn of Africa’s smallest state. It seeks firstly to provide an 
overview of the contours of the “geostrategic” importance of 
Djibouti as a trade and military hub in the region. Secondly, 
it provides some insights into how the Djiboutian government 
juggles the contradictions of its regional foreign policies.
Djibouti is an enigmatic state. It is the dwarf of the Horn 
of Africa, and one of the poorest and smallest members of 
both the Arab League and the African Union. Yet its President, 
Ismael Omar Guelleh, is courted by superpowers and regional 
decision-makers alike. Having inherited power from his uncle 
in 1999, two decades later he is on his fourth Presidential term, 
having in the meantime considerably consolidated Djibouti’s 
power and influence. While this has done little to improve the 
living conditions of the bulk of impoverished Djiboutians, he 
has spectacularly diversified Djiboutian diplomacy away from 
reliance on the largesse of France, the former colonial power. 
Paris quietly retains cultural and military capital in the country, 
but fading French influence is overshadowed by Djibouti’s 
eclectic array of lucrative new partnerships. These include the 
US, China, Japan and the EU – all of whom have established 
military facilities in the country. 
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At the outset, it should be stressed that while Djibouti’s 
geostrategic profile has several distinct dimensions, for 
key Asian and Western powers its importance is above all 
maritime. This is due to its location; sitting overlooking the 
Western approaches to the Bab Al Mandab, the 30km-wide 
gateway where the fickle winds and currents of the Red Sea 
meet the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean. This makes it the 
principal port of call for both commercial ships and naval 
vessels transiting the region to and from the Mediterranean 
via the Suez Canal. As such, it is also the operational base for 
multilateral anti-piracy forces policing the Red Sea and Somali 
coasts. Indeed the “Djibouti Code of Conduct”, which guides 
much anti-piracy activity, underscores quite how central the 
diminutive state has been to the anti-piracy industry.1 Yet 
alongside this prominent international maritime dimension, 
Djibouti has its own, often fraught, strategic position within 
the Horn of Africa to manage. It has survived by navigating 
the frequently choppy diplomatic and military cross-currents 
between its fractious neighbours, Ethiopia, Eritrea and 
Somalia, the latter partially via its autonomous Northern 
province Somaliland. Each of these share borders and social 
clan structures with Djibouti. Finally, in addition to having 
a uniquely close relationship with China, as section four of 
this chapter illustrates, it also has managed complex, at times 
tempestuous, relations with Arab Gulf states, most notably 
Dubai. 
Despite such complexity, and contrary to conventional 
theories of dependency or small-state vulnerability, Guelleh, 
his ministers and entourage nevertheless appear to wield 
considerable autonomy and influence. Analytically, Djibouti’s 
dynamism appears to contradict the notion that small states 
require “strategic partnership” or protection from a larger 
1 For details of the “Djibouti Code of Conduct”, on anti-piracy operations, see 
http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/matrix/djibouti-code-conduct; and C. Bueger 
and T. Walke, From Djibouti to Jeddah, the Western Indian Ocean Needs Security, 
Pretoria, South Africa, Institute for Security Studies, 23 May 2018.
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neighbouring power, or that Ethiopia is the dominant 
“hegemon” in the Horn of Africa.2 
The chapter provides an introduction to these issues; it is 
structured in four principal sections; the first provides an 
overview of Djibouti’s domestic politics, noting how domestic 
and regional policies are intertwined. Secondly, the text briefly 
examines the shifting regional context in which Djibouti finds 
itself. It notes in particular the impact of the 2018 accession of 
Ethiopia’s premier Abiy Ahmed. At least on paper, the putative 
peace deal Abiy signed with Eritrea in mid-2018 (earning him 
the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019) had the potential to significantly 
dent Djibouti’s influence and role in the region. In practice, 
this threat has proved illusory. 
The third section analyses Djibouti-China ties. Djibouti’s 
unique and growing diplomatic role, both in the Horn and 
globally, is in part due to its location as a crucial hub within 
China’s ambitious Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI). 
Djibouti hosts China’s only overseas military and naval facility, 
and is a node for its fast-growing global network of fibre-optic 
cables. Coupled with China’s massive investments in rail and 
port infrastructure, this places Djibouti at the centre of China’s 
growing regional roles in both the Horn of Africa and the 
Middle East. Fourthly and finally, the text outlines Djibouti’s 
fraught ties with the states of the Arabian Peninsula, mostly 
notably Dubai, in the United Arab Emirates, before concluding 
by briefly considering future challenges to Guelleh’s diplomacy.
2 For more detail on Djiboutian diplomacy, and a comparative view on small states’ 
diplomacy, see D. Styan, “Djibouti; small state strategy at a crossroads”, Third World 
Thematics, vol 1, no.1, 2016. On Ethiopia as a hegemon, see S. Le Gouriellec, 
“Regional power and contested hierarchy: Ethiopia, an ‘imperfect hegemon’ 
in the Horn of Africa”, International Affairs, vol. 94, no. 5, September 2018. 
Overall, academic and policy literature on Djibouti remains meager:  C. Clapham 
succinctly locates Djibouti’s regional status in The Horn of Africa. State formation 
and decay, Hurst, London, 2017, pp. 170-175.  See also: A.S. Chiré, (ed.), Djibouti 
Contemporain, Paris, Karthala, 2013; and S. Le Gouriellec, Djibouti: la diplomatie 
de géant d’un petit Etat, Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 2020. 
Djibouti: Geostrategic Balancing Between the Horn and Red Sea 55
Patronage-Based Domestic Politics 
and Cross-Border Identities 
Djibouti gained political independence from France in 1977; 
it has a population of under a million, and thus is a small, as 
well as a relatively young, state. It is by far the smallest state in 
the Horn in terms of population and territory. Its GDP is also 
tiny, both in absolute and per-capita terms, with a minuscule 
wealthy urban elite, surrounded by impoverished suburbs and 
arid hinterland. Geographically it is incorrect to call it either 
a “micro-state” or a “city-state”; although at least 80% of 
Djibouti’s population do live in and around the capital city. 
On most indices it is comprehensively dwarfed not just by its 
neighbours in the Horn, but by all other members of the two 
regional bodies – the Arab League and African Union – of which 
it is an active member, and from which it draws considerable 
diplomatic influence and legitimacy.3 
Similarly, in terms of its Red Sea and Gulf of Aden 
maritime neighbours, Djibouti is the regional minnow; to the 
east, Somaliland has a population of around 4m, including 
Gadaboursi and Issa Somali sub-clans. Members of these 
groups constitute over half of Djibouti’s own population, 
engendering close, but at times fractious, ties with autonomous, 
but internationally unrecognised, Somaliland, for which 
Djibouti is the main transit point. Eritrea to the north of 
Djibouti has a population of around 5 million. Its port of 
Assab – potentially Djibouti’s main competitor as a conduit 
for Ethiopia’s trade – and the Danakil littoral, which lie just 
across Djibouti’s Northern border, are sparsely populated, 
primarily with Afars who also share linguistic and clan ties 
with Djibouti’s own Northern populace. All these coastal states 
are dwarfed by highland Ethiopia’s 100 million population 
3 In population terms, Djibouti is the 5th smallest state in Africa; only the island 
nations of Seychelles, Sao Tome & Principe, Cape Verde and the Comoros have 
fewer people. However, with a territory of 23,000 km2, it is larger in size than Israel 
or Slovenia (or indeed Tuscany). 
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and, across the Gulf of Aden, Yemen’s 28 million beleaguered 
inhabitants. A fraction of Djibouti’s own traders have Yemeni 
roots, and – as in the cases of Somalia and Eritrea – Ethiopia’s 
own Afars and Issa-Somalis share cross-border clan ties with 
Djiboutian populations. Many in Djibouti’s ruling elite have 
origins in Eastern Ethiopia, notably Dire Dawa, the historic 
hub of the railway that first linked Addis Ababa to the port of 
Djibouti a century ago. Somali-Issa migrants from Dire Dawa 
were instrumental in shaping the modern Djiboutian state 
and society. This mosaic of social and linguistic origins in part 
explains the inherent cosmopolitan and patronage-based nature 
of Djiboutian politics. 
In domestic politics, power is largely a personal, patronage-
based matter emanating from the presidential entourage. “Rent” 
accrues from foreign military bases, along with access to other 
economic assets – foreign direct investment, trade licenses, port 
revenues – which are then partially redistributed to maintain 
legitimacy. Personalised, patronage-based politics may partially 
account for Djibouti’s unusual flexibility and innovation in 
terms of foreign policy. Nimble foreign policy has generated 
significant political and economic capital from inauspicious 
foundations, including, as we examine below, Dubai and China. 
Thus Djibouti’s power and influence is disproportionately 
greater than the state’s small size and ostensibly “dependent” 
roles would suggest.4
This does not mean domestic politics are friction-free. The 
opposite is true, above all in relation to the constitutional 
elasticity of presidential terms. Following his first re-election 
in the 2005 presidential election, Guelleh stated that he would 
not seek a third term in office. Political tensions were sparked 
by the need for constitutional amendments to allow Guelleh’s 
4 See S. Gouriellec, “Djibouti’s Foreign Policy in International Institutions: The Big 
Diplomacy of a Small State”, in J. Warner and T.M. Shaw (eds.), African Foreign 
Policies in International Institutions, London, Palgrave, 2018; and D. Styan, “China’s 
Maritime Silk Road and Small States: Lessons from the Case of Djibouti”, Journal of 
Contemporary China, vol. 29, no. 122, 2020.
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re-election for precisely such a third term in 2011. These sparked 
widespread opposition, including from within the presidential 
entourage. This in turn had far-reaching implications for 
Djibouti’s relations with Dubai and the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE), Guelleh breaking with Abdourahman Boreh, a close 
friend and business associate with political ambitions. At the 
time Boreh was a key broker for Dubai Ports World’s (DPW) 
investments in Djibouti’s container terminal. 
Guelleh was elected for a fourth term in 2016. He won 
almost 90% of the 135,000 votes cast, being subsequently 
endorsed by all of Djibouti’s main foreign allies. A similar 
dominance prevails in the legislature, where the 2018 election 
resulted in the ruling Union pour la Majorité Présidentielle 
(UMP) winning 55 of the 65 seats. However, that vote was 
completely overshadowed by the simultaneous announcement 
of the nationalisation of the Doraleh Container Terminal. This 
has left Djibouti with huge debts and a still unresolved, thorny 
set of contentious international legal dossiers, complicating 
relations with both Western and Asian partners. 
The spat with Boreh and imbroglio with Dubai’s DPW 
illustrate the complex cross-currents linking domestic and 
regional policies. Such challenges are also found in the complex 
ties – both official and personal – which members of Djiboutian 
elite’s maintain with Ethiopian authorities. These exist at both the 
federal and regional level, the latter particularly via Ethiopia’s local 
Somali, Afar and Dire Dawa administrations, all of whom share 
borders and cross-border pastoral populations with Djibouti. 
Djibouti’s Place in the Horn’s Shifting 
Regional Context
Much of the prominence of Djibouti’s geo-strategic profile arises 
from three facets of its geographical location: for commercial 
shipping and navies, it is the main bunkering and logistics port 
between the Red Sea and Indian Ocean; secondly, it is also 
Ethiopia’s principal port. Finally, it lies at juncture of the African 
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and Arabian land masses, and as such it is simultaneously a 
cultural crossroads and a commercial entrepôt. 
This translates schematically into four distinct foreign and 
economic roles for Djibouti’s leaders. The first is a bilateral 
role, as a port and conduit for neighbouring Ethiopia, whose 
foreign trade has overwhelmingly transited via Djibouti since 
the rupture with Eritrea in 1998.  Secondly, it acts as a corridor 
to the wider Horn of Africa region. This aspect is central to the 
state’s “Vision 2035” economic developmental plan, which sees 
it as the Horn’s natural regional and logistical hub. (This view 
is partially underpinned by the Horn’s regional body, the Inter-
governmental Authority on Development, IGAD, which has 
its headquarters in Djibouti). Thus, the Djiboutian authorities 
envisage their rail and port and pipeline services not simply 
as bilateral links with neighbouring Somaliland and Ethiopia. 
Rather they are presented as catalysts for broader regional 
economic growth and integration, encompassing all the Horn’s 
states. In addition to the core Ethio-Djiboutian rail-port link 
(see below), examples include the northern port of Tadjourah, 
and an ambitious petro-chemical complex at Damerjog, where 
work was inaugurated in September 2020. This Djibouti Liquid 
Bulk Port (DLBP) is designed to serve oil fields in South-eastern 
Ethiopia. 
The third distinct regional economic role is as a logistical 
hub for transhipments. Since 2009 this role was facilitated 
by what was, until 2018, DPW Doraleh Container Terminal 
(DTC), just to the west of the capital. Djibouti’s Ports and 
Free Zone Authority (DPFZA) explicitly markets Djibouti as a 
global port and hub. It emphasises Djibouti’s centrality to trade 
flows between Asia, Africa and Europe. Djibouti’s longstanding 
potential as a centre of transhipments has been boosted by 
investment of China in infrastructure within Djibouti. As 
discussed in section three below, this includes an additional 
Multi-Purpose Port and vast international free trade zone at 
Doraleh. 
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The fourth and final aspect of Djibouti’s geostrategic role 
and its regional policies is evidently its unique role as a military 
hub, examined in section three below. While external attention 
invariably focuses on Djibouti’s military bases, above all US-
Chinese rivalry, before examining this it is important to note 
the complex set of regional balances that Djibouti maintains 
within the Horn.  
Its ties with the neighbouring autonomous territory of 
Somaliland are stable, but are periodically subject to strains 
due both to trans-border clan dynamics and Djibouti’s 
ongoing role in attempts to reconstruct a central Somali 
state. Djibouti reopened its embassy in Mogadishu in 2018; 
President Guelleh hosting his Somalian counterpart, Mohamed 
Abdullahi Mohamed, in mid-2019. In June 2020, he chaired 
talks in Djibouti aimed are reconciliation between Somali and 
“Somaliland” authorities. Djibouti also participates in the 
African Union (AU) Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). French 
and US troops based in Djibouti contribute to training both 
Djiboutian and AMISOM troops. 
Djibouti’s relations with neighbouring Eritrea, which gained 
independence from Ethiopia in 1993, are fraught, largely due to 
the incursion of Eritrean troops into Djibouti’s territory at Ras 
Doumeira, in the far north-east of the country, in mid-2008. 
Eritrea’s move was condemned by the UN Security Council, 
the Arab League, the AU and IGAD. Mediation by Qatar led 
to the withdrawal of Eritrean forces from Djibouti’s territory in 
mid-2010. However, in 2017 Qatari observers were abruptly 
withdrawn. This was due to the rupture between Qatar and 
other GCC Arabian Gulf states, in which Djibouti sided with 
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Following the 
Ethiopian-Eritrean rapprochement, which began in mid-2018, 
Djibouti initially opposed the lifting of UN sanctions against 
Eritrea, requesting that the UN first facilitate the resolution 
of its own border dispute with Eritrea. While this was finally 
agreed in principle via UN Security Council Resolution 2444 
of 2018, the border remains closed. Djibouti’s bitter stand-off 
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with the UAE, outlined in section four below, complicates ties 
with Eritrea; the UAE maintains a naval base in the Eritrean port 
of Assab, adjacent to Ras Doumeira, as part of its intervention 
in Yemen’s civil war.  Assab is also believed to have been used 
as a staging post for UAE’s operations in Libya and elsewhere.  
Social and economic ties between Ethiopia and Djibouti 
are historically umbilical. They have become even more closely 
interdependent since 1998, due to Ethiopia’s dependency upon 
Djibouti as a conduit for its foreign trade, following the outbreak 
of the Ethio-Eritrean border war and closure of the Eritrean 
ports of Assab and Massawa. Subsequent rapid economic 
growth in Ethiopia, coupled with significant new infrastructure 
developments, have facilitated the upsurge in bi-lateral transit 
trade. Politically, the two states’ policies are closely aligned over 
a series of bilateral issues, notably border security across Afar 
and Issa areas; including the coordination of border controls due 
to Covid-19. In addition to rail and port investments, Ethiopia 
also supplies both hydroelectric power and drinking water 
to Djibouti. When Abiy Ahmed came to power in Ethiopia 
in 2018, he launched a series of ambitious plans for peaceful 
coexistence and integration in the Horn. On paper, these 
might have threatened Djibouti’s role, particularly had Ethio-
Eritrean peace led to the rehabilitation of Eritrea’s ports and 
their use by Ethiopia. However, despite pledges of Saudi and 
Emirati funding for regional infrastructure, to date these plans 
have proved largely rhetorical. Eritrea’s recalcitrant and isolated 
President, Isaias Afwerki, poses little threat to Djibouti’s policies. 
Foreign Military Bases and 
the Djibouti-China Relationship
Before providing a brief overview of China’s ties with Djibouti, 
four factors behind them are worth highlighting. Firstly, many 
of China’s motives in establishing a permanent naval presence 
in Djibouti are identical to those of Western powers. Secondly, 
somewhat paradoxically, the very fact that Djibouti already 
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hosts Western and Japanese militaries largely facilitated the 
establishment of a Chinese base. Thirdly, key reasons for China’s 
presence in Djibouti relate to global, not regional factors, above 
all in the maritime domain. These include China’s increased 
economic dependence on global shipping lanes, their navy’s 
ambitious global “blue water” expansion, and the “Maritime 
Silk Road” component of Xi Jinping’s flagship “Belt and Road 
Initiative”. These factors are essentially all anchored at sea; 
as such they are maritime and unconnected with the Horn 
of Africa per-se. However, to a far greater degree than other 
external powers with a military presence in Djibouti, China 
does now have very extensive commercial and diplomatic 
interests in the Horn as a whole. While it has oil interests in 
South Sudan, Chinese FDI is concentrated in Ethiopia and 
Djibouti in particular
Djibouti’s overseas military and anti-piracy presence
The US, France, Japan, the EU and now China all now have de 
facto permanent military presences in the country. Historically 
Djibouti’s regional military role was as a French military 
base. Yet by 2020 Djibouti was also hosting an eclectic array 
of American, Asian and Arab naval and air forces. Its naval 
profile was magnified by the fact that since 2005 anti-piracy 
forces operating in the region used Djibouti as a logistical 
and administrative hub. In 2009 Djibouti hosted the meeting 
convened by the International Maritime Organization which 
led to the “Djibouti Code of Conduct”. Under this, regional 
and naval powers agreed to co-operate under international law 
to arrest and prosecute persons who have committed piracy. 
In 2009 Djibouti became the base for EUNAVFOR’s 
Operation Atalanta.  This is now by far the largest and longest-
running European Union foreign policy mission under the 
framework of the European Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP). Atalanta maintains around 600 naval personnel, 
several warships and Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance 
Aircraft in constant rotation in the Gulf of Aden and Eastern 
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Indian Ocean at any one time, while coordinating activities with 
other multilateral Combined Maritime Forces in the region. 
Alongside France other key EU states maintain significant 
diplomatic presences in Djibouti, but collectively Atalanta 
represents the EU’s most significant long-term engagement 
both with Djibouti itself and the Gulf of Aden more broadly.
At independence in 1977 there were approximately 4,000 
French military personnel in Djibouti. France’s military ties with 
Djibouti were scaled back in 2011, when the two states’ mutual 
defence agreement was renewed and French Foreign Legion 
troops were moved from Djibouti to Paris’ new military facility 
in the UAE. Nevertheless, in 2020 Djibouti remained France’s 
largest military garrison in Africa. It maintains around 1,400 
permanent troops there and pays the Government of Djibouti 
some €30 million annually for access to its military facilities. 
In terms of the US’s relationship with Djibouti, following 
the creation of US African Command (AFRICOM) in 2008 
Djibouti became the US’s sole permanent military base in 
Africa, led by the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa 
(CJTF-HOA), with around 3,200 US personnel. CJTF-HOA 
acts as a staging post for US missions in the Indian Ocean and 
Middle East. The US base is also the headquarters for counter-
terrorism efforts. These include drone flights and unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAV) strikes over Somalia and the Eastern 
portion of the Arabian Peninsula. Drone flights are now 
conducted principally from a second base at Chebelle, away 
from the built-up areas of Camp Lemonnier (the former French 
Foreign Legion complex). Under an agreement signed in 2014, 
the US pay $63 million per year for the 10-year lease, with an 
option to renew for a further decade. 
Finally, in mid-2011 the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence 
Force established a base in Djibouti; significantly, this was 
Tokyo’s first overseas military base since the end of the Second 
World War. Japan is a major aid donor to Djibouti and it has 
constructed an anti-piracy centre to the west of Doraleh port.
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China’s civil infrastructure and 
naval installations in Djibouti 
As explained below, China has progressively expanded its 
civilian and commercial presence in Djibouti since 2012, with 
substantive investments in railway and port infrastructure. 
Militarily, at the beginning of Guelleh’s presidency, China 
offered only limited training and medical assistance to Djibouti’s 
armed forces. However, military cooperation accelerated as 
Chinese vessels increasingly participated in anti-piracy convoys 
from 2008 onwards. In this sense, China followed both the 
European Union and Japan, each of which expanded their 
physical presence on the back of anti-piracy activities based out 
of Djibouti. During 2012-17 Beijing funded and constructed 
several major infrastructure projects, as Djibouti became an 
increasingly prominent node in the “Maritime Silk Road” 
(MSR) economic initiative.5
In August 2017 China’s Ministry of Defence formally 
opened what it termed a “naval support facility” in Djibouti. 
Both the opening ceremony, and the first live-fire exercises by 
Chinese troops operating from the base the following month, 
were publicized widely in both Western and Chinese media. 
Such coverage in China emphasised Djibouti’s pivotal role in 
the MSR initiative.
The naval support facility is located alongside the Doraleh 
Multi-Purpose Port, and complements China’s substantial 
investment in civil construction and infrastructure projects 
in Djibouti and neighbouring Ethiopia. These include the 
Ethiopia-Djibouti railway, the new Doraleh port itself and 
associated Free Trade Zone, the Ghoubet salt export facility, 
formally opened in 2017, as well as a Sino-Djiboutian Liquid 
Natural Gas terminal, known as the Djibouti Liquid Bulk Port, 
at Damerjog. 
5 This section draws on D. Styan, “China’s Maritime Silk Road: The Horn of Africa 
and Red Sea”, in J. Fulton (ed.), Regions in the Belt and Road Initiative, London, 
Routledge, 2020, pp. 75-96. 
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Djibouti’s vast port expansion programme is the counterpart 
to the Chinese funded, 750km Djibouti-Ethiopia rail-link. It 
connects the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa to Djibouti and 
the Red Sea and is the centrepiece of China’s investment in the 
Horn. Formally inaugurated in 2016, commercial services for 
both cargo and passengers began fitfully in 2018. As such, the 
railway is arguably the most tangible component of the MSR 
in East Africa to date. While it should drastically cut costs for 
all of Ethiopia’s foreign trade, its specific role is to provide a 
maritime outlet for Ethiopia’s burgeoning industrial zones – 
themselves part-planned and financed by Beijing. These now 
attract Chinese and other, mostly Asian and Turkish, companies 
producing for a global market. With the first contracts signed 
in 2011 the railway “renovation” project cost an estimated 
US$3.5 billion. This entailed the complete replacement of the 
dilapidated rails and rolling stock, the electrification of the new 
tracks, and the construction of a string of entirely new stations, 
including a new terminus at Nagad, just outside Djibouti-ville. 
The Addis-Djbiouti railway was financed primarily by China 
Exim Bank, with the Ethiopian government contributing 
around 30% of the funds. Only the final 100km segment of 
the 750km tracks traverses Djibouti and was built by the China 
Railway Construction Corporation (CRCC) under a separate 
contract signed with the Djiboutian government in 2012. 
The financial dimensions of Beijing’s civil and military 
presence remain opaque, although substantial debt-rescheduling 
was agreed with China by mid-2019. Debates around so-called 
“debt diplomacy” have referred to Djibouti with increasing 
frequency since 2018, when US National Security Advisor, 
John Bolton, made such allegations about Chinese policies in 
Djibouti during a review of US policy in Africa. However, he 
offered no evidence to substantiate his claim that China was 
intent on seizing control of the Doraleh Container Terminal, 
following the rupture of relations between Djibouti and its 
joint-owners, Dubai Ports World (discussed in section four 
below).
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Clearly, the expansion of Djibouti’s debt to China is a 
significant issue for the state’s economic and fiscal policy. 
Djibouti has seen a sharp rise in its debt-burden occasioned by 
the scale of Chinese infrastructure lending. Coupled with the 
reality of country’s very weak fiscal system and limited abilities 
to repay, further rescheduling of debt appears inevitable. 
Indebtedness to China has risen steeply due to loans on the port 
and rail infrastructure outlined above. This has prompted direct 
comparison with Sri Lanka. There China Merchants Group 
foreclosed on unpaid debts from the Sri Lankan government 
relating to Hambantota port in 2017. Like Djibouti’s Doraleh 
port, Hambantota’s contained terminal and port is a key hub on 
the Maritime Silk Road, and CMG’s leading role in both places 
prompted many analysts to speculate as to whether Djibouti’s 
escalating debt levels might also end in foreclosure and China’s 
full ownership of Djibouti’s Port Authority and infrastructure.
This scenario is currently highly unlikely. China has already 
moved to reschedule Djibouti’s debts. While these are significant 
in relation to Djibouti’s tiny economy, in absolute terms they 
are dwarfed by Beijing’s exposure to the debts of Ethiopia and 
other major African states, such as Angola or Kenya, to whom 
China has made loans. As such, debt rescheduling for Djibouti 
is likely to follow financial concessions made to Ethiopia. 
Signs of this emerged first on the margins of the Forum on 
China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit in Beijing in 
2018. Rescheduling of railway debt was negotiated with both 
Ethiopian and Djiboutian officials. Ethiopia subsequently 
reported that the repayment period of its loan was extended 
from 10 to 30 years. Details of Djibouti’s new repayment 
terms have not been published, but are believed to mirror 
those of Ethiopia.6 The MSR comparisons with Sri Lanka’s 
Hambantota is misplaced. In a detailed analysis of CMG’s role 
in Hambantota, Zhang notes that the “debt-trap diplomacy” 
6  For a detailed analysis of Djibouti’s debt to China, see: T. Pairault, “La dette 
chinoise de Djibouti”, Geoweb, 28 July 2020.
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narrative “… fails to capture the critical, changing role played 
by China’s SOEs, the driving force of China’s global economic 
expansion. It also underestimates the appeal of China’s state 
capitalism for political elites in developing countries”.7
China’s presence in Djibouti’s ports has grown from a 
managerial and equity stake in the Port Authority, to the 
construction of Doraleh’s Multi-Purpose Port (MPP) and its 
associated Free Trade Zone. The Hong Kong and Shenzen-based 
maritime conglomerate, China Merchants Group (CMG), 
acquired a 23.5% equity stake in Djibouti’s state-owned port 
authority in 2012-13. While negotiations over this investment 
pre-dated Xi Jinping’s launch of the Maritime Silk Road in 
2013, CMG has subsequently become a major player in China’s 
maritime expansion globally along the MSR.  It is the lead 
investor in Djibouti’s main MSR project, the Doraleh Multi-
Purpose Port (MPP).8  Doraleh’s MPP encompasses container, 
general, and bulk cargo facilities. Work on the US$590 million 
port began in mid-2013 and it opened in 2017; the Djiboutian 
authorities, CMG and Dalian Ports are the principal investors. 
The 1.2km quayside provides deep-water moorings that can 
accommodate the world’s largest cargo ships. The new facilities 
massively increase Djibouti’s trans-shipment trade capacity 
and introduces an element of competition into the Djibouti-
Ethiopian trade corridor.  
Contractually the Doraleh MPP is separate from the 
surrounding Djibouti International Free Trade Zone (DIFTZ). 
The first phase of DIFTZ opened in 2018, adjacent to CMG’s 
new Multi-Purpose Port at Doraleh. Such Free Trade Zones are 
7 Hong Zhang, “Beyond ‘Debt-Trap Diplomacy’: The Dissemination of PRC State 
Capitalism”, China Brief, vol. 19, no. 1, Washington, DC, Jamestown Foundation, 
5 January 2019.
8 On CMG and the MSR see: M. Duchatel and A. Sheldon Duplaix, Blue China: 
navigating the maritime silk road to Europe, Brussels, European Council on 
Foreign Relations, 23 April 2018; on China’s anti-piracy, see A.S. Erickson and 
A. Strange. Six Years at Sea... and Counting: Gulf of Aden Anti-Piracy and China’s 
Maritime Commons, Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press and Jamestown 
Foundation, 2015.
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an integral part of the MSR. The blueprint for Djibouti’s FTZ 
envisages that it will act as a hub and port for Ethiopia’s inland 
logistics centres and “dry ports” close to Chinese industrial 
parks in the Ethiopian highlands. The economic geography 
of Djibouti is likely to be further reconfigured in the coming 
years, both as highland Ethiopia’s rail links to the DIFTZ and 
Doraleh ports improve, and the city of Djibouti itself evolves. In 
September 2020 CMG signed a contract to completely rebuild 
Djibouti’s old, downtown port facilities. If realised, these plans 
will radically alter the city, effectively ending a century of port 
activities in the heart of the city and replacing the offices. 
Arguably, two factors which reflect Djibouti’s geostrategic 
location, make the state’s role in the MSR component of 
Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) unique. Firstly, while 
the Gulf of Aden is a crucial maritime transit corridor to 
Europe for Asian trade and Middle Eastern oil, beneath the sea 
it is also a vital telecommunications hub at the crossroads of 
key African and Asian submarine fibre-optic cables. Relatively 
little attention has been focused to date on the telecoms and 
undersea-cable dimension of the MSR, but these are very 
present in Djibouti. The Pakistan-East Africa Cable Express, or 
“PEACE” cable, links Gwadar in Pakistan with Djibouti and 
Kenya in East Africa. It is a reminder that China is intent on 
decreasing reliance on Western-owned commercial cables, and 
that fibre-optics are very much part of BRI infrastructure. 
However, it is the second factor, the military dimension of 
China’s presence in Djibouti which has overshadowed the scale 
of infrastructure development; boosting Djibouti’s broader 
geostrategic profile. Since 2017 Djibouti has been home to 
China’s first permanent overseas naval base. Formally known 
in Chinese as the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) 
“logistics centre”, the base is a fortified annex of the new 
commercial Multi-Purpose Port at Doraleh, sharing berths and 
quays with the civilian port. Officially inaugurated in 2017, 
the base can accommodate up to 400 marines (rather than the 
“10,000” claimed by hubristic Western reports) and comprises 
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ammunition depots, an office complex, plus a heliport with a 
short airstrip.  
Just as BRI projects in Africa often partially subsume (but 
do not fully encompass) elements of pre-existing China-
Africa policies on the continent, they also overlap with China’s 
plans for global military and naval expansion. Beijing’s 2015 
Military Strategy white paper declared that: “It is necessary for 
China to develop a modern maritime military force structure 
commensurate with its national security and development 
interests”.9 The paper announced that PLAN’s role would 
expand to protecting strategic sea lines of communication 
(SLOCs). It would maintain anti-piracy operations around 
the Horn of Africa, while enhancing maritime cooperation 
and supporting an enlarged Chinese role in international 
peacekeeping. All these have since developed in practice in 
the waters of the Horn of Africa, and Western Indian Ocean 
more broadly. Thus, it is at sea and in ports that great- and 
mid-ranking power rivalries have played out in the past decade 
around the Horn (with the Chinese navy’s growing presence 
in the Indian Ocean generating the most debate in the West, 
as well as in India, which resents rivalry in “its” sphere), rather 
than their – to date limited – presence on land. 
However, Djibouti’s geo-strategic profile has been under the 
spotlight due to the broader symbolic importance of Djibouti 
hosting PLAN’s first overseas base. The inauguration of the base 
coincided with President Xi’s heightened emphasis on China’s 
new global presence and status at the 19th Congress of the 
Communist Party of China of 2017.  Significantly, Djibouti’s 
President Guelleh was then the first overseas head of state to 
visit China, immediately after the 19th Congress. His visit saw 
the two leaders announce a strategic partnership consolidating 
existing cooperation agreements, with Chinese media lauding 
the PLAN’s expansion.10 
9 State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Military Strategy, 2015. 
10 “China, Djibouti agree on cooperation”, China Daily, 24 November, 2017. In 
the Chinese popular imagination, views of the Middle East and Horn of Africa 
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In addition to providing technical support to Chinese anti-
piracy and other naval and merchant vessels in the region, 
three other policies underpin Beijing’s permanent presence in 
the region. The first is to be able to physically protect Chinese 
interests and investments in East Africa and Arabia.  Secondly, 
to reassure and if necessary be able to evacuate the large number 
of Chinese nationals now working in Africa and the Middle 
East. During the 2011 war in Libya and again in Yemen in 
2015 the Chinese government had to rapidly evacuate its 
citizens, diverting ships from anti-piracy patrols in the Horn. 
A third policy underpinning a permanent logistics’ presence in 
Djibouti is China’s expanding multilateral role in Africa. China 
has a growing number of peacekeepers deployed with the UN 
in Africa, including 1,000 in nearby South Sudan, as well as in 
Liberia and Mali.11 Beijing has pledged to increase these numbers. 
The Djibouti facility clearly enhances China’s ability to project 
military power in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean and quickly 
deploy troops elsewhere in Africa. This is identical to the role 
Djibouti has long played for French and US militaries, linking 
their garrisons in central Africa, the Indian Ocean and Middle 
East. Nevertheless, to date China’s only terrestrial multilateral 
intervention in the Horn has been to provide troops to the UN 
contingent in South Sudan. 
Much Western media and policy coverage has focused on the 
incongruous closeness of the Chinese and US military facilities 
in Djibouti (barely a dozen kilometres separate the US troops in 
Lemonnier and the Chinese at Doraleh) as economic tensions 
escalated under Donald Trump.  However, barring a fleeting 
spat over Chinese alleged use of weapons-grade lasers, there 
are coloured by “Operation Red Sea”, the highest grossing film in China in 2018. 
This fictionalised account of the rescue of Chinese nationals from Yemen in 2015 
features Djibouti and was sponsored by PLAN. A similar, East Africa-based and 
PLAN-sponsored, movie, “Wolf Warrior II”, was China’s most popular movie in 
2017.  
11 C. Alden, A. Alao and Z. Chun (eds.), China and Africa: Building Peace and 
Security Cooperation on the Continent, London, Palgrave MacMillan, 2018.
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is scant public evidence of any actual friction on the ground. 
Indeed it is fair to assume that tacit cooperation occurs, given 
that ostensible rivals share naval bunkering and airstrips in 
Djibouti’s crowded capital, alongside myriad other forces.
Fractious Gulf Ties 
on the Arab-African Crossroads12
Overall, for the Djiboutian authorities themselves, it is not 
super-power confrontation which has been their primary 
diplomatic and economic preoccupations in recent years. These 
have been regional not global. The war in neighbouring Yemen 
and the repercussions of divisions in the Gulf Cooperation 
Council have posed serious challenges. These include the 
triggering of what many analysts have presented as a regional 
“cold war” within the Horn, as Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and 
the United Arab Emirates all seek allies and clients and military 
footholds in the Horn. Against this backdrop, Djibouti itself 
triggered a major rupture with its own primary economic backer 
to 2008, the Emirate of Dubai, regionally the most influential 
and powerful component UAE. 
Djibouti’s privileged ties with Dubai began to sour even 
before the flagship Doraleh Container Terminal, at the time 
the largest FDI project ever in Djibouti by far, had opened. 
As noted in section one above, in 2008-09 there were 
considerable domestic political tensions as Guelleh pushed 
through constitutional amendments. These triggered a rupture 
with Abdourahman Boreh, a close business associate who was 
instrumental in brokering Dubai Ports World’s investment in 
Doraleh’s container port. Following corruption charges, Boreh 
fled to the UAE; legal actions in London followed. While 
12  For more details on Gulf-Horn ties, see D. Styan, “Djibouti: bridging the Gulf 
of Aden?”, in R. Mason and S. Mabon (eds.), The Gulf States and the Horn of Africa: 
Interests, Influences and Instability, Manchester University Press, forthcoming, 
2021, on which this section draws. 
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DPW continued to manage the port until early 2018, relations 
with Djibouti became acutely strained from 2013 onwards. In 
2014 Djibouti’s Port Authority sought to nullify its existing 
management contract with DPW, alleging malpractice by 
Boreh. After protracted hearings, the cases against Boreh and 
DPW were rejected in 2016-17, the Djiboutian authorities 
being ordered to pay full costs. 
Meanwhile bad blood over the DPW-Doraleh deal – which 
started at root as effectively an intra-Djiboutian personal 
dispute (between President Guelleh and his confidant Boreh) 
– spilled over into the military sphere.  In early 2015 jets 
from the UAE were using Djiboutian landing strips as part of 
their intervention in Yemen’s civil war. A personalised dispute 
over landing rights for UAE planes led to Dubai suspending 
diplomatic ties with Djibouti.  At the time, senior members of 
the Djiboutian government viewed the incident as entangled in 
the broader DPW-Boreh dispute. While visa and flights were 
eventually restored several months later, trust and relations 
never recovered. 
Almost three years later, in early 2018 Djibouti’s government 
unilaterally terminated the Dubai Ports World’s management 
contract and equity stake in the Doraleh Container Terminal. 
The port’s seizure thus brought the increasingly embittered, six-
year legal and commercial dispute between the Emirati-owned 
DPW and Djibouti’s President to a climactic end. In turn, this 
reconfigured alliances in the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea. 
However, in one of the most commented-upon repercussions 
of this Africa-Gulf spat, as Dubai-Djibouti ties soured, in 
2016 DPW had announced a US$440 million, 30-year deal 
to develop the port of Berbera, in neighbouring Somaliland, 
just 250km east of Djibouti on the Gulf of Aden. Ethiopia has 
been long keen to diversify access to ports. In early 2018, just 
days after Djibouti’s seizure of DPW’s stake in the container 
port, the Ethiopian government announced that it would take 
a minority stake in the Berbera port development, alongside 
DPW and the Hargeisa government.  However, the deal had 
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been planned for many months; it was not a direct response to 
Djibouti’s nationalisation of DCT. 
Given this narrow African-Gulf dispute, pitting Djibouti’s 
President and entourage against his ex-advisor and DPW, 
the matter might be dismissed as being as much about pride 
and personalities than hard-nosed commercial rivalry or geo-
politics.  However, Djibouti’s domestic ports’ dispute with the 
Emirates evolved in an exceedingly fraught regional context. 
This meant that UAE/DPW’s problems in the Doraleh port, 
and DPW’s investment in neighbouring Somaliland’s Berbera 
port, had wider implications. 
By 2018, the regional and global context in the lower Red 
Sea and Gulf of Aden meant that regional rivalries and alliances 
on both sides of the Red Sea coast, as well as global rivalries – 
above all between China and the United States – appeared to 
be being played out in a race for military and commercial port 
infrastructure spanning almost 1,200 kilometres of the Horn of 
Africa coastline. 
The scramble for military and commercial influence and 
facilities contributes to political volatility and associated foreign 
policy choices facing all states in the Horn of Africa. This 
was most pronounced in terms of the implications of foreign 
government involvement in Somali politics, and how other 
actors, particularly the other Somali states (quasi-autonomous 
Puntland and the de-facto independent Somaliland), view 
Gulf Arab involvement.  It is also of concern to Ethiopia and 
Djibouti, both of whom contribute troops to the AU mission 
in Somalia, AMISOM. The African Union also expressed 
unease about the impact that growing Middle Eastern rivalry 
had upon Somalia; Chad’s Moussa Faki Mahamat, chairperson 
of the African Union Commission, voiced concern on in May 
2018 at what he termed “increasing instances” of interference 
by “non-African actors” – a veiled reference to UAE, Turkey 
and Qatar.13 
13 “External actors urged to stop meddling in Somalia’s affairs”, Al Jazeera, 29 May 2018. 
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The military and commercial rivalry between disparate Gulf 
and other powers in the Horn also complicates Western strategic 
responses to the rapid increase of Chinese naval power in the 
Indian Ocean and Red Sea. In the short term, the developments 
pointed to a gradual hardening of positions into increasingly 
concrete and fractious regional blocs. In the longer term, US 
and EU concerns about strategic shifts in the region remain 
focused primarily on Chinese plans and the containment of 
Islamist threats emanating from Yemen and Somalia, rather 
than regional tussles between local powers, or indeed the fate 
of the Yemeni nation and peoples.  As such, what Saudi Arabia, 
its allies and Qatar do in the Horn of Africa remains only of 
peripheral importance to US, European and Chinese stances 
over splits in the GCC as a whole. Nevertheless, the escalation 
of war in Yemen in 2015 and the blockade of Qatar in 2017 
have had a profound impact on regional geopolitics in the Horn 
of Africa, as competition and patronage increasingly fell along 
an Egypt-Saudi-UAE vs Turkey-Qatar fault-line, disrupting 
established patterns of patronage and foreign policies. 
Conclusion 
The chapter has attempted to provide an overview of some 
elements of Djibouti’s geostrategic roles as a port and military 
hub in the Horn of Africa and beyond. By surveying local, 
regional and global actors with whom the Djiboutian authorities 
interact, it has provided insights into the complex, multiple 
contradictions of Djibouti’s regional foreign policies. It has also 
illustrated how aspects of small state’s development strategies 
and priorities reflect such policies.  
Somewhat paradoxically, and contrary to the view of some 
in Paris, Washington or Beijing, the real uncertainties and 
challenges facing Ismael Omar Guelleh and those around him 
in 2020 are not posed by global geo-strategic factors. Guelleh 
has proved masterful in his ability to extract substantial rents 
and commissions, coupled with guarantees of international 
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legitimacy and support, from the world’s superpowers. He has 
adroitly played-off China against the US and other powers, 
in the process garnering considerable economic and political 
dividends for his family and entourage.
Instead, Djibouti’s political uncertainties stem from factors 
closer to home. Domestically, Guelleh has been reticent to 
openly nurture or anoint a chosen successor. Nor has he been 
willingly to countenance political pluralism or improved 
freedom of expression. Having amended the constitution a 
decade ago, and already served four presidential terms, in 
mid-2020 all the signs were that Guelleh was preparing for 
re-election in 2021. Despite the poverty of many Djiboutians, 
the presidential patronage machine will have sufficient funds 
to ensure patronage networks deliver the 100,000 or so votes 
to ensure his re-election. What is less sure is whether he can 
subsequently ensure a consensus among his family and close 
followers as to who is best placed to maintain the delicate 
domestic clan-based system of patronage, while balancing local 
regional factors to ensure his own political longevity. 
The impact of Covid-19 upon Djibouti has both a human 
and economic dimension. By September 2020 Djibouti had 
recorded 5,400 cases of Covid-19, with 60 deaths attributed 
to the disease. While absolute numbers are low compared 
with other African states, given Djibouti’s tiny population, 
the state has some of the highest rates of infection per-capita 
on the continent. As such the potential threat from Covid 
itself to Djiboutians remains severe, although after an initial 
swift lockdown, travel restrictions with neighbouring states 
were lifted in mid-July 2020. The pandemic has also dented 
economic growth, with GDP anticipated to contract by 1% 
in 2020. As a consequence, in May 2020 the IMF announced 
US$43.4 million of emergency balance of payments funding, 
and options on up to US$8 million debt relief in an attempt to 
alleviate the impact of the slowdown on government finances.  
Early in the pandemic, the US government announced a 
health emergency within its military facility at Camp Lemonnier, 
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underscoring the degree to which all foreign military bases in 
Djibouti have had to tighten controls on movement of troops 
and contractors around facilities in Djibouti.  
In terms of the economic benefits of Djibouti’s foreign and 
development strategies, the country’s role as the pre-eminent 
regional port and hub are unlikely to be dented in the short 
term. With Yemen wracked by civil war, aggravated by the 
botched Saudi-UAE interventions, and neither Assab nor 
Berbera likely to be able to offer comparable port facilities to 
shippers in the short term, Djibouti is nevertheless likely to 
retain its preeminent logistical position on the Bab Al Mandeb. 
The same applies to its dominance of Ethiopia’s merchandise 
trade flows. Despite incessant grumbles from the authorities and 
merchants in Addis Ababa about Djibouti’s quasi-monopoly 
grip on Ethiopia’s trade, Ethiopia’s economic dependence 
on Djibouti’s merchandise and container ports is unlikely to 
diminish in the near future. Indeed, with the development of 
a policy of inland “dry ports” within Ethiopia, the Djibouti-
Addis corridor is likely to expand. This trend will be reinforced 
if China’s industrial parks in highland Ethiopia expand as global 
trade and manufacturing recover post-Covid. This economic 
dynamic may be further boosted if Djibouti’s vast International 
Free Trade Zone, attached to the Doraleh Multi-Purpose Port, 
starts to attract clients. 
Briefly in mid-2018, there appeared to be a potential threat 
to Djibouti’s economic dominance of the Horn’s maritime 
trade and transhipments from the Ethio-Eritrean peace deal 
spearheaded by Abiy Ahmed. This threat has been postponed, 
thanks largely to the recalcitrance of Eritrea’s aging President. 
Even when a change of leadership in Asmara eventually 
does occur, Eritrea’s dilapidated ports of Assab and Massawa 
are unlikely to pose a major commercial threat to Djibouti’s 
dominance of Ethiopia’s maritime trade for many years; they 
will require substantial investment alongside a radical rethink 
of a reformed Eritrea’s regional strategies. 
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A more immediate uncertainty in terms of Djibouti’s ports’ 
strategy, is the legal status of, and financial compensation owing 
from, the Doraleh Container Terminal. This will remain a key 
liability for Guelleh’s administration. As narrated in section 
four, the Terminal was forcibly sequestered from DPW in 2018. 
Some estimates put the state’s liabilities at well over US$500 
million. It remains unclear how Djibouti proposes to meet this 
debt, though additional Chinese loans or debt-for-equity deals 
cannot be excluded.
Despite the uncertainties over these liabilities, and the 
unsustainable levels of debt owed to China, Beijing’s embrace 
of Djibouti is likely to intensify in coming years. For China’s 
government and parastatal companies, it is above all their ties 
with highland Ethiopia and Addis Ababa, which its vast internal 
market and African Union HQ, which are at the heart of their 
economic and diplomatic strategies in the Horn. As such, any 
rescheduling of debt owed by Djibouti is a relatively minor 
inconvenience when weighed against Beijing’s diplomatic and 
economic ties with Ethiopia and the AU. 
Similarly, the centrality of China to Djibouti’s diplomatic 
and economic policies, and the complexity of the country’s ties 
with neighbouring African and Middle Eastern states, are all 
reminders to what extent the EU is now just one player among 
many on the crowded Djiboutian chessboard. Nevertheless, 
the EU will continue to have a significant presence in Djibouti 
for the foreseeable future, not least because of the ongoing 
influence of both France and the EU’s Atalanta EUNAVFOR 
anti-piracy mission.
4.  Eritrea: Still an Island?
Michael Woldemariam*
The state of Eritrea is experiencing a significant shift in its 
international relations. Since the mid-2000s, the country has 
been a figurative “island”, politically and economically isolated 
from its region and the international system. Yet the landmark 
2018 thaw in relations with its large southern neighbour and 
rival, Ethiopia, has ushered in a new era, creating opportunities 
for the Government of Eritrea (GOE) to rehabilitate its external 
relationships. This chapter seeks to assess Eritrea’s foreign 
relations since its rapprochement with Ethiopia. It argues 
that while the rehabilitation of the country’s international 
relations is real, this process remains partial and incomplete. 
Despite a more hospitable regional and international climate, 
the character of Eritrea’s governing structures impedes a full 
pivot in its foreign policy and external relations. A “garrison 
state” preoccupied with managing threats to regime security, 
the country’s ruling elites pursue the same mix of muscular and 
uncompromising statecraft abroad and semi-isolationism at 
home that initiated, and for so long sustained, the erosion of 
its international standing. Eritrea is no longer an “island”, but 
only significant reform of its governing system can deliver a full 
rehabilitation of its foreign relations. 
The chapter proceeds in the following fashion. It begins by 
outlining the genesis of Eritrea’s slide into international isolation 
* The views expressed in this chapter are his own and do not represent those of his 
employer or any other institution he may be affiliated with.
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in the years following its border war with Ethiopia, emphasising 
the complex interaction between external dynamics and Eritrea’s 
domestic politics. It then describes the slow but still marginal 
improvement in Eritrea’s international standing between 2015 
and early 2018, before moving on to explore the dramatic 
shift in Eritrea’s international fortunes after the summer 2018 
rapprochement with Ethiopia. The final section illustrates why 
the rehabilitation of Eritrea’s external relations remains partial 
and incomplete.
Eritrea as an “Island”
The breakdown in Eritrea’s external relations was as swift as it 
was unexpected. Eritrea and its nationalist rebel movement-
turned ruling party, the People’s Front for Democracy and 
Justice (PFDJ), spent much of the 1990s as a darling of 
the international community, so much so that the Clinton 
administration dubbed President Isaias Afwerki as among 
a select “new breed of African leaders” who would promote 
peace, stability, and economic growth on the continent. First 
Lady Hillary Clinton affirmed this view with a high-level visit 
to the country in March 1997.1 Although Western donors 
occasionally found the Eritrean government to be prickly and 
inflexible on matters that it perceived as threatening its sovereign 
prerogatives, it generally received high marks on governance 
related matters – it remained committed, for instance, to the 
formula of market reforms and multi-party democracy, and 
tolerated little corruption. Eritrea was also a strategic partner 
of the US and its Western allies, playing an important role in 
the containment of Sudanese Islamists and the toppling of the 
notoriously corrupt regime of Mobutu Sese Seko.2
1 D. Himbara, “How Would Bill Clinton Rate These Leaders He Famously Called 
‘New Breed’?”, HuffPost Canada, 18 February 2015.
2 P. Roessler and H. Verhoeven, Why Comrades Go to War: Liberation Politics and 
the Outbreak of Africa’s Deadliest Conflict, New York-Oxford, Oxford University 
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Yet the country’s fortunes on the international stage began 
to change in 1998, in part because its regional position became 
increasingly untenable. Eritrea fought a devastating border war 
with its one-time ally and much larger southern neighbour, 
Ethiopia. By most objective standards Eritrea was on the losing 
end of the fighting. The Algiers Agreement, signed between 
the two states in December 2000, ended the war but failed to 
resolve the underlying dispute. This chain of events, unfolding 
over a period of several years, had the effect of diminishing 
Eritrea in the regional pecking order just as it embarked on 
an intense strategic rivalry with the Horn of Africa’s emergent 
hegemon. As the rivalry deepened and expanded, descending 
into mutual destabilisation, Ethiopia assiduously sought to 
impose a diplomatic blockade on Eritrea that would leave it 
isolated. The latter’s regional and international relationships 
began to suffer as a result. 
The regional dynamics that eroded Eritrea’s international 
standing were reinforced by important global trends that 
involved the world’s preeminent power and gatekeeper of 
international order, the United States. The attacks of September 
11 turned the Horn of Africa, and Somalia in particular, into 
an important battleground in the “Global War on Terror”. The 
US sought regional partners, and a newly ascendant Ethiopia, 
which possessed an extended land border with Somalia, seemed 
an obvious candidate. The secular trend from this point onwards 
was for Washington – which was among the guarantors of the 
Algiers Agreement and had hitherto remained equidistant from 
Addis Ababa and Asmara – to favour Ethiopia on matters related 
to the Eritrea-Ethiopia dispute. An explosive turning point came 
in 2002-03, when Ethiopia refused to honour its commitments 
under the Algiers Agreement, including relinquishing the 
disputed town of Badme. Yielding to intense lobbying from 
Addis Ababa, the Bush administration largely shielded Ethiopia 
Press, 2017; J. Fisher, East Africa after Liberation: Conflict, Security and the State 
since the 1980s, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2020.
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from the diplomatic fallout of this behaviour at the UN, to the 
frustration of the Eritrean side. When US Assistant Secretary of 
State for African Affairs Jendayi Frasier attempted to push the 
peace process forward in 2006, her efforts at shuttle diplomacy 
further antagonised the GOE, not least because she tacitly 
endorsed Ethiopia’s occupation of Badme by visiting the town 
without Eritrean permission.3 By early 2007, it was apparent 
that the evolving triangular relationship between Washington-
Addis Ababa-Asmara had severely damaged US-Eritrea ties.
Yet alone, this turbulence on the international scene was 
insufficient to transform Eritrea into a figurative “island”. It 
was a set of linked internal developments that would seal the 
deal. In 2001, a group of 15 top PFDJ officials, and a broader 
network of their supporters within and outside the ruling 
party, mobilised against President Isaias, insisting that hitherto 
delayed national elections must be held and that a proper 
accounting of the war with Ethiopia was necessary. In power 
since Eritrea’s de facto independence in 1991, this was the most 
serious challenge the incumbent President had faced in his time 
at the helm. In September 2001, he responded with a sweeping 
crackdown that eliminated organised political opposition, the 
free press, an independent civil society, plans for elections, and 
a working legislature. Disappearances and incommunicado 
detention were the primary tools used to consolidate power 
in this context. In order to control an increasingly boisterous 
student and youth population, the national service system was 
transformed into a sprawling apparatus of indefinite military 
service and forced labour. As a result, a pattern of severe human 
rights abuses gripped the country, and a massive human exodus 
began to take shape: by 2008, tens of thousands of Eritreans 
3 For a good summaries of this dynamic, see M. Woldemariam, “The Making of 
an African ‘Pariah’: Eritrea in the International System”, in Postliberation Eritrea, 
Bloomington IN, Indiana University Press, 2018; S. Odinga, “‘We Recommend 
Compliance’: Bargaining and Leverage in Ethiopian-US Intelligence Cooperation”, 
Review of African Political Economy, vol. 44, no. 153, 3 July 2017, pp. 432-48.
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were leaving the country a year.4 Power at the top of the 
ruling party became highly personalized, and concentrated in 
the hands of the President and a loyal band of security elites. 
Given the tense external situation, the putsch was rationalized 
by invoking amorphous and all-encompassing concepts of 
“national security” and “states of emergency”. Through the 
GOE’s now dominant propaganda organs, the argument was 
made that rivalry with Ethiopia and the threat of invasion 
demanded such a radical closure of political space. As time 
wore on and the relationship with the international community 
worsened, the notion of an American inspired conspiracy – in 
support of Addis against Asmara – was increasingly invoked as 
a tool to legitimate the country’s profound authoritarian turn.5
By the mid-2000s, it was apparent Eritrea had been 
transformed into what Tronvoll and Mekonnen called an 
“African garrison state” – a state organised along military lines, 
run largely by military elites, for the purpose of guaranteeing 
their security against militarised threats.6 This transition had 
significant impacts on the country’s international relationships. 
Facing what it judged to be a growing number of provocations 
from Ethiopia and the US, on the border question and other 
issues, an increasingly securitised decision-making apparatus in 
Asmara responded with a foreign policy marked by escalation, 
brinkmanship, inflexibility and intemperateness, all of which 
further isolated it politically.7 Its turn to militarised autocracy 
4 M. Belloni, The Big Gamble: The Migration of Eritreans to Europe, Berkeley CA, 
Univesity of California Press, 2019; M. Belloni, “Why Young Eritreans Are Going 
to Keep Risking Deadly Migration Crossings to Europe”, Quartz Africa, 27 July 
2019.
5 For a good summary of these domestic developments and their origins, see G. 
Kibreab, Eritrea: A Dream Deferred, Oxford, James Currey, 2009; K. Tronvoll and 
D.R. Mekonnen, African Garrison State: Human Rights and Political Development 
in Eritrea, Woodbridge, Boydell & Brewer Ltd, 2014.
6 K. Tronvoll and D.R. Mekonnen (2014).
7 Although the GOE would dispute this characterisation, Presidential Advisor 
Yemane Gebreab seemed to unwittingly acknowledge the underlying pathologies 
in the GOE’s approach to the world when he noted “We have never changed our 
Africa’s Thorny Horn82
– leading some to dub it “Africa’s North Korea” – brought 
its human rights record under intense scrutiny and further 
damaged its ties with Western partners.8 Deploying the rhetoric 
of “self-reliance”, President Isaias worked to isolate the Eritrean 
population from external influences that might undermine his 
grip on power, expelling a long list of donors and/or curtailing 
their operations within the country at the cost of the GOE’s 
international reputation.9 In short, the international system 
had dealt Eritrea a bad and in many ways unfair hand; but its 
deteriorating internal situation meant the GOE played this 
hand poorly.
The cumulative effect of all of these developments began to 
take shape by 2009. Eritrea was hit with UN Security Council 
(UNSC) sanctions in December of that year for its support 
of the Somali Islamist militant group al-Shabaab – part of 
the mutual proxy war between Eritrea and Ethiopia – as well 
as an unresolved border dispute with Djibouti that turned 
violent in May-June 2008 but which Asmara largely refused to 
acknowledge.10 In both instances, the US publicly and privately 
called on the GOE to modify its behaviour, and it was Asmara’s 
subsequent failure to heed this guidance that eventually led 
the US to diplomatically engineer the sanctions regime. 13 of 
15 UNSC members voted for UNSC 1907 – which primarily 
consisted of a two-way weapons embargo on Eritrea – with 
only Libya voting against and China abstaining. 
vision ... We are not very good at or very keen to play the game that we have been 
told we need to play”. See E. Blair, “Crises Give Eritrea Routes for Closer Global 
Engagement”, Reuters, 29 February 2016.
8 “Why Eritrea Is Called Africa’s North Korea”, The Economist, 14 August 2018.
9 E. Harris, “Eritrea Expels Three More Foreign Charities - Eritrea”, Relief Web, 23 
March 2006.
10 The Eritrean government referred to the border dispute as “US fabricated” and 
largely denied the existence of any underlying disagreement. It was only after the 
sanctions regime was initiated that it acceded to Qatari mediation of the dispute, 
although this was ultimately unsuccessful. See Shabait, “A Shameful Day for the 
United Nations”, Press Release, 23 December 2009.
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The sanctions regime was later expanded in December 2011 
with the passage of UNSC 2023, again with overwhelming 
diplomatic support at the UNSC. The resolution sought to 
target two key sources of revenue for the Eritrean government 
– mining and remittances – and called on UN member states to 
take “appropriate measures” in ensuring that funds from these 
sources were not used for military purposes, or in the cases 
of remittances, derived through government extortion. The 
result was an avalanche of scrutiny and in some cases outright 
prohibition of remittance collection by Eritrean officials in 
Western countries.
By 2012, the human rights situation in Eritrea created 
additional problems for the GOE. At the 20th session of the UN 
Human Rights Council (UNHRC) a resolution was adopted 
establishing a special rapporteur for the human rights situation 
in Eritrea, the first non-cooperative country mandate passed 
by consensus in the history of the UNHRC. After a series of 
explosive reports from Special Rapporteur Sheila Keetharuth, 
a Mauritian human rights defender, the Council approved 
the creation of a Commission of Inquiry (COI) to further 
investigate the human rights climate in country. This was also 
a landmark event in the history of the UNHRC, as it was only 
the third such commission created in the Council’s existence, 
following those established to probe the situations in North 
Korea and Syria. After the COI released damning findings in 
2015, the UNHRC decided to extend the mandate of both the 
Special Rapporteur and the COI, while expanding the COI’s 
remit by tasking it with ascertaining whether the Eritrean 
government was guilty of crimes against humanity. The final 
report of the COI concluded that Eritrea’s ruling elite were in 
fact guilty of such charges.
All of the developments at the UN that isolated Eritrea were 
reinforced by multilateral manoeuvring in Africa and the Horn 
region. Much of the initial diplomatic momentum behind the 
UN sanctions regime was generated by the unprecedented 
request of the African Union (AU) that the UN sanction Eritrea. 
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Prior to this request, Eritrea had diplomatically wounded itself 
by suspending its AU membership and President Isaias’s non-
appearance at a critical AU heads of state meeting in Libya that 
addressed the Eritrea file.11 Eritrea was also effectively prohibited 
from rejoining IGAD after it suspended its membership in 
2007 over Ethiopia’s intervention in Somalia.12 In 2010, a 
regional initiative sponsored by Ethiopia called the Sanaa 
Forum – which included Somalia, Yemen, and Sudan – was 
expanded to include Djibouti, which had long resisted joining 
because of the obvious fact that the Forum was designed to 
isolate Eritrea in the Horn and Red Sea arena.13 Later, Horn 
states like Somalia and Djibouti – no doubt with Ethiopia’s 
eager endorsement – co-sponsored key UNHRC resolutions 
targeting Eritrea.
This barrage of international setbacks, shaped by the complex 
interaction between a number of important regional and global 
developments not of Eritrea’s making, as well as the GOE’s own 
pathologies as a garrison state, is how the country became an 
“island” politically and economically isolated from its region 
and much of the world. It would be external developments 
that would erode Eritrea’s international isolation, and internal 
constraints that prevented the country from seizing the 
opportunity to fully rehabilitate its international relations.14
11 Author’s interview, Ethiopian diplomat, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, January 2019.
12 The preceding four paragraphs are primarily drawn from Woldemariam, “The 
Making of an African ‘Pariah’: Eritrea in the International System”, in T.M. 
Woldemikael (ed.), Postliberation Eritrea, Bloomington IN, Indiana University 
Press, 2018, pp. 318-357.
13 “FMs Attending Sanaa Forum Address Security Challenges in Somalia”, Global 
Times, 2 August 2010.
14 It should be noted that the Eritrean government would strongly dispute the 
narrative that it had become internationally isolated. And to be clear, the country 
did have solid ties with a small portfolio of countries whose exact membership 
evolved over time: South Africa, Libya, Egypt, Qatar, China, Russia. For a good 
articulation of this view, see F. Amahazion, “Eritrea: Global Ties and Diplomacy”, 
TesfaNews, 17 March 2014.
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Shifting Fortunes
While the shedding of Eritrea’s status as an “island” was 
accelerated by the landmark thaw in its relationship with 
Ethiopia in 2018, the process was in motion well before this 
development, and apparent as early as 2015. There are three 
distinct but related external dynamics that played a role in 
stabilizing and marginally improving Eritrea’s international 
standing in this period. 
The first was the increasing engagement of Saudi Arabia and 
the UAE in the Horn of Africa region.15 This began with the 
onset of their war effort in Yemen in March 2015, which required 
the UAE to establish a military facility in the vicinity of the Bab 
el-Mandeb and Yemen’s strategic Red Sea coastlines. The most 
obvious candidate to host such a facility, outside of war-torn 
Yemen itself, was Djibouti: there were already several foreign 
military bases in the country, including that of the Emirati’s key 
ally, the US, and an Emirati company named DP World managed 
Djibouti’s main port. But Djibouti and the UAE had recently 
fallen into a major diplomatic spat. In this context, Eritrea’s Assab 
port, which was just 100 miles north of Djibouti’s, appeared the 
next best option. The relationship was consummated during the 
April 2015 visit by President Isaias to Riyadh, and within months 
the UAE had developed a robust military-logistics hub on the 
Eritrean coast.16 Eritrea’s relations with the two Gulf monarchies 
further deepened after the summer of 2017, when it stridently 
aligned itself with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi in their escalating 
rivalry with Qatar and Turkey.17
15 For good overviews of this dynamic, see H. Verhoeven, “The Gulf and the Horn: 
Changing Geographies of Security Interdependence and Competing Visions of 
Regional Order”, Civil Wars, vol. 20, no. 3, 3 July 2018, pp. 333-57; J. Meester, W. 
van den Berg, and H. Verhoeven, Riyal Politik, Cligendael, April 2018.
16 M. Woldemariam, “‘No War, No Peace’ in a Region in Flux: Crisis, Escalation, 
and Possibility in the Eritrea-Ethiopia Rivalry”, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 
vol. 12, no. 3, 3 July 2018, p. 416; “Saudi King Salman Receives Eritrean Leader in 
Riyadh”, Al Arabiya English, 29 April 2015.
17 This was extraordinary about-face, since Qatar had long been one of Eritrea’s few 
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The upshot of these developments from the Eritrean 
perspective was tangible but hardly transformative. Asmara 
acquired powerful patrons that it could leverage diplomatically 
– across the Horn, at important multilateral institutions, and 
in Western capitals. On the other hand, because Saudi-Emirati 
engagement ran the risk of violating the UNSC Eritrea sanctions 
regime, there were limits to how far the Gulf monarchies were 
willing to take the relationship. Indeed, it is likely that Saudi-
Emirati aid to Eritrea did not extend beyond limited “in-kind” 
assistance, in the form of refined fuel products, investments in 
energy, and some coastal maritime capabilities.18 
A second important external dynamic that bolstered 
Eritrea’s international relations was growing momentum in 
Western capitals around the idea of rehabilitating ties with 
Asmara. In the case of the Europeans, this was driven by the 
Mediterranean migration crisis that saw hundreds of thousands 
of African refugees arriving on Europe’s southern shores after 
2012. Eritrean refugees featured prominently in this drama: 
by 2015, Eritreans had become the single largest group of 
refugees entering Italy, accounting for 25 percent of the total.19 
Desperate to encourage domestic reforms that would stem 
Eritrean migration into Europe, the EU sought to leverage a 
€200 million development package for Eritrea in 2016.20 There 
diplomatic friends. M. Woldemariam, “How the Gulf Crisis Is Playing Out in the 
Horn of Africa”, World Politics Review, 1 August 2017; J. Jawhar, “Eritrea Accuses 
Qatar, Turkey of ‘Subversive Acts’”, Asharq AL-awsat, 5 April 2019.
18 M. Woldemariam, “‘No War, No Peace’ in a Region in Flux: Crisis, Escalation, 
and Possibility in the Eritrea-Ethiopia Rivalry”…, cit., p. 423; N. Manek, “Eritrea’s 
Military Got Help From U.A.E., Foreign Firms, UN Says”, Bloomberg.Com, 12 
November 2017; Note that the UN’s Somalia-Eritrea Monitoring Group claimed 
that Eritrea received US$500 million for leasing Assab base to the UAE, a claim 
denied by Eritrea. See T.-A. Tekie, “Eritrea Denies Leasing Port Assab to UAE”, 
Sudan Tribune, 30 December 2016.
19 B. Frouws, The Eritrean Exodus: What Happened in 2016?, Mixed Migration 
Centre, 9 February 2017.
20 “European Union to Finance Development Projects in Eritrea to Curb Illegal 
Migration”, Diplomat News Network, 30 January 2016.
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were parallel developments occurring in Washington, where 
the lobbying efforts of a number of prominent think tankers 
and former US diplomats were creating a buzz around the 
idea that the US should recalibrate its policy towards Eritrea.21 
These efforts evidently found some support on Capitol Hill 
in the form of US Congressman Dana Rohrabacher.22 The 
election of Donald Trump in 2016 was another catalyst for this 
conversation, as it marked the departure of key personalities in 
the Obama-Clinton orbit that had insisted on maintaining a 
hard line on GOE, including National Security Adviser Susan 
Rice. In April 2018, acting US Assistant Secretary of State for 
Africa Donald Yamamoto visited Asmara – the highest-ranking 
US official to visit the country in a decade – with the explicit 
goal of improving US-Eritrea ties.23
In the end, neither the European nor American efforts achieved 
much traction. The EU sought to attach conditionalities to 
the aid package that the GOE predictably refused to comply 
with. And although Yamamoto’s visit convinced some in 
the US government that a breakthrough in ties was possible 
(others in the administration were more sceptical), the GOE 
did not appear willing to accept the American concept for how 
relations should move forward.24 But these episodes did re-
establish a deeper level of diplomatic contact between Eritrea 
and key Western countries, and further punctured the narrative 
that Eritrea was destined to remain an isolated African state.
21 I refer here to the efforts of Bronwyn Bruton of the Atlantic Council and former 
US Assistant Secretary of State Hank Cohen, both of which sat on an Eritrea study 
group designed to shift US policy on Eritrea.
22 D. Rohrabacher, “To Hold Back Iran, Cooperate with Eritrea”, The National 
Interest, 29 August 2017; S. Solomon, “Congressman Calls for US Military 
Partnership with Eritrea”, Voice of America English, 4 August 2017.
23 To be clear, this visit was planned before the resignation of Prime Minister 
Hailemariam Desalegn in early April 2018. Author’s conversation, US diplomat, 
January 2018, Washington, DC.
24 Author’s conversations with US officials in the Fall of 2018 and Spring of 2019, 
Washington, DC.
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The final development that appeared to hold out promise for a 
shift in Eritrea’s international standing was the changing nature of 
the sanctions debate at the UNSC. In short, the consensus behind 
the sanctions began to break down. By 2017, the body responsible 
for monitoring the Eritrea sanctions regime – the Somalia Eritrea 
Monitoring Group (SEMG) – had reported on four separate 
occasions that it was unable to find conclusive evidence of Eritrean 
support for al-Shabaab. Leveraging this fact, Egypt, which held a 
UNSC seat and shared Eritrea’s strategic animus toward Ethiopia, 
mounted an aggressive attempt to water-down the sanction’s 
regime.25 The diplomatic manoeuvre drew some support from 
UNSC permanent members Russia and China. But here too, 
events did not fully move in Eritrea’s favour, as its unwillingness 
to formally engage with the SEMG mechanisms led the US and 
Europeans to block changes to the sanctions. Still, for many close 
observers of the UNSC, these events signalled it was only a matter 
of time before the opinion in the Council moved decisively against 
maintaining the sanctions regime.26 
The Ethiopian Transition as a Turning Point
Events that transpired between 2015 and early 2018 thus 
placed Eritrea in a complicated international position. Its status 
as a figurative “island” persisted, and in some ways was further 
consolidated: in January 2018, for instance, Sudan shuttered 
Eritrea’s last open land border, claiming that President Isaias 
had urged Sudanese Vice President Bakri Hassan Saleh and the 
Sudanese military to oust President Omar al-Bashir.27 Yet several 
external developments had created a sense of momentum for 
the Government of Eritrea in the domain of foreign relations. 
25 “Somalia and Eritrea Sanctions Resolution”, What’s In Blue, 13 November 2017.
26 Author’s interview, Senior Ethiopian diplomat, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, January 
2019.
27 Author’s conversation, Senior official from a prominent multilateral organization, 
Washington, DC, January 2018; “The Story Behind The Sudan-Eritrea Falling 
Out”, Eritrea Digest, 12 March 2018.
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As Foreign Minister Osman Saleh noted in early 2016, “Eritrea 
wants to engage, and now the world wants to engage”.28
But it was dramatic political developments in Ethiopia in 
the spring of 2018 that would play a decisive role in altering 
the external landscape that Eritrea faced. The selection of Abiy 
Ahmed as Ethiopia’s new Prime Minister created space for a 
rapprochement between the two countries for reasons that 
are complex and have been discussed elsewhere. The crux of 
the matter is that much of the Eritrea-Ethiopia rivalry was an 
elite affair, caught up in the historically fraught relationship 
between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and 
the PFDJ, the two political parties that had long dominated 
Ethiopian and Eritrean affairs respectively. Abiy’s side-lining of 
the TPLF created a willingness on the part of President Isaias to 
rehabilitate the Eritrea-Ethiopia relationship. After the critical 
breakthrough in relations in the summer of 2018, ties between 
Asmara and Addis Ababa appeared to blossom. Tiziana Corda 
of the Network for the Advancement of Social and Political 
Studies reports that between September 2018 and September 
2019 alone, there were 12 high-level visits between the two 
leaderships, a greater number of such visits than each country 
had with any other state in that period.29
Whatever the causes of the rapprochement, its implications 
were significant for Eritrea. Ethiopia was a pivotal node in the 
diplomatic blockade of Eritrea, through its robust and successful 
lobbying at the UN, in Washington and other Western capitals, 
and throughout the Horn of Africa region. Under the new 
Prime Minister, Ethiopia changed course, removing the long-
serving Ethiopian ambassador at the UN who had helped 
engineer the sanctions, and formally requesting that the UN lift 
the sanctions regime.30 Within four months of the Ethiopian 
request, the UNSC dropped the Eritrea sanctions.31 
28 E. Blair (2016).
29 See https://twitter.com/tizianacorda/status/1173255967540154368/photo/1
30 A. Ashine, “Ethiopia Requests UN to Lift Eritrea Sanctions”, The East African, 
10 July 2018.
31 “U.N. Lifts Sanctions on Eritrea, but Keeps Somalia Arms Embargo”, The New 
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The thaw also created an opportunity for Eritrea to re-engage 
with other states in the region. The resulting diplomatic activity 
was dizzying. President Isaias visited Kenya in December 2018, 
and PM Abiy brought Kenya’s Uhuru Kenyatta to Asmara in 
March 2019. There was a landmark visit by Isaias to Mogadishu 
just prior to his Kenya trip. Foreign Minister Osman Saleh went 
on historic trips to Djibouti and Somaliland. Isaias convened 
with Djibouti’s Ismail Omer Guelleh in Jeddah in September 
2018. The Eritrean President went on a joint tour with Abiy 
in South Sudan. After Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir was 
toppled in April 2019, reciprocal high-level visits with Sudan’s 
new leadership were quickly undertaken as well. And in more 
concrete terms, in September 2018 there was a tripartite 
agreement between Somalia, Eritrea, and Ethiopia designed 
to align the three countries on regional economic and security 
matters, with two heads of state summits held subsequently to 
follow up on progress.
Eritrea’s dramatically shifting regional position piqued the 
interest of Western states and their donor institutions, who 
sought to support new dynamics in the Horn that were in the 
interest of regional peace and stability. They thus sought to 
more fully engage the Eritrean leadership. Through the last-
minute intervention of National Security Advisor John Bolton, 
the US dropped its opposition to the lifting of the Eritrea 
sanctions regime in November 2018, which played a key role in 
the removal of sanctions that same month.32 Newly appointed 
US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Tibor Nagy visited 
Eritrea in December 2018. Three months later, three members 
of Congress visited Asmara – including the heavyweight 
chairwoman of the Africa subcommittee and Congressional 
Black Caucus Karen Bass – the first Congressional delegation 
to the country in 14 years. This was accompanied by a stream of 
senior-level delegations from Europe, including Italian Prime 
York Times, 14 November 2018. 
32 “UN to Lift Sanctions on Eritrea after US Shift”, France24, 2 November 2018.
Eritrea: Still an Island? 91
Minister Giuseppe Conte, German Foreign Minister Heiko 
Maas, and EU Commissioner for International Cooperation 
Neven Mimica. The EU also re-started development assistance 
to Eritrea, dropping conditionalities in late 2018 in favour of a 
“dual track policy” that separated governance and human rights 
dialogue from development cooperation.33 The World Bank, 
for its part, entered discussions with the GOE on restarting 
a development program for the country.  Large business 
delegations from Germany and Italy arrived in Asmara keen 
to capitalize on the window of opportunity created by the new 
regional rapprochement. 
The above-mentioned developments were just a few of several 
indications that by 2019 Eritrea was no longer an island isolated 
from its region and the world. Just as the onset of the strategic 
rivalry with Ethiopia in 1998 sent Eritrea’s external relations 
into the abyss, so too did the thaw in relations between the 
two countries exactly twenty years later create a window for the 
GOE to rehabilitate its international standing.
Eritrean Foreign Policy and Its Limits
Despite the diplomatic successes of the last two years, Eritrea’s 
external relations face challenges in the year 2020 that should 
not be dismissed. The GOE international standing has not 
returned to the pre-1998 status quo ante, and the reason is 
simple: if the regional and international situation around 
Eritrea has changed, Eritrea itself surely has not. It remains 
a “garrison state”, with all of its attendant consequences for 
Eritrea’s foreign relations.
To be sure, the rationale behind Eritrea’s garrison state has 
shifted somewhat, but the essence is the same. The key enemy 
is now not TPLF-dominated Ethiopia writ large, but the TPLF 
ensconced in Tigray Regional State, a perch from which it 
33 V. Chadwick, “EU Foreign Chief Defends Aid for Eritrea amid Human Rights 
Concerns”, Devex, 16 March 2020.
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engages in subterfuge against the PFDJ and stalls the peace 
process. Remnants of its regional network in Djibouti, Somalia, 
Sudan, the Eritrean diaspora, and the rest of Ethiopia are an 
added danger. There are also Islamist interests, backed by Qatar 
and Turkey, two external players President Isaias continues to 
regard as a destabilizing force. The steady diet of anti-American 
rhetoric from the GOE’s information organs has dissipated, but 
the US and its Western partners are still not to be trusted.34 
Wielding this narrative, which has some basis, the GOE 
continues to emphasize the precarity of its security situation 
and the reversibility of the external gains it has achieved, even 
as it asserts it has been vindicated by its improved international 
standing. So, in May 2019, President Isaias spoke of the 
“beginnings of a new era” just as he cautioned that “These 
momentous events should not prompt us to underestimate the 
challenges the new era brings” and that the GOE “cannot make 
hasty and emotional conclusions before we collect adequate 
information, analyse these data comprehensively with patience 
to have a clear picture”.35 The message being communicated 
here is clear: continuing national security concerns mean that 
Eritrea can no more afford political reform today than it could 
when it was in the throes of its strategic rivalry with Ethiopia.
And so the domestic political situation in Eritrea is mostly 
unchanged. There have been virtually no meaningful political 
reforms, even though the population anticipated the country’s 
shifting international position would generate a domestic 
opening, and dashed expectations are generating some palpable 
signs of discontent. Eritrea remains a country governed along 
military lines, by military elites, for the purpose of guaranteeing 
their security against militarised threats. These hyper-securitised 
governing structures mean that many of the pathologies that 
have shaped the GOE’s foreign policy persist: the diplomatic 
34 These observations are drawn from the GOE’s public commentary, both written 
and those communicated orally by its officials.
35 “President Isaias Afwerki’s 28th Independence Anniversary Speech”, TesfaNews, 
24 May 2019.
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abrasiveness, the inflexibility, and the tendency to embrace 
risky strategies that generate blow-back; the troubling human 
rights record; and the reflexive tendency to wall-off Eritrea 
from external influences that could shake President Isaias’ hold 
on power. 
The costs of these behavioural tendencies for Eritrea are 
obvious across a variety of foreign relations domains, although 
one must be clear that the GOE’s responsibility on these matters 
is only partial. Asmara seeks to undercut key multilateral 
institutions in the Horn region instead of moulding them 
in their own interest, judging them to be too tainted by the 
legacy of the TPLF and their association with Western powers. 
Thus, it refuses to re-join IGAD, and has sought to limit the 
influence of the AU. The latter position was best illustrated 
by Asmara’s efforts to disinvite the AU from the signing 
ceremony of the Jeddah Peace Agreement between Eritrea 
and Ethiopia in September 2018, or by its refusal to sign on 
to the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), 
a stance that eventually made Eritrea the final African holdout 
to the continental arrangement. The Ethiopia-Eritrea-Somalia 
tripartite initiative, advanced by Isaias, was part of this strategy 
and designed to serve as a narrower multilateral alternative. But 
it has no realistic chance of replacing IGAD, isolates Eritrea 
from important multilateral fora, and only serves to antagonize 
countries like Djibouti, Kenya, and Somaliland who feel 
threatened by the tripartite initiative for various reasons.36 
At the bilateral level, Eritrea has not fully normalized its 
relations with key neighbours. Eritrea’s ties with Djibouti have 
not advanced, as the border dispute remains live and relations 
between Isaias and Guelleh continue to be shrouded in mutual 
suspicion. Ties with Ethiopia, which Asmara regards as its most 
important regional partner, remain complicated by a stalled 
36 I. Henneberg and S. Stapel, “Cooperation and Conflict at the Horn of Africa: A 
New Regional Bloc Between Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia and Its Consequences 
for Eastern Africa”, Africa Spectrum, 18 August 2020; S.T. Demissie, Is Another 
Regional Alliance What the Horn Needs?, ISS Africa, 24 March 2020. 
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peace process. It is true that relations between Abiy and Isaias are 
strong, but normalisation between countries requires more than 
friendship between leaders. After a brief opening of the frontier, 
the last border crossing between the two neighbours was closed 
in April 2019. Meanwhile, bilateral links on trade, investment, 
the movement of people, port access, transportation, and a host 
of other important issues have not been formalized. Ethiopian 
sources indicate the government of Eritrea has been slow to 
respond to proposals on these matters.37 There is no doubt 
that TPLF obstructionism and subterfuge, at least as perceived 
by Asmara, is a major reason why Eritrea has slow-rolled 
normalisation – it is the TPLF, for instance, that has blocked Abiy 
from relinquishing Badme and other Eritrean territories. But it 
is also true that full normalisation threatens PFDJ control over 
Eritrea. When the borders between the countries were opened 
in September 2018, tens of thousands of Eritreans, including 
members of the army, flooded across the Ethiopian border never 
to return. Moreover, the opening of the frontier created a massive 
cross-border trade in key goods that threatened the economic 
monopoly of PFDJ conglomerates in Eritrea.38 The dilemma for 
the GOE thus seems stark: it can normalize its relations with its 
largest and economically most vibrant neighbour, or remain a 
garrison state. Both ends cannot be achieved at the same time. 
The other challenge for Eritrea’s bilateral diplomatic ties in 
the Horn is the GOE’s tendency to lean into the politics of 
neighbouring countries in a way that leaves it vulnerable to 
major diplomatic reversals. In Ethiopia, President Isaias’ recent 
public statements have led to speculation – unproven it must be 
emphasized – that he is meddling in Ethiopian affairs in support 
of Abiy’s consolidation of power. In June 2019, these statements 
37 N. Ashenafi, “Ethio-Eritrean Rapprochement: Is It Stalling?”, The Reporter 
Ethiopia, 27 July 2019; Author’s conversations, Ethiopian analysts, Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia, June 2019.
38 Author’s interviews, Ethiopian diplomats and analysts, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 
January and June 2019. Also, author’s telephone conversation with former PFDJ 
member, June 2020. 
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drew a strong rebuke from a high profile group of Oromo 
intellectuals.39 In Sudan, the pattern of Asmara’s engagement has 
created the impression it is working to guarantee the military’s 
supremacy in Khartoum.40 In Somalia, the story is similar, 
as the lack of transparency surrounding Asmara’s training of 
Somali troops has contributed to suspicions that Isaias seeks 
to strengthen Farmajo ahead of the 2020 Somali elections.41 
Given the political volatility in many of Eritrea’s neighbours, 
this kind of muscular and highly partial engagement comes 
with risk: should Asmara’s preferred partners lose power or be 
diminished, it could well find itself in diplomatic difficulty in 
key capitals around the Horn region. 
Outside of the Horn of Africa, Eritrea’s key relationships are 
hardly on a solid footing. The lack of internal political reform 
has impacted the appetite of key Western actors to deepen 
ties with Asmara. The EU’s dual-track approach has quickly 
run into political trouble. Human rights and diaspora groups 
in Europe mobilised against the policy, as evidenced by a 
lawsuit that tied EU aid for roadbuilding projects in Eritrea 
to the country’s system of forced of labour.42 In the German 
Bundestag, questions about the lack of human rights progress 
were raised by MPs, forcing German Foreign Minister Heiko 
Maas to acknowledge the lack of forward movement – a 
public admission that drew a typically harsh response from 
the Eritrean Ministry of Information.43 In June 2020, the 
European Parliament issued a resolution calling on the EU 
Commission to place human rights considerations front and 
39 “Open Letter to President Isayas from Oromo Scholars and Professionals”, 
TesfaNews, 6 March 2020.
40 See Asmara’s opposition to AU sanctions on the TMC in June 2019 and rumors 
it is involved in Beni Amer-Nuba conflict in Eastern Sudan. Author’s email 
communication with African diplomat based in Ethiopia, August 2020. 
41 Telephone conversation with European diplomats, May 2020.
42 The road projects were to be built by state companies that used national service 
conscripts.
43 “Germany Accused of ‘meddling’ over Eritrea’s Absent Civil Liberties”, Deutsche 
Welle, 28 October 2018.
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centre in its aid relationship with Asmara.44 Meanwhile, in the 
foreign ministries of a number of EU member states, scepticism 
about the EU’s approach in Eritrea has grown.45 By September 
2020, the rancour forced the EU to withdraw its assistance for 
road-building projects in Eritrea, reallocate a portion of funds 
meant for Eritrea to other countries, and agree to re-evaluate its 
“dual-track” policy towards the country.46 
Ongoing dialogue between the GOE and the US has also 
been difficult, although the details remain murkier to establish. 
No doubt, human rights considerations are one of several areas 
where there is continuing disagreement. More broadly, Asmara 
and Washington still have differences about the exact sequence 
of actions that would lead to an upgrade in relations, and in 
various parts of the US government there appears to be doubts 
that Asmara actually has interest in boosting ties. As of the 
current time, the two parties have not exchanged Ambassadors. 
At the UNHRC, the scrutiny of Eritrea’s human rights 
situation continues. Although the GOE has made diplomatic 
gains in the Council, including acquiring a seat on the body, 
overwhelming European support led to the renewal of the 
Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Eritrea 
in 2019 and 2020. Eritrea’s refusal to engage with new Special 
Rapporteur Daniela Kravetz, despite what some believe to be her 
more conciliatory approach than her predecessor, has been one 
reason the GOE faces continuing pressure at the UNHRC. The 
top-line findings of Kravetz’s reports have not assisted the GOE’s 
cause either. As she noted in February 2020, “While Eritrea has 
increased engagement with regional and international actors, this 
engagement so far has not led to an actual improvement in the 
human rights situation in the country”.47
44 M. Plaut, “European Parliament Calls on EU Not to Use Forced Labour in 
Eritrea”, Eritrea Hub, 2 June 2020.
45 Author’s telephone conversation with European diplomats, May 2020.
46 M. Plaut, “European Union Promises to Halt Building Eritrean Roads Following 
Criticism of ‘Slave Labour’”, Eritrea Hub, 23 September 2020.
47 L. Bader, “UN Rights Body Maintains Scrutiny of Eritrea’s Dire Rights Record”, 
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Finally, the direction of the GOE’s relations with its Gulf 
partners is hard to decipher. In January 2020 the GOE publicly 
rebuked the Saudi Minister of State for Africa for his claim that 
Saudi Arabia had played a major role in the Eritrea-Ethiopia 
rapprochement, calling his statements “grossly at variance with 
the genesis and facts of the historic agreement”.48 And while 
the GOE has joined the new Saudi-led Red Sea council – a 
body that includes all Red Sea states minus Israel – it demurred 
on attending the early organizing meetings and its overall 
attitude on the venture has been tepid. The relationship with 
the UAE is similarly complex. Abu Dhabi has tried to develop 
a commercial relationship with Eritrea, particularly as it relates 
to Assab port, but it has mostly received the cold shoulder. The 
GOE also rejected Covid-related assistance from the Emiratis, 
and appears to be keen on limiting the UAE’s interaction with 
the local population in the Southern Red Sea region.49 
Again, like so much of what has occurred in the domain of 
Eritrean foreign relations since 1998, the GOE is only partially 
responsible for some of the more recent challenges described above. 
The GOE has rationales for all of its foreign policy behaviour, and 
some of these do stand-up to scrutiny. Yet the simple truth is that 
the pathologies of garrison state governance impose major limits 
on the ability of the GOE to transform its external relations.
Towards a New Era?
Is Eritrea still and “island” isolated from its region and the 
international system? The answer to this question is clearly 
“no”. Eritrea’s 2018 rapprochement with Ethiopia accelerated 
Human Rights Watch, 12 July 2019; “Statement of Special Rapporteur on the 
situation of human rights in Eritrea, Ms. Daniela Kravetz”, UN Human Rights 
Office of the High Commissioner, 20 February 2020.
48 Shabait, “Eritrea Ministry Of Information”, Press Release, 14 January 2020.
49 “Issayas Afeworki gives Emirati base the cold shoulder”, Africa Intelligence, 19 
June 2020; Author’s conversation, European diplomat, November 2019. 
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dynamics already under way, and have allowed the GOE to 
break the diplomatic blockade that has long encumbered 
its external relations. But the evidence also suggests that the 
rehabilitation of Eritrea’s international standing remains partial 
and incomplete. 
The crux of the matter is that the same issues that were 
partially responsible for propelling the deterioration of Eritrea’s 
external relations after 1998, remains a significant obstacle 
today. The world around Eritrea has changed, but Eritrea 
has not; it remains a garrison state with all of its attendant 
consequences for Eritrea’s foreign policy and the country’s 
external ties. This means that only a sustained project of political 
reform at home will be sufficient to fully rehabilitate Eritrea’s 
international position and consolidate recent gains. Here, 
it must be said, the picture looks uncertain. While President 
Isaias has been unwilling to change political course, he is in the 
twilight of his career and its possible his successors may pursue 
a different approach to governance. More immediately, there 
are forces like the Covid-19 pandemic, which is major shock 
that could create an impetus for political transformation, since 
the government has pushed a strict lockdown that successfully 
supressed transmission but rendered much of the population 
economically desperate. These kinds of dynamics – both known 
and unknown – are what will soon define Eritrea’s domestic 
trajectory and foreign policy. For the people of Eritrea and the 
region, much is at stake.
5.  State-Building in Somalia: 
     Role of the Middle East and 
     Horn of Africa Countries
Afyare Elmi, Abdi Hersi
Somalia celebrated its 60th anniversary of independence on 1 
July 2020, but has had a functioning state for less than half of 
that period. The collapse of the central government of Somalia 
in 1991 was the beginning of a trying period of internal clan 
fighting, criminal piracy activities, and extremist groups taking 
root in the country. Two decades have passed since Somalia’s 
so-called third republic was established in Arta, Djibouti, in 
August 2000. To date, besides the Arta peace process, two more 
reconciliation conferences (Kenya and Djibouti in 2004 and 
2009 respectively), five presidents, thirteen prime ministers, 
hundreds of ministers and parliamentarians and several new 
regional authorities later, Somalia’s state-building effort is, at 
best, very slow, if not stagnant. Nevertheless, the country is now 
making an effort to achieve its long-held dream of establishing 
a functioning and democratic state. 
Somalia and Statehood
Classic definitions posit that a state is an organised entity 
which “successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use 
of physical force within a given territory”.1 The characteristics 
1 M. Weber, “Politics as a Vocation”, in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), 
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of ‘normal’ states include “having control of their territory, 
having a strong domestic political system, and being politically 
stable”,2 but distinctions can be drawn between quasi-states 
and functioning states based on an underlying notion of 
different “degrees of statehood”. Conceptual state-building 
frameworks have been advanced, with some scholars suggesting 
that peace-building and state-building are synonymous.3 Ali 
and Matthews set forth four components to the task of peace-
building: establishing a secure environment, revitalising the 
economy, building governance institutions, and dealing with 
issues of justice. Fukuyama comes to a similar conclusion and 
identifies three sets of institutions: state (security and economy), 
democratic accountability and the rule of law.4 
Throughout history, Somalia’s governments have struggled to 
exert full control over the country’s territory. Lack of resources has 
hindered the country in establishing a viable state and a competent, 
non-politicised, professional and inclusive security force. In the 
absence of those attributes, in the early 1990s Somalia’s military 
regime collapsed. Almost everything that symbolises statehood 
was lost, including the justice system (police, courts, correction 
houses). The characterisation of Somalia as not a “normal state” 
is partly due to the emergence of ruthless and powerful non-
state actors, including armed warlords, tribal militias, insurgency 
groups, terrorists and extremist ideologues. 
From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, London, Routledge, 2009, pp. 77-128. 
2 C. Clapham, “Degrees of Statehood”, Review of International Studies, vol. 24, no. 
2, 1999, pp. 143-157.
3 T.M. Ali and R.O. Matthews (eds.), Durable Peace: Challenges for Peacebuilding in 
Africa, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2004; D.A. Lake, The State Builder’s 
Dilemma: On the Limits of Foreign Intervention, Ithaca NY, Cornell University 
Press, 2016; A.K. Talentino, “The Two Faces of Nation-Building: Developing 
Function and Identity”. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, vol. 17, no. 3, 
2004, pp. 557-575.
4 F. Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French 
Revolution, New York, Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2011; F. Fukuyama, Political 
Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalisation of 
Democracy, Macmillan, 2014. 
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Assessing Political, Security and 
Economic Progress and Setbacks
An incomplete constitution, a sectarian/clannish political class, a 
political culture of distrust, a counterterrorism-centred security 
system, and over-reliance on the African Union Mission in 
Somalia (AMISOM) forces and the international community 
have produced ineffective and unsustainable institutions. 
Some scholars still relatively recently characterised Somalia 
as a failed state5 and a “humanitarian fiasco”.6 While citing 
the emergence of informal alternative governance structures, 
Menkhaus described the country as a “functional failed 
state”.7 Despite these characterisations, Somalia’s leadership 
and the international community have been making efforts 
to establish a functioning state, albeit with limited progress. 
Politically, the essence of the “state” of the “Somali Republic” 
has been contested for the last two decades. As the situation 
stands, although the national government in Mogadishu enjoys 
juridical sovereignty, the country is divided in many ways. 
The Somaliland question
The Somali political class has not addressed the fundamental 
question of whether one state or more should have emerged out 
of the Somali Republic of the 1960s. Self-determination and 
secessionism in Somaliland are a case in point in this regard. 
When the military government fell in 1991, Somaliland, one of 
the regions that founded the 1960 republic, decided to secede 
from Somalia. Even though no country has recognised its 
5 J.J. Messner, Fragile States Index X 2014, Fund for Peace (FFP), 2014.
6 M. Fahlen, “The Africa Union Mission in Somalia. Toward a New Vision of 
Regional Peace Keeping?”, in P. Wallensteen and A. Bjurner (eds.), Regional 
Organizations and Peacemaking. Challengers to the UN?, London, Routledge, 2014, 
p. 181.
7 K. Menkhaus, “State Failure, State-Building, and Prospects for a ‘Functional 
Failed State’ in Somalia, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, vol. 656, no. 1, pp. 154-172.
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sovereignty yet, Somaliland remains a de facto state, and it has 
been seeking independence persistently since 1991.8  
At the time of writing, there are two parallel initiatives in train 
to facilitate and/or mediate between Somalia and Somaliland. 
The first, begun in 2012, is led by Turkey. To date, there 
have been four meetings between the parties in this Turkey-
mediated process. The parties have not yet addressed the main 
problems and have delegated the more substantive issues to a 
joint technical team.9 Meanwhile, Djibouti and Ethiopia are 
leading the second initiative. In June 2020, the parties met in 
Djibouti, albeit with no tangible results.10 Notably, the United 
States, the European Union and the African Union supported 
this initiative. While it is clear that the restart of high-level 
negotiations in Djibouti is a significant step, all indications are 
that the parties will not adequately address final-status matters 
of union versus separation. A possible reunion/secession of 
South and North can happen when security is established, the 
economy keeps pace, and regional administration and central 
government relations improve in Somalia. So far, parties have 
not been negotiating in good faith and each has been trying 
to capitalise on the externally-sponsored mediation process. 
A growing mistrust between the parties risks rendering the 
process futile. Despite the difficulties around the question of 
secession or union, in comparison with the south of Somalia, 
state building in Somaliland showed progress in the areas of 
security, democratisation and rule of law.
8 See M. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland: Reconstructing a Failed State, 
Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2008.
9 British Embassy Mogadishu, “Joint Statement on Djibouti Talks Between Somalia 
and Somaliland Leaders”, 16 June 2020.
10 O. Mahmood and Z. Yusuf, Somalia-Somaliland: A Halting Embrace of Dialogue, 
International Crisis Group, 6 August 2020.
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Problems of clan-based federalism in the South 
Besides the important issue of Somaliland status, state-building 
in the rest of Somalia is proceeding at a slow pace. Somali 
stakeholders that oppose secession have also been struggling to 
agree on the nature of the state that is to govern the country after 
the civil war. In 2004, the Kenyans hosted, and the Ethiopians 
dominated, a Somali reconciliation conference to prescribe a 
federal system for the country.11 To date, drawing from the 
model of Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism, there are five clan-based 
federal member states in the country: Puntland, Galmudug, 
Hirshabelle, South West, and Jubaland. Two more regions 
(Banadir and Sool/Sanaag) have been campaigning to be added 
to this list. For the first years of the Somali Republic, Banadir 
(Mogadishu) had a regional status, but this was questioned 
by some of the factions after the civil war. As a result, article 
nine of Somalia’s draft constitution affirms that Mogadishu is 
the capital of the country, but asserts that the parliament will 
determine its status through the constitution review process. 
Since 1991, the status of Mogadishu has remained a contested 
issue.12 However, there is strong pressure from the communities 
of Mogadishu/Banadir, who are calling for regional status and 
representation in the senate. Somalia’s House of the People 
passed a motion in June 202013 that granted thirteen seats 
for the representation of Mogadishu/Banadir, but its regional 
status remains in question. 
Additionally, communities from the Sool/Sanaag regions 
that oppose Somaliland’s secession have also sought a regional 
status that is independent of Somaliland and Puntland.14 The 
11 United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Charter of 
the Federal Transitional Government of Somalia, Nairobi, February 2004.
12 Somalia’s Parliament Should Produce a Constitution by and for the People, Heritage 
Institute for Policy Studies, February 2017. 
13 “Impossible to Hold 2020 Polls - Somalia Elections Boss”, Africanews, 27 June 
2020.
14 M.V. Hoehne. “Against the Grain: Somaliland’s Secession from Somalia”, in L. 
De Vries, P. Engelbert, and M. Schomerus (eds.), Secessionism in African Politics: 
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Somaliland and Puntland administrations oppose this for 
different reasons. Somaliland argues that these two regions are 
part of the Somaliland protectorate that the British Empire 
left behind, and therefore that Sool and Sanaag are part of 
Somaliland. On the other hand, Puntland contends that the 
two regions belong to the Darod clans that established the 
Puntland state in 1998. The Somali government has recognised 
these two regions as belonging to the Puntland. Representatives 
of these two regions were selected/elected in Puntland in the 
2016 political dispensation of Somalia. 
For some, the establishment of the regional authorities of 
Jubaland, South-West, Hirshabelle, and Galmudug represents 
at least limited progress. However, the constant bickering and 
disagreements between federal member states (FMSs) and the 
Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) is the biggest political 
setback facing the country. Additionally and more importantly, 
there is no agreement between the FMS and FGS levels of 
government on the power-sharing issue. The constitution 
is mainly silent on the functions that belong to each level 
of government. This remains a controversial issue between 
the centre and the regions, leading to the current stalemate. 
Moreover, federal member states question the ways in which 
the FGS is exercising its powers, or at least ignoring the FMSs 
as stakeholders. In its turn, the FGS questions the behaviour 
of the FMSs, who act as though they were independent states. 
One contentious issue is the displeasure of the FGS at how the 
FMSs conduct international relations and ignore the national 
government.15 
Ironically, although the FGS and current parliament pride 
themselves on enacting the highest number of laws, they 
have not completed the constitutional review process and not 
Aspiration, Grievance, Performance, Disenchantment, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2019, pp. 229-261.
15A. Muhumed,“Dysfunctional Federalism: How Political Division, Constitutional 
Ambiguity and a Unitary Mindset Thwart Equitable Distribution of Power in 
Somalia”, Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, July 2020.
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established a constitutional court. Strained relations between 
the FGS and its member states are by far one of the biggest 
setbacks the current Somali government faces. The best way to 
end this conundrum is to finalise the constitution and spell out 
the powers of each level of government.16 
Related to the clan-based federalism is the contested 2020 
political dispensation that some of the regions and the opposition 
groups advocated for. In the formation of the third republic of 
Somalia in 2000, hundreds of Somalis met in Djibouti, where 
they decided to establish a democratic state that is at peace with 
itself and its neighbours. Adopting democracy meant that there 
would be no regime security for the governing administration 
after its mandate expires. Universal suffrage is still a distant 
dream for the citizens. But, in line with the spirit of the delegates 
of the Djibouti peace process in 2000, and with the help of the 
international community, Somalia’s political class has, at least, 
been socialised into accepting the rotation of power every four 
years. In fact, rotation of power has become the new normal 
for the political class – parliamentarians selected on a tribal 
formula determine the government of the day.  The infamous 
4.5 formula of clan representation was a by-product of this 
peace process.
Since 2000, the country has had five governments and 
presidents. The previous four presidents surrendered power 
peacefully after their terms ended.17 Moreover, none of the 
six “elected” Somali presidents, since 1960, served more than 
one term. Interestingly, the current parliament’s mandate 
is up in December 2020, while the President’s time ends in 
February 2021. Legislators passed and the President signed 
an unimplementable election law. Opposition groups have 
complained that President Farmajo is determined to gerrymander 
the selection process or stage-manage a mandate extension. 
16 Ibid.
17 President Abdiqasim Salad Hassan (2000-04); President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed 
(2004-08); President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed (2009-12); President Hassan Sheikh 
Mohamud (2012-17). 
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So far, after three rounds of negotiations in Dhusamareb, the 
capital city of Galmudug, stakeholders have finally agreed on 
a complex indirect election model that fell short of the long 
promised direct public election of one man one vote. Although 
this has been hailed as an important milestone, the absence of 
both Puntland and Jubaland administrations in the third round 
of the Dhusamareb negotiations made the process incomplete. 
At the time of writing (September 2020), the leaders of 
Jubaland (Ahmed Mohamed Islam) and Puntland (Said Deni) 
are in Mogadishu to negotiate with the other stakeholders. 
However, on the broader level, the policies of President Farmajo 
have deepened the trust deficit among the Somali stakeholders. 
As a result, the international community, under the leadership 
of the United Nations special representative of the secretary-
general, Ambassador James Swan, and US Ambassador Donald 
Yamamoto, have had to step in and guide the process. In fact, 
the international community has been pressuring the parties 
and guiding the process from behind. As a result, all FMS 
leaders and the President agreed on conducting timely and 
indirect election that is largely similar to the 2016 political 
dispensation.
The challenges of building security 
Security is the biggest challenge that successive Somali 
governments and administrations have faced throughout 
the past 20 years. A prerequisite to any improved security in 
Somalia entails the state owning the monopoly over the means 
of coercion. Regrettably, that has not been the case in the 
recent past, and there are no indications of that changing in 
the near future. On the security front, Somalia faces multiple 
challenges. For the sake of space, we will limit our discussion 
to three aspects: al-Shabaab; disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration (DDR) of clan militias; and the establishment of 
a professional army, thus ending the reliance on the African 
Union peacekeeping mission. 
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Besides Somaliland’s secession and clan-based federalism, 
the country is divided along ideological lines. Al-Shabaab, a 
Salafi-jihadi armed organisation, opposes all Somali authorities 
on two grounds. First, the extremist organisation calls for the 
implementation of Sharia in the country. The Somali government 
does not oppose this and argues that the draft constitution is 
based on Sharia. Many, however, including Somalia’s moderate 
Islamic groups, reject al-Shabaab’s interpretation of Sharia. 
Moreover, al-Shabaab demands that foreign troops should leave 
the country unconditionally, knowing well that the weaknesses 
of Somalia’s security forces make this demand impractical, as 
AMISOM forces keep the current government on life-support. 
Al-Shabaab poses a major threat to Somalia. The war with 
al-Shabaab is proving to be more difficult year by year. While 
the joint operations of the Somali armed forces and AMISOM 
troops were successful in driving al-Shabaab out of major cities, 
they have not reduced the overall threat levels posed by the 
group. International security experts report the adaptability 
of al-Shabaab in the new environment.18 The extremist 
organisation employs various ways to undermine the security 
forces and destabilise the country.19 At times, al-Shabaab has 
attacked the military bases of the government and its allied 
forces and inflicted substantial casualties.  Often, it uses person-
borne improvised explosive devices (PBIEDs) and vehicle-
borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) to inflict these 
deadly assaults.20 The 13 August 2020 United Nations Security 
Council Somalia situation report21 described the deteriorating 
security situation as follows: 
18 A.L. Dahir, “Somali Terror Group Al Shabab Remains Resilient Despite 
Setbacks”, New York Times, 29 December 2019.
19 M.I. Shire and A. Hersi, “Brothers in Arms: The Phenomenon of Complex 
Suicide Attacks”, Terrorism and Political Violence, Routledge, vol. 31, 9 December 
2019.
20 Ibid.
21 United Nations Security Council, 13 August 2020, www.undocs.org/
en/S/2020/798
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The security situation remained volatile, with 288 incidents in 
May, 269 in June and 218 in July. Most of those incidents were 
crime-related killings and shootings and al-Shabaab attacks, 
including those using improvised explosive devices. Levels of 
crime and armed conflict-related incidents have remained steady 
since January, with a slight decline in June and July. The number 
of terrorism-related incidents remained at an average of around 
75 per month in May and June, with 53 incidents in July.
By any measure, even though there are more than twenty 
thousand AMISOM forces drawn from several African countries, 
security improvement in Somalia proceeds at a meagre pace. For 
instance, during the tenure of Farmajo government (2017-20), 
al-Shabaab killed thousands of civilians. In October 2018, in a 
single attack, al-Shabaab killed close to one thousand individuals 
in Mogadishu through a single vehicle-borne suicide mission. 
Unless al-Shabaab is defeated militarily or there is a negotiated 
settlement with the extremist movement,22 the situation will 
remain the same.
Al-Shabaab aside, Somalia’s armed clan militias are an 
impediment to establishing a functioning state as well.23 After 
the state institutions collapsed in 1991, clans organised to 
defend and, at times, expanded to other areas. These militia 
groups have administered cities, ports and critical checkpoints, 
thus sustaining themselves for lengthy periods. The formation 
of clan-based federal member states has further provided a raison 
d’être for these militias. Unfortunately, although these militias 
are a security threat, Somalia’s central government has always 
been too weak to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate them into 
the Somali security forces. As a result, there are militia groups 
in most regions that would in fact like to join the security forces 
for employment purposes but have not been reintegrated yet. 
22 A.A. Elmi and A. Aynte, Somalia: The Case for Negotiating with Al-Shabaab, Al 
Jazeera Centre for Studies, 25 February 2012.
23 V. Felbab-Brown, The Problem with Militias in Somalia: Almost Everyone Wants 
Them Despite Their Dangers, Brookings Institution, 14 April 2020.  
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Finally, Somalia’s government has not succeeded in building 
a professional and inclusive army for the country. However, 
there has been some progress in terms of the administration and 
training of the forces. The Somali government has eliminated 
many of the “ghost soldiers” and created a reliable database 
for the security forces. Ghost soldiers are those who had never 
existed or had long ago deserted but were kept on the books 
by corrupt paymasters to siphon off their salaries. They include 
former military officers who should have retired from service as 
well as untrained young former militia men. The government 
has succeeded in the registration of uniformed forces such as 
the police, military and other militia groups using biometrics 
systems. This is an important accountability measure in 
building an effective national security architecture. Unlike the 
old system, the new registration system has restored integrity in 
the exercise. The government has also been paying the salaries 
of armed forces regularly remedying the previously haphazard 
(under)payment of soldiers. This is a big success for Farmajo’s 
government. Additionally, since Turkey opened its training 
camp in Mogadishu in 2017, it has trained 2,500 Somali troops 
(commissioned, non-commissioned and foot soldiers).24 That 
said, the government faces a number of political, contextual 
and operational challenges to establishing an inclusive and 
professional army that can secure the whole country.25
The pace of economic recovery
Raising the much-needed revenue base, addressing poverty 
and unemployment have been the foremost economic recovery 
objectives of successive post-conflict governments in Somalia. 
Amongst the key challenges facing the economy include 
resolving the currency (Somali shilling) crises. While facing 
24 L. Ilhan and Z. Demirci, “1 of 3 Somalian Troops to be Trained by Turkey: 
Envoy”, Anadolu News Agency, 4 August 2020. 
25 P.D. Williams, “Building the Somali National Army: Anatomy of a Failure, 2008-
2018”, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 43, no. 3, 2020, pp. 366-391.
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many political and security challenges, different administrations 
(for the last two decades) have contributed to the rebuilding of 
the state economy, which albeit is still at the embryonic stage. 
Due to the lack of socio-economic infrastructure, Somalia’s 
economy is susceptible to external shocks.26 During the period 
of civil war, the informal economy and private enterprises 
were strong, showing the resilience of this sector.27 Despite 
being labelled a failed state, the country has introduced some 
valuable initiatives, such as offering its citizens some of the 
world’s cheapest international phone calls and implementing 
its widely used mobile phone money system. Reconstituting 
a functioning central bank is another prime example of these 
significant achievements.  
The normalisation of Somalia’s relations with international 
financial institutions and sustained efforts in securing debt 
relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative 
(HIPC) – reaching the Decision Point was a recent remarkable 
achievement28 – is key to Somalia’s economic recovery. The 
country is still going through a painstaking process of debt 
relief that requires belt-tightening and discipline, and it needs 
to show the relevant financial institutions that it is capable of 
meeting their requirements.
The reported economic recovery journey faces significant risk 
due to the Covid-19 pandemic and its required costly health 
response program.29 The lockdowns and restrictions imposed 
by the Somali government as precautions to stop or reduce the 
spread of the coronavirus have potentially dented the economy, 
reduced domestic revenue sharply, and substantially increased 
expenditure. As a result, real GDP might shrink, making the 
economic outlook somewhat gloomy.30 These new economic 
26 International Monetary fund (IMF), Somalia to Receive Debt Relief under the 




30 African Development Bank Group, “Somalia Economic Outlook”, 30 January 2020.
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challenges plus an expected lower flow of remittances to boost 
the national economy risk derailing achievement of further 
milestones on the Completion Point for debt relief.31 
Despite the above challenges, Somalia’s parliament passed its 
revised budget in June 2020. The total is about US$650 million 
dollars, of which the government contributes only 31%. The 
international community has committed the remaining 69% 
(budgetary assistance and projects). The fact that the country 
relies on external support to this extent is disturbing indeed. 
This revenue base shows a lack of economic viability. The Somali 
government has argued that one way to address this issue is to 
fast-track the exploration of natural resources of the country, 
particularly oil. The Somali parliament has passed its petroleum 
act and established the country’s petroleum agency.32 However, 
there are legitimate warnings concerning a rushed approach 
to Somalia’s natural resources without the proper policies 
and institutions.33 While the country’s development depends 
on this economic resource, oil can also be a curse. Therefore, 
caution is warranted on this issue. Lack of political agreement 
on resource sharing between the FGS and its FMSs can also 
jeopardise any prospect of collecting taxes to increase local 
revenue substantially. Besides limitations on domestic revenue 
generation, Somalia faces two further economic challenges. 
First, since the state collapsed, different administrations have 
been talking about printing the Somali currency. No decision 
has been made yet. Second, poverty and unemployment 
are serious problems that feed into the security and political 
problems in the country. In Somalia, unemployment levels of 
persons aged between 14 and 29 is estimated to be 67%.34  
31 A.D. Hassan, “Impact of COVID 19 on Somalia’s Economy: Will the Virus Be a 
Springboard to a Severe Crisis?”, Modern Diplomacy, 9 July 2020.
32 “Somalia: Petroleum Law Ratified”, African Energy, newsletter no. 410, 27 
February 2020.
33 J. Gundel, “What’s the Oil Rush in Somalia?”, London School of Economics and 
Political Science, 17 June 2020.
34 M. Dalmar, A.Y.S. Ali, and A.A. Ali, “Factors Affecting Unemployment in 
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The Rise of Abiy Ahmed in Ethiopia: 
Implications for Somalia
The election of Abiy Ahmed as Ethiopia’s first Oromo ethnic 
Prime Minister shifted perceptions of Somalis about Ethiopia. 
For hundreds of years, Somalis and Abyssinians have had 
a hostile relationship. Differences in religion and ethnicity 
have fuelled the conflict. For the Somalis, Ethiopia was one 
of the colonial countries that participated in the partition of 
the Somali Peninsula.35 Since independence, the two countries 
have fought twice (1964 and 1977). During the civil war, 
Ethiopia continued its support of warlords and factional 
leaders.36 When the Islamic Courts Union removed these 
warlords, Ethiopia invaded Somalia in 2007 under the pretext 
of counterterrorism, thus exacerbating the rise of extremism. 
In the recent past, Somalia has become the stage for proxy 
wars and rivalries between regional states, notably Eritrea and 
Ethiopia, and to an extent Ethiopia and Kenya. For example, 
the FGS nullified the election of Jubaland President Ahmed 
Madobe. Whilst Ethiopia generally supported the FGS, Kenya 
resorted to protect Ahmed Madobe’s legitimacy as President 
of Jubaland. In other examples, Ethiopia was supporting the 
Somali warlords and the transitional government while Eritrea 
supported the opposition groups.37 
In 2018 Ethiopia’s ruling coalition (Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Democratic Front) chose Abiy Ahmed as the Prime 
Somalia”, Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development, vol. 8, no. 22, 2017, 
pp. 200-210. 
35 Somali Republic, The Somali Peninsula: A New Light on Imperial Motives, 
Mogadishu, Somalia, 1962.
36 A.A. Elmi and A. Barise, “The Somali Conflict: Root Causes, Obstacles, and 
Peace-Building Strategies”, African Security Studies, vol. 15, no.1, 2006, pp. 32-54.
37 K. Mulugeta, The Role of Regional and International Organizations in Resolving the 
Somali Conflict: The Case of IGAD, Addis Ababa, Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung, 2009, 
p. 26; A. El-Affendi, “The Perils of Regionalism: Regional Integration as a Source 
of Instability in the Horn of Africa?”, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, vol. 
3, no. 1, 2009, p. 10.
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Minister of the country.38 Unlike previous leaders of Ethiopia 
(Abyssinian highlanders), Dr Abiy Ahmed is an ethnic Oromo, 
which is the largest group in Ethiopia. When he came to power, 
Abiy Ahmed initiated several positive changes: reaching a peace 
agreement with Eritrea, releasing political prisoners, reconciling 
with opposition groups abroad and repatriating them home, and 
mediating regional conflicts. The new Prime Minister’s reforms had 
a positive impact on the Somali Region, sometimes referred to as 
the “Ogaden” region, in Eastern Ethiopia, as Addis Ababa changed 
the regional administration and reconciled it with the armed 
Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). These achievements, 
plus his constructive rhetoric, conferred on the Prime Minister 
global appreciation. Since his election, the region has steered in a 
new direction toward development rather than conflict. This new 
phenomenon is recognised both within and outside the region, 
leading Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to win the Nobel Peace Prize.39 
Abiy Ahmed’s rise to power in Ethiopia affected Ethiopia’s 
problematic relations with Somalia in three important ways. 
First, an Ethiopian-led tripartite integration project has divided 
the Somali political elite. Abiy has initiated and led what he 
called Horn of Africa Cooperation (HoAC),40 a three-way 
integration project between Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia. 
For any meaningful integration in the Greater HoA region, 
excluding Kenya (the largest economy) and Djibouti (the most 
strategic country) from this project is counterproductive. It is 
also unclear how the existing Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD), in which Ethiopia and Kenya dominate, 
can co-exist with the proposed new HoAC, which aims to bring 
peace and boost trade between the member countries. So far, 
the leaders of these three countries have met multiple times 
38 “Abiy Ahmed Elected as Chairman of Ethiopia’s Ruling Coalition”, Al Jazeera, 
28 March 2018. 
39 “Nobel Peace Prize: Ethiopia PM Abiy Ahmed Wins”, BBC, 11 October 2019.
40 I. Henneberg and S. Stapel, “Cooperation and Conflict at the Horn of Africa: A 
New Regional Bloc Between Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia and Its Consequences 
for Eastern Africa”, Africa Spectrum, 2020.
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in Addis Ababa, Asmara and Mogadishu. Besides a few press 
releases and speeches, the parties involved have not provided 
sufficient public information. In one of their press releases, they 
announced that Ethiopia would invest in four Somali ports.41 
Many Somalis have rejected that Ethiopian move. 
For Somalia, the integration initiative has further exacerbated 
the divisions among Somalis. The opposition groups and 
some civil society organisations have demanded the Somali 
government share the full agreement with parliament. So far, 
neither Villa Somalia (the official Presidential palace) nor other 
parties have done so. For some Somalis, the 2020 integration 
project is similar to the regional federation42 of the 1950s 
that Emperor Haile Selassie called for. The Emperor argued 
that Ethiopia could not survive without access to the sea and 
went on to claim that the Somali Peninsula and Eritrea were 
part of Ethiopia. For Somalis, since then, Ethiopia has been 
holding on to this strategy, and different regimes have adopted 
different tactics to secure their aims.43 In fact, Ethiopia’s need 
for a permanent sea corridor is more urgent now. For the 
opponents of the integration project, it is nothing but a new 
tactical approach by Addis Ababa to secure its old ambitions 
in the region. On the other hand, the Federal Government of 
Somalia and its backers, including the United States, support 
this initiative. 
Second, unlike the previous Addis Ababa administration 
that supported the regions and kept Mogadishu weak, Abiy 
empowered the central government of Somalia. Somaliland 
might be an exception in this case, as Ethiopia remains engaged 
with Hargeysa diplomatically. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Abiy 
Ahmed’s policy shift has meant a lot to the Federal Government 
of Somalia because Ethiopia has troops in the country. Some of 
41 A. Sheikh, “Somalia, Ethiopia to Jointly Invest in Four Seaports on the Red Sea”, 
Reuters, 16 June 2018.
42 J. Spencer, Ethiopia at Bay, Algonac, Michigan, Reference Publications, 1985, p. 
141. 
43 Ibid.
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these troops are under the African Union peacekeeping mission, 
but there are also Ethiopian battalions in Somalia that do not 
have an international mandate. Recently, these non-AMISOM 
forces have been involved in two incidents. In one, the Federal 
Government of Somalia has reportedly used these forces for the 
political dispensations of the South West region in Baidoa to 
arrest Mukhtar Robow (a former Shabaab leader who has quit 
violent politics).44 This incident placed Ethiopia’s forces in an 
awkward position as the international community demanded 
an explanation. As a result, the Somali government expelled the 
United Nations Secretary-General envoy Nicholas Haysom.45 
Additionally, Ethiopia’s non-AMISOM forces shot down a 
civilian airliner in Berdale.46 This accident further brought to 
the fore the Ethiopian involvement in Somalia. The Federal 
Government of Somalia has not been transparent about the 
presence of non-AMISOM Ethiopian forces in its territory.  
Third, Abiy Ahmed’s rise to power has further complicated 
the relations between Somalia and Kenya, which deteriorated 
at the same time as Ethiopia and Somalia developed closer ties. 
Historically, Somalia and Kenya have clashed over the Somali 
region in the North East of Kenya. But a maritime dispute 
between the two countries surfaced in which Somalia took the 
matter to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). This led Kenya 
to develop strong relations with the Jubaland administration 
and its leader, Ahmed Mohamed Islam Madobe, which angered 
the FGS, especially after Villa Somalia nullified his re-election 
as President of the Jubaland administration. On the other hand, 
Ethiopia has provided unconditional support to the Federal 
Government of Somalia. The irony here is that Ethiopia and 
44 “African Union Force Denies It Was Involved in Arrest of Ex-Al Shabaab Leader”, 
Reuters, 15 December 2018.
45 M. Bearak, “Somalia Expels Top U.N. Official After He Criticizes Crackdown on 
Dissent”, The Washington Post, 2 January 2019.
46 “Ethiopia Admits Shooting Down Kenya Aid Aircraft in Somalia”, Al Jazeera, 9 
May 2020.
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Kenya have had a defence pact against Somalia since 1963.47 
Yet, in 2018, they almost went to war for the sake of their 
proxies in Somalia (Ethiopia supporting the central government 
and Kenya supporting the Jubaland administration). Moreover, 
the election of Abiy Ahmed has altered Somalia’s relations with 
some of its closest allies, such as Egypt. At a time when Somalia 
is entering a new dawn of cooperation with its former arch-rival 
in the region, Ethiopia, the dispute between Ethiopia and Egypt 
over the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) across the 
Nile is creating a dilemma for Somalia’s foreign policy. Somali 
governments have traditionally supported Egypt in both the 
Arab League and African Union meetings. The rise to power 
of Abiy in Ethiopia has had an impact on this foreign policy.48 
Middle Eastern States and Somalia
Besides the involvement of Somalia’s neighbours in its domestic 
conflicts, the Middle Eastern states have become interested in 
the country for their own reasons.49 In fact, one of Somalia’s 
main curses is its strategic geopolitical position. The country’s 
proximity to the maritime route of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait in 
the Red Sea and its location on the Gulf of Aden and the Indian 
Ocean is proving to be a constant challenge. Great powers (the 
United States, China and some European countries) have secured 
military bases in the Horn of Africa using the pretext of fighting 
maritime piracy and terrorism. Additionally, several Middle 
Eastern countries have shown a renewed interest in the region 
in the last decade. These can be grouped into two coalitions: 
the Turkey-Qatar coalition and the Saudi Arabia-led coalition, 
47 W. Kabukuru, “The Kenya-Ethiopia Defence Pact: Has Somalia Become a 
Pawn?”, New African, 26 February 2015.
48 Although diplomats confirmed that Mogadishu voted for the resolution, it has 
publicly withdrawn that support. See “Somalia Rejects Arab League Resolution on 
Egypt’s Stand on Nile”, Garowe Online, 25 June 2020.
49 J. Gorvett, “Gulf Rivalries Play Out in the Horn of Africa, Sometimes with 
Deadly Consequences”, The Washington Diplomat, 29 August 2019.
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which includes the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt. 
Iran is mostly absent, while others such as Kuwait and Oman 
have confined their activities to traditional diplomacy. 
The Middle Eastern countries have always had security 
and economic interests in the Horn of Africa region.50 For 
instance, according to a World Bank report, piracy attacks in 
the Gulf of Aden and the Western Indian Ocean have affected 
the Gulf and Middle Eastern countries in a significant way.51 
Therefore, these countries have contributed to counter-piracy 
operations through the American- and European-led coalitions 
or individually.52 Moreover, the Middle Eastern countries, like 
others, have been interested in establishing a military base in 
the area, particularly after the Yemen war. On the economic 
side, these countries have been interested in securing natural 
resources (oil) and markets for their products for some time. 
They have invested in different industries in the Horn of Africa 
countries. Eleonora Ardemagni summed up their motivations 
by saying that the Middle Eastern countries came to the Horn 
of Africa to compete “for local alliances, commercial ports, and/
or military agreements and bases”.53
Most Middle Eastern countries have had historical relations 
with Somalia. After it became an independent state in 1960, 
Somalia established diplomatic and economic relations with all 
the Middle East countries, except Israel. However, the Yemen 
conflict, Gulf crises, and Iran-Saudi competition triggered the 
renewed interest of these countries in Somalia. For example, 
50 H. Verhoeven, “The Gulf and the Horn: Changing Geographies of Security 
Interdependence and Competing Visions of Regional Order”, Civil Wars, vol. 20, 
no. 3, 2018, pp. 333-357. 
51 World Bank, The Pirates of Somalia: Ending the Threat, Rebuilding a Nation, 
Washington, DC, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/
World Bank, 2013.
52 A. Elmi and S. Mohamed, Assessing the Role of the GCC Countries in Ending 
Piracy in the Horn of Africa, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Doha 
Institute, 2017.
53 E. Ardemagni, Gulf Powers: Maritime Rivalry in the Western Indian Ocean, ISPI 
Analysis, no. 321, April 2018.
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in 2016, because of Saudi Arabian pressure, Somalia expelled 
Iran’s diplomatic mission.54 
The United Arab Emirates have signed agreements with 
Somaliland on a Berbera port and military base.55 Fly Dubai 
and Air Arabia started regular flights to Hargeysa. Moreover, a 
significant number of Somali businesses, particularly the money 
transfer agencies, have moved their headquarters to Dubai. In 
addition, the UAE’s port operating company, DP World, has 
signed agreements with the Puntland authority on the Bosaso 
Port. The UAE has maintained a base in Puntland in order 
to support counter-piracy operations and it has helped the 
administration with the formation of the Puntland Maritime 
Police Forces.56 On the other hand, Qatar has supported 
Somalia’s central government economically.57 It has invested in 
several infrastructure projects (two major roads) in Mogadishu 
and cities near the capital. Qatar has also secured the Hobyo 
Port with the help of the Federal Government of Somalia.58 
Qatar Airways started to fly to Mogadishu in 2019. 
Turkey’s renewed interest in Somalia started after the 2011 
famine in the country, when Ankara’s government significantly 
assisted Somalia in controlling the humanitarian effects of the 
crisis.59 The then Prime Minister and now President of Turkey 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited the country several times and 
ordered Turkish companies and charities to help Somalia. 
For instance, Turkish companies managed and developed the 
airport and the Port of Mogadishu. Turkish Airlines started 
flying to Somalia, which was an isolated country at the 
54 “Somalia Received Saudi Aid the Day It Cut Ties with Iran: Document”, Reuters, 
17 January 2016.
55 “Somaliland Agrees to UAE Military Base in Berbera”, BBC, 17 February 2017.
56 The United Arab Emirates in the Horn of Africa, International Crisis Group, 6 
November 2018.
57 Ibid.
58 “Qatar to Build New Port in Somalia’s Hobyo”, Al Jazeera, 20 August 2019.
59 F. Donelli, “The Ankara Consensus: The Significance of Turkey’s Engagement 
in Sub-Saharan Africa”, Global Change, Peace & Security, vol. 30, no. 1, 2018, pp. 
57-76.
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time.60 The Turkish government opened its largest embassy 
in Mogadishu,61 and Ankara started to provide budgetary 
assistance to the Federal Government of Somalia.62 Besides 
hundreds of scholarships for students, Ankara opened its doors 
to Somalis who were travelling for tourism, medical, business 
and education purposes. More importantly, Turkey opened 
a military base that has trained hundreds of Somali security 
forces.63 This head-start won Turkey a special place in the hearts 
and minds of the Somali people. But, like other countries, 
Turkey is also pursuing its strategic and economic interests as it 
considers Somalia as the gateway to East African market. 
That said, what does the renewed interest of the Middle 
Eastern countries mean for Somalia? Their presence and the 
resources they invest in the country are a plus. For a long time, 
Somalia has been isolated from the rest of the world, and was 
considered a no-go zone. Most of the Western aid focussed on 
relief. The Middle Eastern countries and their charities have 
been contributing to the education, health and infrastructure of 
the country. Investments in infrastructure in Berbera, Bosaso, 
Mogadishu and other locations will certainly help the country.
However, the Middle Eastern countries’ competition for allies 
has had negative consequences for the politics of the country 
by facilitating corruption. The international community has 
become concerned about cash being provided to politicians 
to buy votes and political positions. It is a public secret that 
Somali politicians in power (nationally and regionally) and 
those who want to replace them seek rent from these Middle 
Eastern countries and some international mining companies. 
60 A. Elmi, “Transnational Islamic NGOs in Somalia: Challenges and 
Opportunities” in A.O. Farah and L. Xing (eds.), Transnational NGOs and Global 
Governance, Aalborg, Aalborg University Press, 2014.
61 “President Erdoğan in Somalia Opens World’s Largest Turkish Embassy, Other 
Projects”, Daily Sabah, 3 June 2016.
62 L. Pitel, “Somalia Reaps Rewards of Ankara’s Investment”, Financial Times, 25 
May 2016.
63 H. Orhan, “Turkey Opens Military Base in Mogadishu to Train Somali Soldiers”, 
Reuters, 30 September 2017.
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Sometimes, these rent-seeking politicians and their brokers get 
what they are looking for. More importantly, during elections, 
some of these countries contribute campaign money to allied 
politicians. The United Nations Monitoring Group reported 
that the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Qatar provided 
financial support to their ally politicians in the last election.64 
As the situation stands now, Turkey and Qatar support the 
Federal Government of Somalia while the UAE has supported 
Somaliland, Puntland and Jubaland.  
Conclusion
The Horn of Africa region remains strategic but volatile at 
the same time. Somalia’s state-building project is still at an 
early stage. The sectarian political class and lack of resources 
are to blame for most of the political, security, and economic 
problems. Despite these, in its quest for finding a lasting 
solution to its protracted civil conflict, Somalia is attempting 
to assert itself again as a normal state that plays its part in 
regional, continental and global affairs. For that to happen, 
crucial areas for Somalia’s return to normality include political 
stability, improved security, and economic recovery as well as 
the strengthening of institutional capacity. The state-building 
project is ongoing, and there is a limited progress in forging 
stronger political, security, economy, and judiciary institutions. 
Overall, re-establishing a functioning state in Somalia has, at 
best, been too slow. 
However, as weak and fragmented as the country is, two 
external factors – changes in Ethiopia and the renewed interest 
of the Middle Eastern powers – have impacted on Somalia’s 
security and politics. Whilst the rise of Abiy Ahmed is hailed as 
64 See United Nations, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, 
New York, p. 29; International Crisis Group (ICG), Intra-Gulf Competition 
in Africa’s Horn: Lessening the Impact, ICG Middle East Reports, no. 206, 19 
September 2019.
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improving peace in the region, it has notably contributed to the 
already existing divisions among Somalis. An important factor 
that is often ignored by researchers and political commentators 
is the fact that Somalia’s return to normal statehood is partly 
dependent on the behaviour of its neighbours and key 
international partners. We conclude here that the impact that 
Abiy Ahmed’s rise to power in Ethiopia has had on Somalia is 
perceptible. 
We also contend that renewed competition and rivalry 
between Middle Eastern states has had both positive and 
negative implications for Somalia’s return to normalcy. 
The involvement of the Middle Eastern countries brings 
much-needed development support for infrastructure. Yet, 
these countries’ competition for allies delays the political 
development of Somalia. In other words, the recent rivalry of 
the Middle Eastern countries has negatively affected Somalia 
by exacerbating the existing divisions within the political class.
6.  Ethiopia: Between Domestic Pressures 
     and Regional Hegemony
Aleksi Ylönen, Alexander B. Meckelburg
Ethiopia, due to its central position, large population, 
economic growth, and ostensible role as a security guarantor 
in the region, is central to understanding the Horn of Africa. 
Advocates of authoritarian tradition and repressive governance 
with an expansionist outlook, Ethiopian rulers have dominated 
the populations of the highlands and surrounding lowlands for 
centuries.1 Since the political transition that began with the 
death of the long-time leader and architect of modern Ethiopia,2 
Meles Zenawi (in office 1995-2012), and taking a new turn in 
early 2018 with the peaceful transfer of the position of Prime 
Minister to Abiy Ahmed Ali, Ethiopia has seen a series of violent 
conflicts, political assassinations, and shifting alliances that have 
profoundly shaken the country. Domestically, centres of power 
have shifted. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) 
that held central control over the ruling alliance for nearly 30 
years has been forced into opposition by the new leadership 
although the current government is merely a continuation of 
the old regime with a reformist agenda. The reform agenda of 
the new camp has initiated reconciliation in domestic affairs, 
lending it international recognition and admiration, while also 
1 J. Markakis, Ethiopia: The Last Two Frontiers, Woodbridge, Suffolk, James Currey, 
2011.
2 R. Lefort, “Ethiopia’s Crisis: Things Fall Apart: Will the Centre Hold?”, Open 
Democracy, 19 November 2016. 
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being highly assertive in the regional arena. Internationally, 
the landmark peace deal with Eritrea, Somalia’s continued 
weakness, and the contested filling of the Grand Ethiopian 
Renaissance Dam (GERD) have provided new opportunities 
and posed new challenges for Ethiopia’s regional affairs; the 
way appeared open for the assertion of hegemony and for 
peaceful cooperation. However, with the central government’s 
military campaign to subdue the regional leadership in Tigray, 
another scenario, the country’s descent into a protracted 
conflict, has become a real possibility. The two-week-old 
campaign has made any prediction of the future difficult due 
to its complex dynamics and unpredictable outcome.
In this chapter, we discuss Ethiopia’s domestic and 
international affairs from the perspective of continuity and 
change, with a focus on the whirlwind reformist landscape 
of the Abiy administration, in an attempt to understand the 
reform-conflict nexus that has overshadowed the last two 
years’ political developments.
Ethiopia’s Historical Trajectory
Ethiopia has played a central role in the politics of the Horn 
of Africa for a long time. In the course of the late XIX century, 
the empire expanded largely through conquest.3 From the 
late 1870s, Emperor Menelik II and his generals extended the 
borders of the Ethiopian Empire by forceful incorporation and 
skilful diplomacy.4 In 1896, Ethiopia fended off Italian colonial 
ambitions in the decisive Battle of Adwa and by the end of 
the XIX century, it had made treaties and established borders 
with Britain, France, and Italy, who occupied the surrounding 
territories. The victory of Adwa allowed Ethiopia to assume 
3 J. Young, “Regionalism and Democracy in Ethiopia”, Third World Quarterly, vol. 
19, no. 2, 1998, p. 192.
4 R. Caulk, Between Jaws of Hyenas. A Diplomatic History of Ethiopia (1876-1896), 
Wiesbaden, Harrassowitz Verlag, 2002.
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international statehood and recognition unparalleled in the 
rest of Africa and carried the country’s foreign relations for 
decades to come. The concentration of power and territorial 
demarcation under Emperor Menelik II led to the consolidation 
of a centralized imperial political system in and beyond the 
Ethiopian highlands.5
In the early XX century, Ethiopia underwent extensive 
modernisation. This was largely credited to Ras Tafari, who also 
increased Ethiopia’s international exposure and ensured the 
country’s membership in the League of Nations while promising 
to eradicate slavery. In November 1930, Ras Tafari was crowned 
Emperor Haile Selassie and the following year he introduced 
Ethiopia’s first constitution in which power remained with the 
nobility in a bicameral legislature, but gradual democratisation 
was envisioned.6 
The Italian invasion and occupation of Ethiopia in 1936 
temporarily halted the political and economic trajectory of 
the country. The Emperor was forced into exile while Italian 
administration was established. Although Haile Selassie 
delivered an emotional speech in the largely defunct League 
of Nations to rally support, it took until 1941 for allied forces, 
with support from Ethiopian patriots, to liberate the country. 
The increasingly interconnected post-WW2 world allowed 
Ethiopia to extend its influence, especially in its own 
neighbourhood. Haile Selassie envisioned an internationally 
active Ethiopia: in the course of the early 1950s, the country 
took part in the first significant United Nations peace missions 
and successfully lobbied among its Western allies for federating 
Eritrea as an autonomous part of Ethiopia in 1952. Towards the 
end of the decade, the Emperor tightened his grip on Eritrea 
5 D. Donham, “Old Abyssinia and the New Ethiopian Empire: Themes in Social 
History”, in D. Donham and W. James (eds.), The Southern Marches of Imperial 
Ethiopia: Essays in History and Social Anthropology, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1986, pp. 3-48. 
6 Ethiopian Constitution of 1931, 16 July 1931. See Chapter IV, Art. 32. for the 
aspired democratisation, albeit without timeline. 
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and despite local resistance succeeded in fully annexing it as 
an Ethiopian province in November 1962.7 In the following 
year, Haile Selassie’s grand project, the Organization of African 
Unity (OAU), hosted by Ethiopia, was inaugurated. However, 
as the Eritrean insurgency escalated, partly due to external 
support, Ethiopia became increasingly entangled in proxy wars, 
particularly in Sudan, while Arab states sought to use Eritrean 
rebels against Ethiopia and its allies.8
In the early 1970s, Haile Selassie sought to elevate Ethiopia 
above regional entanglements. The leadership continued 
to benefit from its alliance with the United States while 
establishing diplomatic relations with China, and played the 
role of peacemaker in the Sudanese civil war. However, in 
1974, the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie came to an end in 
an army coup. The revolution of 1975 brought the military 
regime, the Derg, headed by Mengistu Haile Mariam, to power 
and caused an abrupt shift in Ethiopia’s domestic politics and 
foreign relations.
As the new regime sought to stamp its authority, repression 
associated with the intended consolidation of a communist 
state led to the intensification of armed opposition. When 
the Eritrean liberation war escalated, other ethno-nationalist 
insurgent movements, most notably in Tigray, but also in Afar 
and Oromia as well as Ethiopia’s Somali region, were established. 
Meanwhile, relations with Somalia had deteriorated to such 
an extent that, in response to irredentism in Ethiopia’s Somali 
territory, the Somali regime, consumed by the nationalist idea 
of “Greater Somalia”, launched a full-scale invasion of Eastern 
Ethiopia in July 1977 under the pretext of unifying the Somali 
people. Ethiopia’s close relations with the communist bloc 
helped the regime to narrowly escape defeat when Soviet military 
7 A. Ylönen, Eritrea: A Rogue or a Strategically Constructed Threat?, Note 14, 
Observatoire des Enjeux Politiques et Sécuritaires dans la Corne de l’Afrique, 
February, p. 11.
8 R. Pateman, “Eritrea, Ethiopia, and the Middle Eastern Powers: Image and 
Reality”, Northeast African Studies, vol. 8, no. 2/3, pp. 23-39.
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material and advisors, and a significant Cuban contingent, 
came to its aid. Although external support allowed Ethiopia to 
deliver a devastating blow to the Somali military, to the extent 
that its expansionist plans were abandoned and the regime in 
Mogadishu was forced to turn inwards, it did not help the Derg 
to escape increasing pressure from insurgent movements at 
home. Instead, during the early 1980s, the Eritrean insurgency 
inspired other regional liberation movements in and beyond 
Ethiopia. Faced with increasingly powerful insurgencies and 
declining Soviet support, the Derg regime made unsuccessful 
constitutional concessions in 1987. However, the opposition 
forces organized themselves as the Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) led by its strongest 
faction, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). By 1991, 
the central government could no longer resist the rebel advance 
and collapsed.
The TPLF and Ethiopia’s role in the Horn of Africa
The victory of the EPRDF marked the beginning of a new era 
of authoritarian rule in Ethiopia. Under the 1994 constitution, 
the TPLF-led government reorganized the country into a 
federal system built on ethno-linguistic criteria. This system 
was designed to reflect the realities at the end of the civil war 
and provide a framework for inclusive inter-ethnic cooperation 
through strong provisions for self-determination of Ethiopia’s 
different ethnic groups.9 Critics have since emphasised the 
resulting inflation of identity politics that led to ethno-national 
competition within and between federal states.10 Indeed, over 
time, efforts to centralise power under the TPLF-led EPRDF 
9 M. Bassi, “The Relativistic Attitude in Development: Reflections on the 
Implementation of the Ethiopian Multinational Constitution”, Archivio 
Antropologico Mediterraneo, vol. 21/2, no. 22, 2019, pp. 1-30.
10 J. Abbink, “Ethnicity and Conflict Generation in Ethiopia: Some Problems and 
Prospects of Ethno-Regional Federalism”, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 
vol. 24, no. 3, 2006, pp. 389-413; A. Kefale, Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in 
Ethiopia: A Comparative Regional Study , Abingdon, Routledge, 2013.
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began to conflict with the contradictory idea of devolution 
through ethnic federalism under which ethnically defined 
regions were to enjoy wide autonomy and a constitutional right 
to secede.11 
As the EPRDF consolidated its power at the centre of the 
political system and extended its control into the regions, the 
satellite party structure gave the ruling coalition ample space 
and authority to claim to correct historical marginalisation and 
exclusion. Despite this, the minority leadership of the TPLF 
within the coalition demanded tight control of the political 
context, making the coalition increasingly autocratic. 
Meanwhile, the TPLF was forced to grant independence 
to Eritrea due to the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front’s 
significant contribution to overthrowing the Derg. Eritrea’s 
independence in 1993, and the souring of relations between 
the two states soon after drew the TPLF’s attention increasingly 
towards its northern neighbour. Landlocked Ethiopia, however, 
remained keen on using Eritrean ports and subsequently, to the 
dismay of Eritrean leadership, exerted increasing, especially 
economic, influence over the new country.12 This evidently 
made the leadership in Asmara, accustomed to independence 
in its foreign relations, uneasy, and presented the renewal of 
Ethiopian domination as an existential threat. The wrangling, 
partly caused by Eritrea asserting itself as a new player in the 
neighbourhood, culminated in a devastating two-year war in 
May 1998 which served to draw attention away from Ethiopia’s 
domestic repression and the TPLF’s efforts to further consolidate 
power in the state peripheries where armed opposition was 
active.
11 A.M. Abdullahi, “Article 39 of the Ethiopian Constitution On Secession and 
Self-determination: A Panacea to the Nationality Question in Africa?”, Verfassung 
und Recht in Übersee / Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America, vol. 31, 
no. 4, 1998, pp. 440-455.
12 A. Abbay, “’Not with Them, Not without Them’: The Staggering of Eritrea to 
Nationhood”, Africa: Rivista trimestrale di studi e documentazione dell’Istituto 
italiano per l’Africa e l’Oriente, vol. 56, no. 4, 2001, pp. 459-491.
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Building on Marxist-Leninist inspired, ethno-nationalist 
credentials and the credo of abyotawi demokrasi (“revolutionary 
democracy”), the TPLF and EPRDF entered into the post-Cold 
War global order, enabling at least the conjecture of ethno-
nationalism and moderate market-liberalisation. The core 
emphasis and proclaimed backbone of the economy remained 
the peasantry. This, however, changed markedly when the 
TPLF/EPRDF undertook its next ideological move, the gradual 
shift towards and adoption of the “developmental state model” 
which followed the 2001 split within the TPLF and became 
the official creed of the EPRDF from 2007.13 Ethiopia’s growth 
was significant in the first two decades of the century, though 
this boom happened at the expense of a free market economy, 
with the government maintaining tight control over key 
sectors, like its monopoly of telecommunications,14 as a type of 
“vanguard capitalism”.15 Starting in 2005, the government also 
established control mechanisms, like the “‘one-to-five’ system, 
where one person is charged to monitor, train, or mobilise five 
others”.16 This extended state control into the peripheries and 
likewise made the government the most effective employer and 
gatekeeper to investment and business, paralysing investment 
outside the government’s grip. 
The EPRDF’s supremacy was tested in the 2005 election. 
The opposition scored significant victories in the urban areas, 
while the EPRDF continued to draw on crucial support in the 
rural areas where the government’s developmentalist policies 
had made a greater difference. The protests that ensued faced 
13 T.N. Gebregziabher, “Ideology and Power in TPLF’s Ethiopia: A Historic 
Reversal in the Making?”, African Affairs, vol. 118, no. 472, 2019, pp. 463-84.
14 C. Clapham, “The Ethiopian Developmental State”, Third World Quarterly, vol. 
39, no. 6, 2018, p. 1156.
15 F. Gebresenbet and B. Kamski, “The Paradox of the Ethiopian Developmental 
State: Bureaucrats and Politicians in the Sugar Industry”, Journal of Contemporary 
African Studies, vol. 37, no. 4, 2019, pp. 335-350; T. Weis, “Vanguard Capitalism: 
Party, State, and Market in the EPRDF’s Ethiopia”, Ph.D. Thesis, University of 
Oxford, 2016.
16 F. Gebresenbet and B. Kamski (2016), p. 4.
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violent suppression by the authorities.17 The leadership, despite 
international condemnation, remained confident that internal 
political upheaval would not significantly change Ethiopia’s 
partnership with its main external allies.
Strengthening regional dominance
In terms of its central role in regional relations, Ethiopia benefited 
from the launch of the African Union in 2002 as the successor 
of the OAU. Meanwhile, the Ethiopian regime expanded its 
alliance with the United States as part of the emerging War 
on Terror in which the Horn of Africa became one of the key 
strategic regions, in part due to its proximity to the Middle East 
across the Red Sea. As a result, the US established its Africa 
Command (AFRICOM) base in Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti 
and initiated close security collaboration, operating bases in 
Ethiopia. This converted Ethiopia into a bulwark against the 
surrounding “terrorism prone” states subject to radical Islamist 
propagation. Sudan, once a major hub for radical political 
Islam, Somalia, with growing radical Islamist tendencies, and 
Eritrea, seen to flirt with Arab interests in the Horn, seeking 
to weaken Ethiopia, and stir instability in the sub-region, 
cemented Ethiopia’s role as the most strategically important 
state in the Horn. 
In the aftermath of the Eritrean-Ethiopian War, Ethiopia 
forged increasingly close relations with Djibouti, while Eritrea 
became internationally isolated and portrayed as the “North 
Korea” of the Horn. Djibouti’s being an important US and 
Western ally facilitated Ethiopia’s closer relations with it. At 
the same time, despite its Western alliances, Ethiopia also 
looked to the East to diversify its external partnerships. Seeing 
Sudan’s close collaboration with China from the mid-1990s as 
an example, the Ethiopian government looked towards Beijing 
for support. It recognised that Chinese backing had been 
17 J. Abbink, “Discomfiture of Democracy? The 2005 Election Crisis in Ethiopia 
and Its Aftermath”, African Affairs, vol. 105, no. 419, 2006, pp. 173-199.
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crucial in salvaging the Islamist regime in Khartoum when 
faced with international condemnation, US sanctions, and an 
increasing number of insurgencies in its peripheries, some of 
which Ethiopia itself had supported. Similarly, in the context 
of a gradually heating great power competition, Addis Ababa 
sought to capitalise on Beijing’s desire to pursue economic 
interests in the strategically important Horn of Africa. 
Ethiopia’s partnership with Djibouti was ultimately cemented 
by Djibouti’s intimate relations with China, which also helped 
Addis Ababa’s relationship with Beijing. In this context, 
the mutual benefits gained by both Djibouti and Ethiopia 
were enhanced by Chinese involvement, which improved 
logistic infrastructure between the two states and increasingly 
interconnected their economies. 
China, on the other hand, saw Djibouti as a stepping-
stone to increasingly lucrative Ethiopian markets and readily 
financed a railway connecting the Ethiopian capital to the 
ports in Djibouti. Soon after, UAE’s Dubai Ports World, a 
worldwide logistics company linked to state interests, sought 
to take advantage of the new landscape by striking deals both 
in Djibouti and Ethiopia, and elsewhere in the Horn. This 
increasing foreign interest proved beneficial to Ethiopia which 
succeeded in marketing its potential and broadening its external 
alliances with the leading Gulf States.  
In the mid-2000s, Ethiopia’s Western allies, especially the 
US, perceived the rise of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in 
Somalia as a regional threat. The ICU extended its influence 
until it claimed to be in control of Mogadishu in June 2006. 
Meanwhile, Somalia’s internationally recognized authority, the 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) which installed itself 
temporarily in Baidoa in 2005, called for assistance against the 
ICU which, according to the United Nations, was supported 
by external actors, including the Arab States and Eritrea. 
Soon after, Ethiopia, influenced and supported by the US, 
intervened in defence of the TFG, and occupied Mogadishu. 
The ICU disintegrated as a result, but remaining radicals 
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founded insurgent groups and armed opposition to the Somali 
government soon crystallized in the hard-line Islamic group al-
Shabaab, resulting in escalation of the conflict in Somalia.18
Following the establishment of the African Union Mission 
in Somalia (AMISOM), Ethiopia partially withdrew from 
Somalia in 2009. However, from 2013 on, al-Shabaab sought 
increasingly to target Ethiopia, which responded by integrating 
its remaining contingent in Somalia into the AMISOM.
Meanwhile, as part of its approach towards Somalia, 
Ethiopia has continued to maintain a close relationship with 
the breakaway, self-declared independent Somaliland. Rooted 
in Ethiopia’s provision of sanctuary to the Somali National 
Movement (SNM), an armed opposition group based in 
Somaliland in the 1980s, Ethiopia-Somaliland relations 
have remained strong. Ethiopia has endorsed Somaliland by 
maintaining political ties and engaging in economic activities. 
Political Openings and Instability 
Despite maintaining high levels of economic growth, the 
Government of Ethiopia has been unable to deliver economic 
integration. One reason for the persisting imbalance was 
probably the increasing gap between party and people, including 
the government’s overpowering involvement in social life. 
An important part of the discontent that led to political 
change was the regime’s land policy. One aspect of the 
developmental economic strategy was a shift from small-hold 
agriculture to state-led, large-scale land investment.19 The 
2010s became “a decade of land grabs” in Ethiopia, as the 
government and local administration awarded large tracts of 
land in seemingly peripheral and unused areas to land investors. 
18 M.H. Ingiriis, “From Al-Itihaad to Al-Shabaab: How the Ethiopian Intervention 
and the ‘War on Terror’ Exacerbated the Conflict in Somalia”, Third World 
Quarterly, vol. 39, no. 11, 2018, pp. 2033-2052.
19 J. Markakis(2011), p. 260.
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The politics of land grabs became a testimony to the flexibility 
of the government “to override the local self-government 
ostensibly granted to indigenous peoples under the federal 
constitution”.20 Land leasing was done through the so-called 
land bank on the federal level and bypassed local offices to 
prevent corruption. Local authorities and people saw in this 
a severe infringement on their rights to self-administration.21 
The Addis Ababa masterplan announced in 2015 ignited 
protests which pushed for political reform, land reform, and 
democratic openings.22 Opposition, often driven by regional 
youth, grew and spread to different areas of Ethiopia. The two 
largest protest movements centred on Oromia and Amhara. 
While these were initially separate movements, the response of 
the government drew them together and by 2016 the Amhara 
endorsed the fight of the Oromo and vice versa.23 These were 
unprecedented alliances in the face of extraordinary decay in 
central government power. By 2016, observers saw looming 
either the possibility of an Ethiopian spring or a “descent into 
civil war”.24 The protest movement gained momentum and its 
peaceful stance won global recognition when Fayyisaa Leellisaa, 
during the 2016 Rio Summer Olympics, endorsed the protests 
and condemned the violence used against the young protesters.
20 C. Clapham (2018), p. 1158.
21 F. Gebresenbet, “Land Acquisitions, the Politics of Dispossession, and State-
Remaking in Gambella, Western Ethiopia”, Africa Spectrum, vol. 51, no. 1, 2016, 
p. 5-28.
22 J. Záhořík, “Reconsidering Ethiopia’s Ethnic Politics in the Light of the Addis 
Ababa Master Plan and Anti-Governmental Protests”, The Journal of the Middle 
East and Africa, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 257-272
23 J. Fisher and M.T. Gebrewahd, “‘Game over’? Abiy Ahmed, the Tigrayan People’s 
Liberation Front and Ethiopia’s Political Crisis”, African Affairs, vol. 118, no. 470, 
2019, p. 201; A. Allo, “‘The Blood Flowing in Oromia Is Our Blood Too’: Why 
Oromo-Amhara Solidarity Is the Greatest Threat to the Ethiopian Government”, 
African Arguments, 27 September 2016.
24 R. Lefort, “The ‘Ethiopian Spring’: ‘Killing Is Not an Answer to Our Grievances’”, 
Open Democracy, 9 September 2016.
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In a quick progression of events, Prime Minister Hailemariam 
Desalegn, who had succeeded Meles Zenawi, stepped down 
and the vice-chairperson of the Oromo Peoples Democratic 
Organization (OPDO) was named his successor. Abiy Ahmed 
Ali “since his April 2018 inauguration, presided over a dramatic 
set of iconoclastic policy shifts”.25 His impressive record of 
rapid reforms included the freeing of political prisoners, an 
invitation to opposition parties (including those that had 
been labelled terrorist groups like the ONLF or OLF), and a 
peace deal with Eritrea,26 which earned him the Nobel Peace 
Prize. Economically, he addressed increased privatisation and 
economic liberalisation. In the spirit of the demonstrations and 
protests that brought him to power (one of the slogans was 
“down, down woyyane” – demanding the retreat of the TPLF), 
Abiy began by distancing himself from the TPLF. The new 
Prime Minister extended apologies and sought reconciliation, 
“condemning his immediate predecessors within weeks of 
coming to office as overseers of ‘terrorist acts ... and using force 
just to stay in power’”.27 This provided a pretext to reform 
the EPRDF at the expense of alienating the TPLF. Within 
a few weeks, Abiy changed the name of the OPDO to the 
Oromo Democratic Party (ODP)28 and had key military and 
intelligence officers replaced. After Abiy propped up relations 
with Eritrea, the TPLF became confined to Northern Ethiopia 
and gradually alienated from the EPRDF. 
Most significant was the reform of the EPRDF in November 
2019. The EPRDF executive committee and council “plus the 
five parties that control the Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, 
Harari and Somali regions and that are allied to, but are not part 
25 J. Fisher and M. T. Gebrewahd (2019), p. 194.
26 A. Ylönen, “Is the Horn of Africa’s ‘Cold War’ over? Abiy Ahmed’s Early Reforms 
and the Rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea”, African Security Review, 
vol. 27, no. 3-4, 2018, pp. 245-252.
27 J. Fisher and M. T. Gebrewahd (2019), p. 194.
28 D. Mumbere, “Ethiopia’s Oromo Party Changes Name, Logo Ahead of 2020 
Vote”, Africanews, 21 September 2018.
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of it”,  agreed to merge into one single Prosperity Party.29 This 
move was welcomed by some as ending ethnic particularism and 
promoting inclusion, but was denounced by others as a move to 
roll back ethno-national achievements and return to unitarianism 
and centralism. The TPLF did not join the new party. 
Regional affairs: New opportunities or the same old?
The rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea gave credence 
to the new Ethiopian administration’s ability to lead the way 
towards increasingly friendly relations in the Horn of Africa 
and the wider region. Prime Minister Abiy sought to mediate 
and ease tensions between federal Somalia and Somaliland, but 
as an interested party heavily involved in Somalia, such efforts 
have so far not been fruitful. The Ethiopian government’s 
endeavours as one of the main mediators in the South Sudan 
crisis were somewhat more successful in the short-term in that 
the previously forged, externally induced peace agreement 
was revitalized. Recently, however, Ethiopia’s relations with 
some of its neighbours have become more strained, with the 
country continuing to rely principally on close relations with 
Djibouti and Somaliland and trying to keep the leading Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) states interested in the promising 
Ethiopian economy despite low oil prices.  
These developments are largely due to Ethiopia’s efforts to 
ensure strategically crucial and economically important sea 
access. Although Ethiopia’s unprecedented rapprochement 
with Eritrea brought initial promises for resuming important 
economic ties and access to Eritrea’s ports, these hopes have since 
waned, partly due to Eritrean reluctance and unrest in Tigray. To 
diminish dependence on Djibouti, Ethiopia has, for many years, 
also looked at the Berbera Corridor as an alternative access to a 
Red Sea port. In 2018, shortly before Abiy’s ascendance to power, 
the Ethiopian government formally became part of a tripartite 
29 Keeping Ethiopia’s Transition on the Rails, International Crisis Group, Africa 
Report, no. 283, 16 December 2019.
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consortium managing and developing the Berbera Port together 
with the United Arab Emirates-based Dubai Ports World and 
the Somaliland government. Although this has since put the 
Abiy administration in a somewhat uncomfortable position in 
its relations with Mogadishu, Berbera Port continues to play an 
important role in Ethiopia-Somaliland relations. This is despite 
Ethiopia’s plans to seek access to port facilities in Sudan30 and 
Kenya too. Mogadishu has vehemently resisted the project as a 
violation of its sovereignty.31 Working with Somaliland on the 
project has therefore brought about an uneasy situation which, 
after some hesitation, the Ethiopian government has sought to 
remedy by promising to pursue port development elsewhere in 
Somalia as well. However, Ethiopia’s involvement in Somalia 
has continued to feed political divisions and resembles a 
longstanding policy of preventing the rise of a strong and 
unified Somalia through heavy interference in Somali affairs.32 
The fourth option to access the Red Sea through Sudan via 
north-western Ethiopia has been considered more unreliable 
and less viable despite initiatives gradually moving towards that 
end. Ethiopia uses Sudanese ports for a rather insignificant level 
of exportation, but the project of building a new port mainly 
to manage Ethiopian trade has stalled. The final option for 
ensuring sea access is through the Kenyan Lamu Port-South 
Sudan-Ethiopia-Transport corridor (LAPSSET) mega project, 
which plans to connect especially southern Ethiopia to the 
Indian Ocean.33
Particularly since 2018, partnership with Ethiopia has also 
been one of the focal points of the leading GCC countries 
30 O. Ayieko, “Ethiopia to Lose $1b In Case it Exits Somaliland’s Berbera Port”, East 
African Business Week News, 20 August 2020.
31 International Crisis Group, “Somalia-Somaliland: The Perils of Delaying New 
Talks”, Africa Report, no. 280, 12 July 2019, p. 4.
32 B.B. Yihun, “Ethiopian Foreign Policy and the Ogaden War: The Shift from 
‘Containment’ to ‘Destabilization’, 1977-1991”, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 
vol. 8, no. 4, 2014, pp. 683-686.
33 LAPSSET Corridor Development Authority (LCDA), LAPSSET Projects, 
2020, http://www.lapsset.go.ke/
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in their attempts to extend their influence in the Horn. 
Recognizing Ethiopia’s centrality in the sub-region, and the 
opportunities provided by political reforms, the UAE and 
Saudi Arabia have worked hard to turn the country from a 
longstanding bulwark against Arab influence in the Horn 
into a partner. Competition with Iran, the Yemeni civil war, 
and the GCC crisis have driven the Gulf States’ interests in 
the Horn of Africa where Ethiopia’s dominant status makes 
it a formidable ally. In partnership with Saudi Arabia and the 
UAE, who are not among Ethiopia’s conventional allies but 
who have strong relations with Eritrea, Abiy’s administration 
has settled the longstanding confrontation with Eritrea, made 
possible by the prior removal of the TPLF from the helm of 
power. Maintaining good relations with Arab states is also likely 
to yield domestic benefit for Abiy in terms of financial resources 
and support within Ethiopian Muslim communities while also 
strengthening his appeal in regional politics. 
Since Abiy assumed power, Ethiopia’s relations with its 
Western allies have been generally good. Abiy’s initial reforms 
and rapprochement with Eritrea were especially applauded 
in the West, although the US itself played an important role 
in facilitating the latter. However, recent domestic political 
problems, the adoption of repressive measures and inflexibility 
in negotiations over the Nile waters have not been viewed 
positively by some political and civil society actors in the West. 
New beginnings and inherited conflicts
Abiy’s domestic agenda is known as medemer and is described in 
a book of the same name. It urges radical reforms of the public 
sector and civil service and the end of ethno-particularism. From 
an economic perspective, it diverges from the old developmental 
paradigm by fostering more privatisation, contrary to the 
vanguard capitalist paradigms of his predecessors.34
34 L. Yohannes, “Abiy’s Homespun Balancing Act: Medemer Reviewed”, Ethiopia 
Insight, 26 January 2020.
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Despite or because of the PM’s largely reconciliatory 
approach, Abiy proved unable to gain control quickly over the 
imminent conflicts in the country. The first months of the new 
regime were tainted by conflicts flaring up in the Gedeo-Guji 
region as well as in the Gambella and Somali Federal States. The 
number of IDPs grew to 3 million, the highest in the world in 
2018.35 While some argued that these conflicts were inherited 
from the previous administration, the government’s blatant 
paralysis made way for a shift in public opinion. Opponents 
and supporters alike started asking whether the new reform-
minded administration would be able to deliver on national 
security.
The ascent to power of an Oromo politician gave members 
of the Oromo community the impression that the root cause of 
their protests would soon be dealt with; some believed they had 
finally captured political control of Ethiopia. In certain areas, 
disgruntled youth even insulted and attacked non-Oromos. 
Local administrations and police posts in Oromia were 
dismantled, the Ethiopian flag taken down, and the Oromia 
flag hoisted in its place. It became common to see sidewalks 
and fences across towns in Oromia painted in the colours of 
the regional flag. In other parts of the country too, the new 
government found it hard to handle the security apparatus, 
and local militias and groups filled the alleged security void. 
While the Abiy administration called the Oromo Liberation 
Front (OLF) back into the political game, its political arm, the 
Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) expanded military operations 
in Western Wollega. It refused to agree to the political 
bargaining and instead defected from the party and has since 
operated independently. By March 2020 several hundred 
people had been killed by the military and the militias or fled 
to neighbouring Gambella.36   
35 “Ethiopia - National Displacement Report Round 18: July - August 2019 - 
Ethiopia”, reliefweb, 24 October 2019.
36 Z. Zelalem. “Special Edition: Failed Politics and Deception: Behind the Crisis in 
Western and Southern Oromia”, Addis Standard, 20 March 2020. 
Africa’s Thorny Horn138
At the same time, calls for regional autonomy grew with the 
referendum in Sidama on the creation of a new regional state 
on 23 November 2019. This was preceded by waves of protests 
over the future status of the region’s capital Hawassa and its 
role in the new regional arrangements; violent repression by the 
security forces began in July 2019. 
Demographic and land issues
Hidden behind much of the current crisis is economic 
contraction. Widespread youth unemployment coupled with 
an inflated higher education sector and an economy incapable 
of providing employment for graduates unable to make a living 
from agriculture has caused widespread frustration. Young 
people across Ethiopia soon began contesting “the dominant 
portrayal of Ethiopia as ‘Africa’s fastest growing economy’”.37 
Feelings of marginalisation are catalysed by identity discourse 
focused on land alienation. The issues of urbanisation and 
modernisation are therefore once again being viewed in an 
age-old perspective of victimhood and disaffection. This is the 
case across Ethiopian communities who have lost faith in the 
government.
The Oromo case is critical in this regard and arguably the 
most pressing political issue today. It also exemplifies the 
complex relationship between economic contraction, identity 
conflict, political bargaining and global interconnectedness. 
The protests, promoted over social media and supported by 
the diaspora, helped form the qeeroo movement that has driven 
Oromo unrest since 2014. “Qeeroo” is a term for “youth” 
loaded with Oromo traditional symbolism.38 Also known as the 
Oromo Youth Movement, its internal organisation structure 
remains obscure.39 Its followers are “largely educated youth 
37 T. Abebe, “Lost Futures? Educated Youth Precarity and Protests in the Oromia 
Region, Ethiopia”, Children’s Geographies, 2020, p. 6. 
38 T. Abebe (2020).
39 M. Aga, “Qeerroo: A Regimented Organization or a Spontaneous Movement?”, 
Ethiopia Insight, 21 August 2020; T. Østebø, “Analysis: The Role of the Qeerroo in 
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with rural backgrounds”.40 Critically, they are the first cohort of 
Oromo youth to substantially benefit from access to university 
education after mother tongue primary education.
Propelled by ongoing economic grievances that Abiy has 
been unable to address in his short presidency, and stemming 
from core demands like making Oromo a government language 
and grievances over the status of Addis Ababa, internal Oromo 
opposition to Abiy has grown. His opponents have emphasized 
the new PM’s EPRDF background and insist he will ignore 
the Oromo. Instead, they have spun a narrative that Abiy is 
working toward autocratic rule backed by old unitarist elites. 
Within two years, the qeeroo have turned around, and “Abiy 
must go” has become the movement’s new slogan. 
Current Main Policy Issues and the Way Ahead 
Oromo divisions
On the back of the qeeroo movement, the Oromo political 
elite is fighting a struggle over the political future of Ethiopia. 
Oromo protests since 2015 did not topple the old regime but 
merely ushered in Abiy Ahmed and his reforms. The new Prime 
Minister was seen as a governmental solution for the demands 
of the Oromo. When an Oromo was installed in the palace, 
many thought the time had come for the Oromo to lead 
the state. From day one, the expectations placed on the new 
administration were therefore overwhelming. The new leader 
had to satisfy demands for stability while introducing changes 
in government (especially following anti-TPLF inclinations) 
and not alienating hardliner ethno-nationalists. The current 
political impasse is both a crisis of all citizens over popular 
participation and an internal Oromo crisis over the future of 
Future Oromo Politics”, Addis Standard, 26 May 2020.
40 T. Abebe (2020), p. 2.
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Oromo political identity. While the Oromo are the largest 
ethnic community in Ethiopia, their success in political claims-
making and state capture has been limited. This has resulted 
in discontent and opposition within the Oromo but large-
scale support for Abiy Ahmed: the fragmentation of recent 
Oromo identity politics and the return of internal divisions is 
obvious.41 Simultaneously, other communities are now voicing 
discontent about the current government’s prioritisation of 
Oromo in terms of land access and political posts, especially in 
Addis Ababa.  
The political stalemate was exacerbated by the murder of 
Oromo musician Hachalu Hundessa on 29 June 2020. The 
killing escalated the stand-off between the opposition and the 
government. The event was followed by an outburst of violence 
across Oromia and in Addis Ababa in which more than 200 
people lost their lives. The government has imprisoned several 
thousand people since then, including opposition leaders like 
Jawar Mohammed and Bekele Gerba. 
The stand-off also exposes the extent to which the current 
political crisis is one of contested leadership of Ethiopia’s future 
federal system. Framed by a conflict between nationalists 
(Amhara dominance), unitarists, and federalists, the qeeroo are 
back, reinvigorated by protests throughout the diaspora against 
atrocities committed against the Oromo. The government is 
framed as “neo-neftegna” ostensibly undermining the previous 
regime’s achievements in self-determination. The term neftegna 
(meaning “gun carrier”, once used to refer to the soldier settlers 
of the Menelik era) also identifies the recently formed Prosperity 
Party with the feudal expansion of the late XIX century and 
raises the spectre of national oppression. 
41 T. Østebø and K. Tronvoll, “Interpreting Contemporary Oromo Politics in 
Ethiopia: An Ethnographic Approach”, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 2020, 
pp. 1-20.
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The Nile stalemate
The Nile has been an important dimension in Ethiopian 
strategic regional relations. From Emperor Haile Selassie’s 
ambitious modernisation efforts onwards, harnessing water 
resources has been a key part of the leaderships’ attempts to 
develop the country. However, Ethiopia’s weakness and political 
upheaval during the Derg regime, as well as the focus of foreign 
relations on the immediate neighbourhood did not allow the 
country to challenge the hegemony that Egypt had inherited 
over the Nile waters through the treaties of 1929 and especially 
1959. Although the idea of building a dam on the Blue Nile 
had lingered for decades, it was well into the second decade of 
EPRDF rule before the project was pushed forward. As Ethiopia’s 
assertiveness in its regional relations had grown significantly in 
the first decade of the new millennium, the government finally 
surveyed the dam site and concrete plans to build the structure 
were drawn up. Egypt’s efforts to prevent upstream developments 
affecting water usage along the course of the Nile, which it had 
sought to safeguard through political influence, negotiations, 
and various agreements over the years, were frustrated. One year 
after the 2010 Cooperative Framework Agreement, in which 
upstream countries finally stated their intention to develop Nile 
water resources without seeking Egypt’s approval, Ethiopia’s 
massive dam plan was made public, stirring up relations with 
Egypt and Sudan. Since the beginning, Cairo has vehemently 
opposed the project which it perceives as an existential threat 
to Egypt’s food, water, and energy security. In Sudan, news 
of the dam project was received with mixed reactions, largely 
due to uncertainty with regard to Ethiopia’s ability to regulate 
the flow of the Blue Nile to the benefit of Sudanese riverine 
agriculture, fisheries, and hydropower production. In Ethiopia, 
the project – known as the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam 
(GERD) – gained an important nationalistic dimension, and 
its completion is now seen as crucial to the legitimacy of the 
ruling elite. Over the last decade, amidst continuous delays, 
Ethiopia has been able to convince the Sudanese government 
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of the benefits of a more regulated flow of the Blue Nile. Sudan 
subsequently became a mediator between Egypt and Ethiopia 
until the demise of Omar Bashir in April 2019. As the dam 
has come nearer to completion, Ethiopia has adopted a harder 
stance, despite major political changes since 2018. While 
Egypt and Sudan insisted on a comprehensive and definitive 
agreement on water allocation and upstream developments, 
Ethiopia opted for a piecemeal step-by-step approach and the 
involvement of the African Union, despite pressure by the US, 
including a partial suspension of aid. In July 2020, Ethiopia 
began filling the reservoir to take advantage of the rainy season, 
without reaching a prior comprehensive agreement with Egypt 
and Sudan. Both Cairo and Khartoum voiced their concern 
repeatedly – Egypt seeking to use its reach in the United 
Nations and other international bodies – and Addis Ababa’s 
relations with both states have grown increasingly tense.42 It has 
even been suggested that the recent political unrest in Ethiopia, 
which has caused considerable instability, is partly being fuelled 
by Egypt.43 For the moment, a comprehensive solution on the 
Nile remains elusive.
The Covid-19 crisis and the national elections
Ethiopia has seen turbulent change since Abiy Ahmed came 
to power. Abiy’s imprint on the domestic scene has been 
significant but overshadowed by resistance and conflicts that 
have broken out in various areas. 2020 was to be the year of 
general elections and an important test for the political future 
of the Prime Minister. While it would have been a decisive 
period for Ethiopia anyhow, the Covid-19 crisis has added to 
the complexity of the country’s problems.
42 A. Ylönen, “Talking Nile: Historical Aspects, Current Concerns, and the 
Stalemate in Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Negotiations”, The Horn Bulletin, 
vol. 3, no. 4, July/August 2020, pp. 1-10.
43 “Oromia cracks open again”, Africa Confidential, vol. 61, no. 15, 23 July 2020, p. 
2.
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The Ethiopian response to the virus started slowly, but in 
a coordinated fashion; the Ministry of Health has been at 
the frontline in combatting the virus since the beginning. In 
late January 2020, the Ministry opened a call centre and, in 
coordination with the World Health Organization (WHO), 
started training a response team. The response of the government 
nevertheless appeared relatively lax to some, considering that 
Ethiopian airlines kept up its 30 plus flights per week to China, 
the epicentre of the expanding corona-crisis in late December 
2019. Since May 2020, the rainy season has seen infections rise, 
and testing has been expanded accordingly. 
The government finally declared a state of emergency which, 
logistical considerations apart, was also arguably used to 
postpone the elections. This led to opposition protests and 
changed the pace of events. Potentially the most critical result 
of Covid-19 policies, the postponement is seen to strongly 
support the opposition’s claims that the government is working 
towards a totalitarian system and aims to cling to power while 
ostensibly claiming to be inclusive and calling for dialogue. 
The TPLF has responded with revived calls for self-
determination, primarily because of its own marginalisation in 
the new political order. The government in Mekelle even went 
ahead with regional elections, leading to further muscle-flexing 
between the TPLF and the national government.44 Addis Ababa, 
citing a ruling by the House of Federation, declared the regional 
elections unconstitutional as they ignored the roles of the House 
of Peoples’ Representatives and of the National Election Board.45 
Despite this, the regional vote was held in early September 2020 
and the TPLF won a landslide victory. The government refused 
to acknowledge the result. The constitutional stalemate is not 
over. The national state of emergency declared because of the 
44 A. Asefa. “‘Exit’ Imminent as Abiy Neglects the Tigrayan ‘Voice’”, Ethiopia 
Insight, 22 August 2020.
45 “News: House of Federation Votes Tigray Regional Election Contravenes Federal 
Constitution, Non-Binding & Non-Applicable”, Addis Standard, 5 September 
2020. 
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pandemic came to an end in late August. The government’s legal 
mandate also ended in early October. This was resolved by an 
investigation by an independent constitutional committee, but, 
focusing on the health crisis, the government failed to use the 
chance to reopen a transitional dialogue and further address the 
consequent constitutional dilemma through inclusive politics.46 
The Conflict over Tigray
The political deadlock between the TPLF and the government 
took an extraordinary turn when on the night of 4 November 
the TPLF attacked the Ethiopian military’s Northern 
Command Post to seize military equipment. Immediately, the 
government launched an all-out military campaign involving 
air raids and ground forces to subdue the TPLF-led regional 
government. Two weeks into the conflict, hundreds have lost 
their lives and thousands of refugees have crossed into Sudan 
for safety.47 According to some news sources, both parties have 
committed atrocities,48 while TPLF has fired missiles both at 
Gonder and Lalibela airports in the Amhara region south of 
Tigray and across the border at Asmara in Eritrea, ostensibly 
to punish the Amhara and Eritrea for their support of the 
government’s military campaign. The unfolding conflict has 
brought the reform-course of the government to a stand-still 
and the administration has rejected international offers for 
mediation, qualifying it as an internal affair.49 Instead, the 
government is presenting its campaign as a punitive measure to 
bring the criminal “TPLF junta” to justice. 
46 M.A. Salemot, “With Legal Roads Closed, a Transitional Government Should 
Take the Wheel”, Ethiopia Insight, 26 May 2020. 
47 “Refugee Exodus to Sudan Swells as War Crimes Feared in Ethiopia’s Tigray”, 
Reuters, 13 November 2020.
48 J. Burke and Z. M. Salih, “Both Sides in Ethiopian Conflict Are Killing Civilians, 
Refugees Say”, The Guardian, 13 November 2020.
49 “Tigray Crisis: Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Rejects Peace Talks”, BBC 
News, 11 November 2020.
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However, a number of external parties in the region have 
interests in or result affected by the conflict. The Eritrean 
leadership has sought the demise of the TPLF and its troops 
have allegedly been involved on the ground. Tigray borders 
Eritrea and a friendler regional administration under the central 
government’s influence would serve Eritrea. On the other hand, 
Egypt’s interests would be served by a weak central government 
in Ethiopia which would cede ground in the Nile dispute. Others 
affected by the conflict are Djibouti, Ethiopia’s main economic 
lifeline to the Red Sea, Somalia, which depends heavily on the 
Ethiopian military in its battle against al-Shabaab, and Sudan, 
which is forced to deal with a great number of refugees from 
Tigray at least in the short term.
In the official narrative of the government, the TPLF, since 
retreating from power, failed to join the new political project 
and worked against the new leadership and the constitution, 
ostensibly funded ethnic-based dissent groups (among them 
the OLA and Gumuz-based separatist group), and plotted 
with the government of Egypt, supporting those who would 
destabilize the country. In the view of the Abiy administration, 
the TPLF’s “old guard” has made the country ungovernable by 
funding anti-peace elements that spread conflicts and weaken 
its reformist course.
Shrouded in this relentless fight between the new 
administration and the TPLF is the question of access to the 
political and economic arena. While the government seems to 
be determined to fully uproot the previous networks of power 
created during the last three decades, the TPLF is trying to 
shift the attention of the conflict to the international level in 
order to create a seat for itself at a mediation table and to regain 
access to the political future of Ethiopia, the country it had 
ruled for so long. The TPLF has done much to discredit the 
Abiy administration and has attempted to show that the new 
camp is unable to govern the country so long. In the meantime, 
a new administration, loyal to the central government, has been 
nominated to replace the TPLF leadership in Tigray. It is yet 
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too early to assess the full extent of the war since it occurs in 
an internet and telephone blockage under a six-month state of 
emergency in the region.50 However, it is highly unlikely that 
the conflict will be resolved before a defeat, resulting in a direct 
loss of life of thousands and endangering the livelihoods of an 
unpredictable number of people for a long time. 
Conclusion
Ethiopia’s complex domestic political landscape is the major 
determinant of its regional and international relations and 
its central role in the equally complex politics of the Horn 
of Africa. Throughout Ethiopia’s imperial and revolutionary 
political history, the country has continued both as a light-
bearer and as a conservative actor in the region. While Ethiopia 
has often taken the initiative to shape political realities in the 
Horn of Africa, it has generally been more reactionary in its 
wider relations with the great and regional powers.
Hence, despite promising economic statistics, at a closer 
look, the important changes of recent years reveal conflicting 
political and economic legacies. The current government 
emerged with a promise to tackle the main political, economic, 
and social problems emanating from the tenure of past regimes, 
initiate its self-proclaimed reformist course and aspire to 
creating inclusion and prosperity. Success in this daunting 
endeavor would likely result in increased political stability. 
Instead, though, the reformist agenda is wrangled up in various 
conflicts on various fronts and any progress will depend on 
the outcome of the conflict in Tigray. At this point, it seems 
unlikely that, since the surgical intervention to take out the 
TPLF leadership has failed, any government military triumph 
will result in immediate peace. On the contrary, protracted 
civil strife, particularly between Amhara and Tigrinya along 
50 S. Allison, “Blackout Makes It Hard to Report on Ethiopia’s Civil War”, The Mail 
& Guardian (blog), 16 November 2020.
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their shared borders, and the deliberate targeting of Tigrinya 
speakers scapegoating them for the long years TPLF rule appear 
among the most dangerous future scenarios. Should they come 
true, such scenarios would potentially destabilize the country 
and set back the wellbeing and economic progress of the people 
of Ethiopia for years to come.
As the current situation shows, conflicts run within and 
between groups and between groups and the government. The 
reformist agenda, probably even the Noble Peace Prize Award 
itself, has made Abiy a target for various groups who want to 
prove that he is unable to peacefully transform the country and 
govern it. The quest for inclusive citizenship and the age-old 
nationalities question have still not been settled.51 The current 
situation is complex and no simple formula for a “way ahead” can 
be identified. There have been seismic shifts in power balances 
and coalitions. The TPLF-era has ended and “with the dissolution 
of the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front, the 
subservience of the other ethnic political groups that were part 
of the EPRDF coalition is over”.52 Instead, the conflict lays open 
the fierce competition over power and over the renewal of the 
Ethiopian polity since Abiy emerged as the new leader. But given 
the current events in Tigray and violence across the country, the 
new Ethiopia seems more opaque than ever.
With new options for state capture on the table, the current 
situation invites various actors to fight for a seat at the table. The 
government is seen as more and more rigid in trying to sustain 
the upper hand in this race for power. Abiy Ahmed is viewed 
by some as genuinely driven by a will to establish peace and 
prosperity in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa. Others, however, 
see his efforts as a pretext to expand the autocratic rule of his 
own camp and extend Ethiopia’s hegemonic aspirations in the 
region. His ambiguous position in the absence of elections is 
certainly making him increasingly vulnerable to such allegations. 
51 R. Lefort, “Political Shake-up and Localism Can Edge Ethiopia Forwards”, Open 
Democracy, 29 May 2019.
52 W. Aberra, “Lemma’s Disunity Drug”, Ethiopia Insight, 17 December 2019.
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At the moment it should not be underestimated though that 
the conflict in Tigray gains the Abiy administration enormous 
domestic support. What appears as a significant conflict also has 
the signs of a violent transformation of political and economic 
control from one camp to the next. Consequently, Ethiopia 
at present is indisputably going through some of the most far-
reaching changes in its recent history.
Abiy’s reforms and associated Ethiopian foreign policy have 
facilitated new alliances and opportunities for appeasement in 
regional relations, although the country’s assertiveness in issues 
such as the Berbera Corridor and the GERD have also somewhat 
undermined relations with its allies and pitted Ethiopia more 
clearly against certain regional rivals. The fragmented political 
landscape in Ethiopia is also still susceptible to foreign influence 
and exacerbation, as the TPLF’s suspected support by Egypt 
might indicate, although political fault lines and related conflicts 
have been largely generated by internal dynamics.      
Vital to a peaceful future for Ethiopia is focus on dialogue 
between Oromo and Tigray elites, the positioning of the 
Prosperity Party with regard to the future of federalism, and, 
above all, the upcoming elections. But without prioritization 
of the plight of the sections of civilian population which 
are at a danger of further victimization, the government 
will divert markedly from the idea of transitional justice the 
new administration started with and likely open the door to 
protracted ethnic strife.
Equally crucial will be developments in the relationship 
with Eritrea, cooperation on issues related to the Nile waters 
with Egypt and Sudan, cross-border relations with the latter, 
continued interventions in Somalia, and Ethiopia’s role in 
Somalia-Somaliland relations. Wider relations with regional and 
global powers will also help to define the future of international 
alliances in the Horn. One thing is certain: the success or failure 
of Ethiopia’s quest for hegemony in the Horn of Africa will be 
largely determined by internal dynamics.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
Giovanni Carbone, Camillo Casola
The Horn of Africa is one of the most dynamic regions on 
the African continent. The political processes currently under 
way have deep implications that reflect not only on domestic 
developments within the area’s core states (i.e. Ethiopia, 
Somalia, Eritrea and Djibouti) but also on the unstable 
equilibria that characterise inter-state relations in the macro-
region. The 2018 appointment of Abiy Ahmed as head of the 
Ethiopian government, in particular, proved a game changer. 
The impetus given by the Prime Minister to easing tensions 
with neighbouring Eritrea, the mediation he offered to regional 
actors for the solution of internal crises (in Sudan, South 
Sudan and Somaliland), the strengthening of relations with 
international partners (from China to Saudi Arabia), and a 
growing regional leadership that made the country a privileged 
reference point for Europe and the international community 
in the most acute phases of the pandemic, have all contributed 
to increasing the strategic centrality of Addis Ababa, while at 
the same time raising the geopolitical profile of a region whose 
relevance had been on the rise for a number of years.
As in the rest of the world, the Covid-19 pandemic has had 
a disruptive impact on the Horn, causing significant political 
and social consequences. In Ethiopia in particular, the health 
crisis presented the government with complex choices: the 
long-awaited parliamentary elections, seen as a fundamental 
test for the leadership of Abiy and his new Prosperity Party, 
were postponed indefinitely because of the risks of large-scale 
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contagion. This decision to protect public health at the expense 
of the democratic process exposed the government to (at times 
violent) criticisms from the opposition, who accused the Prime 
Minister of trying to consolidate power beyond constitutional 
time limits. The ensuing crisis in Tigray, where local political 
authorities controlled by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front 
(TPLF) organised and won regional elections that Addis Ababa 
deemed illegitimate, exacerbated domestic and centrifugal 
tensions in a federal system already under pressure from the 
competing power ambitions of the Amhara, Tigrayan and 
Oromo elites. The deadlock between the federal government 
and the Tigrayan regional authorities recently led the former 
to initiate military action. The risk of rapid and dangerous 
escalation is extremely high. Meanwhile, minor ethnic groups 
have also raised their demands for autonomy. In June 2020, 
the Ethiopian government officially recognised a new regional 
state following the late 2019 referendum in which the Sidama 
communities had voted overwhelmingly in favour of this option.
In Somalia too, the political repercussions of Covid-19 have 
had a direct impact on the country’s electoral processes. The 
virus added to an extremely fragile and patchy state apparatus, 
making the organisation and running of a proper popular 
election hard to conceive. Not only was the vote postponed to 
2021, but a power conflict between Mogadishu and regional 
bodies ultimately imposed the abandonment of the plan to 
return to universal suffrage (the Somali population has not 
gone to the polls since 1969) and its replacement with an 
indirect and clan-based voting mechanism, as already used in 
recent years.
If the political impact of the coronavirus crisis on the region 
has been important, its social consequences have been even 
more profound. In a region marked by high levels of endemic 
poverty, chronic conflict and recurrent food crises, where some 
20 million people were seriously food insecure even before the 
outbreak of the pandemic, and where an invasion of desert 
locusts has caused devastation since 2019, conditions have been 
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further aggravated by Covid-19. The most vulnerable sections of 
the population include refugees, asylum seekers and internally-
displaced persons (Ethiopia alone hosts 800,000 refugees and 
asylum seekers, mostly from South Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea, 
alongside 1.4 million internally displaced persons; the latter 
number is bound to increase due to the Tigray conflict), who 
are mostly short of sustenance resources and lack economic 
and social protection mechanisms. The very restrictions 
imposed by the need to contain the pandemic have impacted 
the distribution of food and humanitarian aid, as well as the 
sustainability of informal work activities. According to some 
estimates, in 2020 the number of individuals experiencing 
acute food insecurity (i.e. “crisis” level or worse) will be 25-30% 
higher than forecasted prior the outbreak of the pandemic.1
Beyond the direct and indirect effects of the coronavirus 
in the region, the Horn of Africa remains an area of dense, 
lively and intricate developments, both when one delves into 
the political and economic dynamics within each individual 
country, and when one looks at the regional interactions and 
the extensive involvement of external players that contribute to 
shaping current developments. In this Report, we also wish to 
emphasise how minor states in the region are fully part of these 
processes.
Despite its relatively diminutive size and of the irrelevance 
the latter may suggest, Djibouti has come to occupy an 
unprecedented strategic position. Overlooking the Bab el-
Mandeb Strait, the gateway to the Red Sea, and a crucial 
commercial maritime node for the transit of oil ships, the 
country has unexpectedly become a major international military 
hub for foreign powers aiming at a direct foothold in the area, 
whether at sea or on the ground. Long a post-colonial army 
outpost for Paris, the French presence has been joined by the 
United States and other European states, including Italy and 
Germany, as well as by Japan and China. Beijing’s first military 
1 “Famine Early Warning System Network”, East Africa, May 2020.
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base abroad testifies to the attention paid to East Africa and 
the Horn as areas directly linked to Xi Jinping’s Maritime Silk 
Road. The ability of Djibouti to leverage its strategic position 
and growing international competition (such as between 
Emirati and Chinese companies for the control of the Doraleh 
port) has helped it obtain investments, the revenues necessary to 
feed a neo-patrimonial distribution of prebends and handouts, 
and international legitimacy, despite the country’s limited size, 
fluctuating economic performance, and serious deficits in 
democracy and human rights.
In Eritrea, the peace deal with Ethiopia signed in Jeddah 
marked a further step in the direction of progressive normalisation 
of political-diplomatic relations with regional and continental 
partners. This was recently evidenced by Asmara’s participation 
in the Red Sea Alliance, a new platform launched by Saudi Arabia 
and allegedly meant to coordinate efforts in combating piracy 
and illicit trafficking, but de facto aimed at halting meddling in 
the region by Saudi Arabia’s  rivals (i.e. Iran, Turkey and Qatar). 
The persistent, harsh repression of rights and freedoms at the 
hands of Isaias Afwerki’s government, however, continues to 
hinder the full rehabilitation of the regime by the international 
community, while the unending tensions with the TPLF and 
the Tigrayan elites across the border with Ethiopia – including 
Asmara’s involvement in the recent conflict between Addis and 
Mekelle – remain a potentially destabilising factor. Eritrea is no 
longer the “pariah” state it was until a few years ago, completely 
isolated and opposed not only by the West but also by African 
states. Yet, the path towards a full return to the international 
community will need internal reforms and openings that are 
still to materialise.
The improvement of the political and security situation in 
Somalia has allowed the government to regain partial control 
over larger areas of the country. But the state-building process 
is still highly incomplete, and the scarce financial resources 
available represent a decisive limit. Secessionist and autonomist 
claims, in Somaliland and Puntland respectively, remain key 
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unresolved issues for the government of Mogadishu, whereas 
the presence of al-Shabaab jihadists in the south, though 
mainly limited to rural areas and villages, represents a wider 
threat, as demonstrated by the attacks that have hit the capital 
over the past year. Geopolitical competition among external 
actors weighs heavily on the country’s present and future 
prospects for stabilisation, particularly the activities of mutually 
hostile powers such as Turkey – which over the past ten years 
has developed a pervasive presence in Somalia, inaugurating a 
military base and obtaining from the Farmajo government a 
formal invitation to explore offshore waters in search of oil – 
and the United Arab Emirates.
In Ethiopia, Abiy Ahmed’s new leadership initially boosted 
ambitions for regional and continental leadership. The Grand 
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam construction project is a plastic 
representation. Symbolically, it marks a shift from the country’s 
past marginality on the continental scene to today’s undisputed 
centrality, demonstrated by the strong position the Ethiopian 
government took in negotiations with Egypt and Sudan for 
the management of the Nile waters. While tensions with Egypt 
remain extremely high and far from resolved, the dam project 
also consolidates the economic and development prospects of 
a country that led the continent’s growth rankings before the 
outbreak of the pandemic. Addis Ababa is strongly supported 
by the Chinese, attracted by a 110-million people market and a 
nascent industrial and productive reality. 
Ethiopia’s unresolved ethno-regional tensions represent the 
most problematic aspect of a political model whose most evident 
frailties are centre-periphery relations. The Prime Minister’s 
attempt to overcome ethnic divisions led to the dissolution of 
the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front 
(EPRDF) and the reorganisation of the governing coalition 
around a unique national party, the Prosperity Party. But 
this clashed with the persistence of centrifugal forces – most 
notably in Tigray, as mensioned – and with the country’s 
ethno-federal set-up. The ensuing tensions and complexities 
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prompted the government to respond decisively, in some 
cases using force, which in turn has damaged the image of 
mediator that accompanied the rise of the young Oromo leader. 
The government has also been forced to take greater note of 
ongoing developments, as when some local communities voted 
overwhelmingly in favour of establishing a new regional state, 
in 2019. 
The Horn of Africa remains a precarious but geopolitically 
crucial region. The EU and Italy must therefore multiply efforts 
in support of positive political and economic developments in 
the area. In particular, the following recommended initiatives, 
actions and measures should be considered: 
• Fighting the pandemic.  For the duration of the pan-
demic, international cooperation and resources will be a 
key lifeline for already vulnerable populations and frag-
ile health systems. The EU and Italy – the latter with 
historically close ties to the region – thus have a role 
to play in avoiding further deterioration of state struc-
tures, greater human suffering, and possible instability 
across much of the region.
• Adopting an early warning approach. State weakness 
increases the vulnerability of the area: Somalia, Eritrea 
and Ethiopia, alongside nearby Sudan and South Sudan 
– both part of an expanded notion of the Horn – are all 
among the twenty-one states most at risk globally, ac-
cording to the Fragile States Index.2 This overall fragili-
ty requires close monitoring of ongoing and future de-
velopments on the part of Italy and the EU, who must 
stand ready to adopt new diplomatic and economic in-
itiatives in this key region.
• Defending the chances of democracy. No country in 
the Horn qualifies as a democratic regime. Moreover, 
the growing presence of and efforts by China, Russia, 
Turkey and Middle Eastern states in the region carries 
2 Fragile States Index 2020, Fund for Peace. 
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with it the promotion of alternative political models. 
This is a critical time in which the EU and the West at 
large should make an extra effort to support whatever 
democratic voices, options and possibilities there are in 
the region – including in the fluid and unpredictable 
Ethiopian scenario.
• Containing crisis-induced migration. The EU and Italy 
should support current regional developments that favour 
stability and inter-regional relations, as the latter hold sig-
nificant potential for reducing certain causes of migration.
• Preventing backsliding in Eritrea. The EU and Italy, 
working together with other international partners, 
should find appropriate ways of engaging Eritrea in 
a continuous dialogue, exploiting the recent appease-
ment of regional tensions to promote a gradual political 
and economic opening of the regime.
• Keeping Djibouti. Italy and the EU must strength-
en their relations and political-diplomatic influence 
in Djibouti, a country targeted by China as an in-
creasingly crucial geopolitical and commercial node. 
Opportunities for promoting more open and respon-
sive governance should be pursued.
• Promoting inclusive dialogue in Ethiopia. External 
actors should press the government, which recently 
postponed a national election and extended its mandate 
beyond the term envisaged by the constitution, to pur-
sue inclusive and cooperative dialogue with the national 
opposition and a peaceful resolution of the conflict in 
Tigray.
• Moving towards a free and fair vote in Ethiopia. To 
help domestic stabilisation in Ethiopia, the EU and 
Italy should support the creation of conditions condu-
cive to a free and fair election in 2021.
• Promoting dialogue in Somalia. The EU, and particu-
larly Italy, should exert diplomatic and political  pres-
sure and facilitate negotiations aimed at sorting out the 
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Somalia-Somaliland issue. Mogadishu is not currently 
living through such a defining moment as Addis Ababa 
and Asmara. Rather, the long-term process of state-re-
construction must continue, with the international 
community supporting the transitional tasks of consti-
tution-making, good governance, and elections under 
universal suffrage.
• Strengthening security forces in Somalia. In view 
of the 2021 deadline for the withdrawal of AMISOM 
troops from Somalia, the EU should increasingly sup-
port the establishment and strengthening of profession-
al, inclusive and apolitical national security forces.
• Investing in infrastructure and education in Somalia. 
While a continuation of humanitarian support to 
Somalia is recommended, the EU and Italy should also 
invest in high impact development projects in infra-
structure and education, two key sectors for rebuilding 
the nation.
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